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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF:
VIVIAN WIGGINS and
EMERSON D. WIGGINS,
Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2009-1926

POST HEARING MEMORANDUM
RE: IDAHO CODE § 12-117

--------------------------)
COMES NOW the State ofIdaho, Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter the
"Department") and submits the following post hearing memorandum regarding application of
Idaho Code § 12-117:

POST HEARING MEMORANDUM
RE: IDAHO CODE § 12-117 - 1
Z:\MRCases\Eslate\WigginsV\Magistrale\Post Hearing Memorandum re Attorney Fees. wpd

I.
THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S RENDITION OF
THE UNDERLYING FACTS IS INCORRECT.
The personal representative repeatedly states that the Department "assisted" the Wiggins
in dividing their property,l or that the Department "participated" in the removal of Vivian's
interest in the real property.2 The personal representative also claims the Department stipulated
that the property of the estate was not community property. There is, of course, nothing in the
record to support such claims. The Department's stipulation was as follows:
MR. MASINGILL: Your Honor, this is what we've stipulated to. That the
department treated the couple, Emerson and Vivian, as though t!!ID' had a
marriage settlement agreement that divided their assets. The marriage settlement
agreement would have transmuted the property from community property to
separate property to each party. The marriage settlement agreem!;:nt would have
been dated approximately 2002. That we agreed to the admission -- stipulate to
the admission ofthe exhibits that I've presented which are Exhibits A through G I
believe is the last one. At any rate, they're Bates nos. 001 through 097.
We stipulate that the first application for Medicaid took place in 2002 and
it is shown as Bates nos. 033 through 03S. That the second applic::ation was
applied for on 8/27/03 and it is Bates nos. OS8-060.
We'd stipulate that unless the MS -- the marriage settlement agreement
had been -- unless it had been executed, Vivian would not have been eligible to
receive Medicaid benefits and we stipulate to Cory's two exhibits from his latest
reply brief. I believe they're lien documents.
MR. CARTWRIGHT: They were Exhibits A and B to the reply brief.
COURT: Okay. Just a second. And Mr. Cartwright, is that the stipulation
on behalf of the State -- the claimant?
MR. CARTWRIGHT: That is correct, Your Honor. I wOlld offer one
other stipulation at this point and that's that neither party has belm able to locate
the original marriage settlement agreement.

IPlaintiff's First Supplemental Memorandum in Support of the Estate's Motion' or Attorney Fees and Costs, pp.
5, 7, 13, 14.
2Plaintiff's First Supplemental Memorandum in Support of the Estate's Motion 'or Attorney Fees and Costs, p.

7.
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Tr. p. 4, 1. 20 to p. 5,1. 25 (emphasis added).3 That is the extent of the stipulation. The
Department understands that the court inferred from this that the Department stipulated that there
was, indeed, a marriage settlement agreement. The Department's counsel should probably have
been more explicit. What the Department stipulated to was that, for eligibility purposes, the
Department treated the couple as if they had a marriage settlement agrec::ment. A marriage
settlement agreement may have existed, or this may have been the result of an error by the
eligibility staff who may have been told that one existed or simply presumed it as a fact, since, as
the stipulation states, no marriage settlement agreement has ever been d'iscovered either in the
Department's records or those of the decedents. In all candor, as further discussed herein, from
the Department's perspective it didn't matter. If it had mattered, counsd would, perhaps, have
been more cautious in phrasing the stipulation. In any event, there is nothing in this stipulation to
suggest the Department participated in or assisted the couple in dividing their assets.4 Nor did
the Department stipulate that the property was not community property hefore the death of
Vivian. Nor is the personal representative's suggestion as to what his witness might have said
either credible or in evidence in this case.
The claim ofthe Department's assistance or participation in the division ofthe Wiggins's
property is made in connection with a claim of estoppel, presented for the first time here. Of

3A

copy of the transcript is attached.

4Federal Medicaid eligibility law ignores state community property principles aLd specifically authorizes
spouses to transfer property between themselves. Therefore, couples seeking medical assistance can transfer their assets
between themselves to assist in meeting eligibility criteria. This is their choice; because of federal law requirements it is
neither required nor prohibited by the Department.
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course, even if these claims were true, estoppel cannot lie against the stC\te in perfonning its
governmental functions. Floyd v. Board of Com Irs of Bonneville Countv, 37 Idaho 718, 727,52
P.3d 863, 872 (2002) ("Nor may the defense of estoppel be applied against the state in matters
affecting its governmental or sovereign functions."); accord State v. Taylor, 44 Idaho 353,

,

256 P. 953, 955 (1927) (State not estopped from ejecting lessee after accepting lease payments).
While reluctant to address issues that should be irrelevant, the Di~partment recognizes that
the record of this case may be read by others, including an appellate court. Accordingly, the
Department feels obligated to respond to the personal attacks made against the Department's
counsel in the final page of the personal representative's brief. The Department will limit itself
to simply denying any rude or unprofessional comments or behavior in this matter. The
Department has filed, with this brief, the Second Affidavit ofW. Corey Cartwright which
attaches the collected email communications between the parties. An interested reader may
judge for himselfthe tenor of those communications.

H.
IDAHO CODE § 12-117 ONLY PROVIDES FOR
ATTORNEY FEES WHERE AN AGENCY ACTED
WITHOUT A REASONABLE BASIS IN FACT OR LAW.
The personal representative cites a dissenting opinion in the case of Taylor v. Canyon
County Bd. o.fCom'rs, 147 Idaho 424, 210 P.3d 532 (2009), together with the case of Rammel! v.
Idaho State Dept. ofAgriculture, 147 Idaho 415, 210 P.3d 523 (2009), jor the proposition that an
erroneous interpretation of a statute subjects a state agency to attorney f~es under Idaho Code §
12-117. This is incorrect. Even if Justice Horton's opinion was the majority opinion in Taylor,

POST HEARING MEMORANDUM
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what Justice Horton said was that "there is no statutory authority for review of any portion of the
Vickers' petition for review." Taylor, 147 Idaho at 443,210 P.3d at 551 (underline added).
Therefore, in Justice Horton's view, it wasn't an erroneous interpretation of statute that should
have subjected the Vickers to attorney fees, it was the absence of any aUl:hortiy for their action.
Likewise, in the Rammel! case the court upheld a detennination that the Rammells had acted
"without any basis in law or fact." Rammel!, 147 Idaho at 422,210 P.3d at 530 (underline
added). Again, it was not an erroneous interpretation, it was the absencI;: oflegal authority that
triggered Idaho Code § 12-117.5
The most complete discussion of Idaho Code § 12-117 by the Idaho Supreme Court is
found in Ralph Naylor Farms, LLC v. Latah County, 144 Idaho 806, 1n P.3d 1081 (2007),
where the court explained that "if an agency's actions are based upon a 'reasonable, but
erroneous interpretation of an ambiguous statute,' then attorney fees should not be awarded."

Ralph Naylor Farms, LLC, 144 Idaho at 809, 172 P.3d at 1084. The court went on to explain as
follows:
Typically, in analyzing an award of fees under I. C. § 12- .117, this Court
has looked to detennine whether there was no authority at all for the agency's
actions or whether, on the other hand, the law was not clear or u;lsettled as to
whether the agency had the ability to act. In University of Utah Ho.)p. v. Ada
County Bd. Of Com 'rs., 143 Idaho 808, 153 P.3d 1154 (2007), this Court awarded
attorney fees against the County when there were clear statutory procedures which
the County had failed to follow in denying an application for medical indigency.
There were no facts indicating a good faith attempt to interpret the applicable
statutes or reasonable confusion about the County's duties. In Fischer v. City of
Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349, 109 P.3d 1091 (2005), the Court awar(ied attorney fees
against the City of Ketchum because it had granted a conditional U~3e pennit

5The

court went on to find that Idaho Code § 12-117 wasn't applicable to the un derlying administrative

decision.
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without requiring certification from a licensed engineer. The Kel chum Zoning
Code specifically required such certification before a conditiona: use permit could
issue and this Court found that the City had "ignored the plain la nguage of the
ordinance that a certification ... is required before granting a CUJ." 141 Idaho at
356, 109 P.3d at 1098.
On the other hand, in Magic Valley Sand and Gravel, supra, the Court did
not award attorney fees against the City of Burley, even though we found the City
acted in violation of the constitutional limits on its power and in violation of the
LLUP A by adopting a zoning ordinance affecting an impact area lying outside the
City's limits. The Court noted there was case precedent dating "as far back as
1949 that a city's exercise of jurisdiction in an impact area lying beyond a city's
limits is inconsistent with the constitutional limitations placed 011 a city's powers
by Artic1e XII, § 2 of the Idaho Constitution." 140 Idaho at 120, 90 P.3d at 345.
Nevertheless, because the City was making a reasonable attempt to interpret the
LLUP A, no fees were awarded.
In Karel v. Department a/Finance, 144 Idaho 379, 162 L3d 758 (2007),
this Court declined to award fees even though we determined thf: Department had
no authority to request documents from a securities agent when 1here was no
statutory obligation to maintain the requested documents. There were statutory
recordkeeping provisions, but the Department admitted it was fi(,t requesting any
of those documents from the securities agent. However, because this was a matter
of first impression in determining how the recordkeeping requin:ments should be
applied, we denied an award of fees under I.C. § 12-117.
The question presented by this appeal is whether the Count'! acted without
authority in the face of clear provisions and thus, without a reas(,nable basis in
fact or law when it enacted the Ordinance; or alternatively, whether the County's
actions were based upon a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous or unclear
law.

Ralph Naylor Farms, LLC, 144 Idaho at 809-10, 172 P.3d at 1084-5. Tle court further
explained:
Although Naylor Farms was the prevailing party below, lhe district court
declined to award fees because the conflict between the Ordinance and state law
"was by no means obvious." In explanation, the court noted that Latah County
was empowered through the LLUP A to consider the effects of l::nd use
regulations on water. Although the court concluded that the Ordinance went
beyond considering the effects on water and, in effect, was an attempt to manage
water in Idaho, the court also concluded that the County's interpretation of its
duties under LLUP A was not unreasonable.

POST HEARING MEMORANDUM
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In considering whether Naylor Farms is entitled to an award of attorney
fees, we must determine whether the County was faced with an ambiguous or
unclear statute that would excuse a reasonable but erroneous int([llretation, in the
absence of applicable case law.

Ralph Naylor Farms, LLC, 144 Idaho at 810, 172 P.3d at 1085 (underline added). Finally, the
court concluded that the County had not acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law:
Even though the district court ruled against the County and set a,ide the
Ordinance, it did so on the basis that the County's actions were preempted by
State law and not because the County acted wrongfully or withont any authority.
Because there was a legitimate question about the validity cfthe County's
actions in adopting the Ordinance, the County did not act withOl.t a reasonable
basis in fact or law and, therefore, we affirm the district court's decision denying
an award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-117.

Ralph Naylor Farms, LLC, 144 Idaho at 811, 172 P.3d at 1086.
Similarly, in the case of Matter ofRusset Valley Produce, Inc., 127 Idaho 654, 904 P 2d
566 (1995), the court dealt with what it described as a "reasonable but erroneous" interpretation
of statute:
We disagree with the district court's conclusion that the !=:ommission acted
without a reasonable basis in fact or law. First, the Commission's license
revocation action against Russet Valley was warranted, as the hE aring officer
found violations of both the license agreement and the Commission's regulations.
The Commission's February 18th order, among other things, confirmed those
violations. The district court also confirmed those violations whm Russet Valley
appealed the February 18th order. Moreover, the issue ofwhethtr Russet Valley's
violations were "continuing violations" was not free from doubt The
Commission's interpretation regarding continuing violations wa; a "reasonable,
but erroneous interpretation of an ambiguous statute." See, e.g. Cox v. Department
orlns., 121 Idaho 143, 148,823 P.2d 177, 182 (Ct.App.1991) (rt~versingdistrict
court's award of attorney fees against agency). Under the circumstances, we
cannot say that the Commission has altogether acted without a rnasonable basis in
fact or law, and hence, no attorney fees should have been awarded under I.C. §
12-117. Krueger v. Board ofPro. Discipline, 122 Idaho 577, 58:1, 836 P2d 523,
529 (1992) (where board did not act without a reasonable basis in fact or law, no
attorney fees will be granted under I.C. § 12-117). Accordingly, the portion of the
POST HEARING MEMORANDUM
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district court's memorandum decision awarding to Russet Valley its costs and
attorney fees under I.C. § 12-117 is reversed, and the district court's September
10, 1993 ruling on costs and attorney fees, which awarded Russet Valley
$4,943.80, is vacated.
Matter of Russet Valley Produce, Inc., 127 Idaho at 661,904 P.2d at 57:1 (underline added).
Similarly, the Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly held that where the issue is a matter of
first impression, or other states have conflicting case-law, attorney fees :;hould not be awarded
under Idaho Code § 12-117. The case of Smith v. Idaho Dept. ofLabor, 148 Idaho 72, 218 P .3d
1133 (2009), involved the question of whether a postal meter imprint was the equivalent of a
post-mark for purposes of meeting administrative filing deadlines:
Reasonable attorney's fees and costs are available to the prevailing party
under Idaho Code § 12-117 "if the court finds that the party against whom the
judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact oraw." The issue of
whether a postage-meter mark can substitute as a postmark when determining the
filing date of an appeal is an issue of first impression in Idaho ar.d one on which
other state courts disagree. (citations omitted)
Accordingly, Smith acted with a reasonable basis in law :md the
Department is not entitled to attorney fees. Costs on appeal to R,~spondent.
Smith, 148 Idaho at

218 P.3d at 1137 (underline added); see also S,lint Alphonsus Regional

Medical Center v. Ada County, 146 Idaho 862,863,204 P.3d 502, 503 (2009) ("Because the
issue of standing presented a question of first impression under the amelded statutes, we
conclude that Ada County did not act without a reasonable basis in law, and we deny St.
Alphonsus' request for attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-117."). In T(ootenai Medical Center
ex reI. Teresa K. v. Idaho Dept. of ofHealth and Welfare, 147 Idaho 872, 886, 216 P.3d 630,
644 (2009), the court stated:
These issues have not been previously addressed by an Idaho apoellate court, and
therefore involve matters of first impression. In Wheeler v. IdahJ Dept. ofHealth
POST HEARING MEMORANDUM
RE: IDAHO CODE § 12-117 - 8
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and Welfare, 147 Idaho 257, 266-67, 207 P.3d 988,997-98 (2009), this Court
declined to award attorney fees under I.C. § 12-117 when a case involves issues of
first impression. (citing In re Ferdig, 146 Idaho 862, 863, 204 P.3d 502, 503
(2009)). Therefore, we decline to award the Department attorney fees on appeal.
Kootenai Medical Center ex reI. Teresa K, 147 Idaho at 886, 216 P.3d at 644 (underline added).
Finally, in State, Dept. a/Finance v. Resource Service Co., Inc., 134 Idaho 282, 1 P.3d 783
(2000), the court dealt with the claim that the state agency failed to consider existing case law:
The crux ofRSC's argument here is that the Department failed to consider
case law standing for the proposition that lease lotteries, such as those involved in
this case, are not considered securities and therefore, the Department acted
without a reasonable basis in fact or law in filing and maintaining suit against
RSC for violation of the Idaho Securities Act. In particular, RSC argues that the
Department "steadfastly refused to find merit in the [SEC v. Encirgy Group of
America, 459 F.Supp. 1234 (S.D.N.Y.1978) ] decision" which it asserts was
relied upon by this Court in RSC I. It should be noted that while this Court cited
favorably to the Energy Group decision in its ultimate determination on the issue,
other courts and securities administrators addressing the issue h8ve found,
contrary to Energy Group, that application filing services such as the one operated
by RSC may qualify as investment contracts and may therefore be securities.
(citations omitted).
Therefore, although this Court ultimately determined thaI: the particular
lottery lease filing service operated by RSC did not constitute an "investment
contract" in violation of the Idaho Securities Act, we hold, basee}. upon the lack of
case law of this state in addition to supporting decisions from other jurisdictions,
that the Department was not without a reasonable basis in fact OJ law in bringing
and maintaining suit against RSC for violation of the Idaho Securities Act.
State, Dept. of Finance, 134 Idaho at 285, 1 P.3d at 786 (underline added).
Clearly, it is not enough that the personal representative prevailEd. Rather the personal
representative must show that there was not a reasonable basis for the Department's claim in this
matter.
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III.
THE DEPARTMENT'S CLAIM IS SUPPORTED BY LAW.
Idaho Code § 56-218(1) permits the Department to recover from the estate of the spouse
of a Medicaid recipient:
Except where exempted or waived in accordance with federal law medical
assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual who was
fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the individual received such assistance
may be recovered from the individual's estate, and the estate of(he spouse, if any,
for such aid paid to either or both;
Idaho Code § 56-218(1) (underline added). This law, on its face, is not limited to the community
property of the Medicaid spouse owned at death. The court found that such a limitation exists,
and by such ruling the statute is necessarily ambiguous. The Department's position that "the
estate of the spouse" includes property that had been transferred to that :;:pouse by the Medicaid
recipient is not unreasonable, even if erroneous.
Likewise the Department's rules support the Department's interpretation. IDAPA
16.03.09.900.20 states:

20. Limitations on Estate Claims.

***

A claim against the estate of a spouse of a participant is limited 10 the value of the
assets ofthe estate that had been, at any time after October 1, 1993, community
property, or the deceased participant's share of the separate property, and jointly
owned property. * * *
IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20 (underline added). Also, IDAPA 16.03.09.900.24 states:

24. Marriage Settlement Agreement or Other Such AgreemE nt.
A marriage settlement agreement or other such agreement which separates assets
for a married couple does not eliminate the debt against the esta:e of the deceased
participant or the spouse. Transfers under a marriage settlement agreement or
other such agreement may be voided if not for adequate consideration. (3-30-07)
POST HEARING MEMORANDUM
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IDAPA 16.03.09.900.24 (underline added). The Department's rules have the same force and
effect as law. Mallonee v. State, 139 Idaho 615,619,84 P.3d 551,555 (2004). Clearly, even if
erroneous, the Department's pursuit of its claim against the estate of Everest was not
unreasonable.

IV.
THIS IS A MATTER OF FIRST IMPRESSION IN InAHO
AND THERE IS CONFLICTING CASE LAW FRO!it{
OTHER STATES.
The Department believed the case of Idaho Department ofHeahh and Welfare v.
Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6 (1998) conclusively decided this issue in favor of the

Department. Obviously, the court found Jackman to not apply to the facts of this case.
Moreover, the statute has been modified several times since Jackman, most recently in 2008 to
provide for the Department's claim in this matter. Accordingly, this is nn issue of first
impression in Idaho and no Idaho appellate court has spoken to this issue. Contrary to the
suggestion of the personal representative, In re Estate of Elliott, 141 Idaho 177, 108 P.3d 324
(2005), has no bearing on this issue. In Elliott the court considered the lights of the Department
where the Medicaid recipient's spouse died first and probate was openel Idaho Code § 56218(1) permitted the Department's claim to "be established against the '~state." The Department
believed that federal law prohibited it from filing a claim in the estate 0 f a pre-deceased spouse
of a Medicaid recipient, where the Medicaid recipient was still living, and instead sought to
intervene in the probate estate as an "interested person" as defined by the probate code. The
Supreme Court held that Idaho Code § 56-218(1) unambiguously required the Department to file
POST HEARING MEMORANDUM
RE: IDAHO CODE § 12-117 - 11
Z:\MRCases\Estate\WigginsV\MagistrateIPost Ilearing Memorandum re Attorney Fees.wpd

a claim in the estate of the predeceased spouse. 6 The Court concluded that the Department had
acted without a reasonable basis in law in seeking to intervene in a probate proceeding without
filing a claim. None of this has anything to do with the issue in this case.
In concluding that Jackman does not apply to this case, the court has necessarily held that
the question presented here (whether the Department can make a claim to formerly community
property transferred to a spouse) is a matter of first impression and has not been decided by any
appellate court in Idaho. Indeed, the issue has only been considered by one other magistrate
division court, and that decision was issued following oral argument in ithis case and was decided
on different grounds. It would be accurate to say that this court is the first to rule on this issue in
this way in Idaho.
Additionally, the courts of other states have made conflicting dedsions on this same
Issue. In In re Estate 0/ Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52 (2008), the Minnesota Sllpreme Court held that a
claim of the type here could not be made, and based its decision on federal law pre-emption. The
court in this matter did not adopt Barg. On the other hand, the North Dakota Supreme Court
held just the opposite in the case of In re Estate a/Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 2000). To say
this area of the law is unsettled would be an understatement.

v.
CONCLUSION
Being the prevailing party, alone, is not sufficient to support an award of attorney fees.

6This would necessarily be a contingent claim as provided for in Idaho Code § 15-3-810. Following this
decision the legislature amended Idaho Code § 56-218 to provide the current method of filing contingent claims where
probate is opened while one of the spouses survives.

POST HEARING MEMORANDUM
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Under Idaho Code § 12-117, the personal representative must show the Department "acted
without a reasonable basis in fact or law." The Department's claim was well supported by both
fact and law. Moreover, attorney fees are not awarded under Idaho Code § 12-117 where, as
here, the law is unsettled or not clear, or where the matter is one of first Impression in this state
and the case law from other states is conflicting. The Department did not pursue this matter
without a reasonable basis in fact and law.
DATED this 14th day of May, 2010,

!J/0~:21=

W. COREY CARTWRIGHT
Deputy Attorney General
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7
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15

16
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1

(Proceedings begin.)

2

COURT: The Court's on reco

1
n the matter of the

MR.

[LL: That's true. Your Honor, we'd be

2

brief if the Court vvould like to

3

estates of Vivian and Emerson Wiggins. Attorney for the

3

4

estate, Mr. Masingill, is present with the personal

4

5

representative, Lynn Wiggins. Mr. Cartright's here on

5

be, you know, a matter of law. It involves fE~deral laws

6

behalf of the State.

6

and state laws and there are a couple cases involved.

7

The issue before the Court is that apparently

8

Vivian Wiggins received some Hedicaid benefits and as a

9

result, when the estate was filed, the State filed a lien

direct us how you wilnt to go.
COURT: Thi,; appears, based on the stipulation, to

7

For the record, I received this morning the first

8

reply brief of the Sti'te's and I've had an opportunity to

9

read the reply brief. I tlad not had an opportunity to

10

to recover those and the issue was whether or not that lien

10

review the Exhibit C which was a copy of the decision in

111

should stand and whether or not they have a right to claim

12

assets which the estate believes to be separate property of

11
12

least the --

13

Emerson Wiggins.

13

MR. MASINGrLL: The first of the Jackman cases.

14
15

MR. CARTWPIGHT: The original and superseded

114

And it's my understanding after having met with

'15

both counsel in chambers that there would be at least some

16

stipulation of facts we can put on the record.

117
18
19
1 20

21
22
1 23

, 24
1

25

MR. HASINGILL: Do you want me to give it a shot,
Cory?
COURT: Mr. Hasingill.
MR. MASINGILL: Your Honor, this is what we've
sti pulated to. That the department treated the couple,

question I have is whether or not there is any -- the

20

parties want to present some oral argument today?

21

Emerson and Vivian, as though they had a marriage

22
23

marriage settlement agreement would have transmuted the

24

property from community property to separate property to

25

HR. CARTWRIGHT: I would like to present some brief
argument, Your Honor.
MR. MASINGILL: I would too.
COURT: In looking at this -- I got so caught up in
the law. Let's see. We have a claim -- we have a claim

6
1

made on the estate. We have a denial of the claim. I'm

2

been dated approximately 2002. That we agreed to the

2

trying to figure out who's got the burden to go first.

3

admission -- stipulate to the admiSSion of the exhibits

3

4

that I've presented which are Exhibits A through G I

4

petition for allowance, Your Honor, that's before the

5

believe is the last one. At any rate, they're Bates nos.

5

Court.

6

00 1 through 097.
We stipulate that the first application for

MR. CARTW'UGHT: I believe it's actually my

6

COURT: Go ahead.

7

MR. CARTWUGHT: Your Honor, I think that just

8

Medicaid took place in 2002 and it is shown as Bates nos.

8

about everything is in the brief so I'm just going to

9

033 through 035. That the second application was applied

9

summarize here a little bit.

11

113

114
15
16
17

18
1

matter. I need sonre time to look at this. So I guess the

19

each party. The marriage settlement agreement would have

12

1

18

1

10

1

COURT: Ant: so frankly, I'm not prepared to rule as
a matter of law todclY because it's a fairly complicated

4

7

1

Jackman deciSion.

16
17

settlement agreement that divided their assets. The

!

the -- I'm referring to as the Jackman case I believe or at

19
20

21

for on 8/27/03 and it is Bates nos. 058-060.
We'd stipulate that unless the MS -- the marriage
settlement agreement had been -- unless it had been

10

The claim of the department was originally

11

disallowed for the r:ason given in the disallowance that

12

the property that

tr e department was claiming against was

executed, Vivian would not have been eligible to receive

13

the separate propel ty of Emerson Wiggins. And so our

Medicaid benefits and we stipulate to Cory's two exhibits

14

original brief that we filed back about December 1

from his latest reply brief. I believe they're lien

15

essentially went to chat issue to show that Idaho law

documents.

16

clearly allows us to recover property, whether it was

17

separate or not, as long as it had been the Joint or

18

separate -- or community property rather of the couple at

19

some time in the PilSt and sometime after, of course 1993,

is that the stipulation on behalf of the State -- the

20

which In this case seems to be the case.

claimant?

21

MR. CARTWRIGHT: They were Exhibits A and B to the
reply brief.
COURT: Okay. Just a second. And Mr. Cartwright,

Mr. Masingill's brief then that he filed on Friday

122

MR. CARTWRIGHT: That is correct, Your Honor.

22

of this last week channed the issue a little bit ar)d went

23

would offer one other stipulation at this point and that's

23

to the argument es 5er.tially of a federal preemption saying

24

that neither party has been able to locate the original

24

that the Minnesota Su:xeme Court case of :3arg -- Henry Barg

marriage settlement agreement.

25

essentially set fortr la N that showed that the federal law

1 25

5

7
4

'1

the Jackman case about whether

2

agreement was valid or not. It was

3

marriage settlement agreement signed by Barbara Jackman on

3

brief says, "We conclude, however, that federal law applies

4

behalf of her mother was -- using her power of attorney was

4

applicable in this ca!:e prohibited this recovery except

changed and Jackman 1
ink ies the fifth page of

valid and effective and therefore this distinction that Mr.

5

from any communit" property the spouses may have

Masingill's making doesn't really exist. That in this

6

accumulated after a marriage settlement agreement

7

case! it's really the same case as it was in Jackman. The

7

transmitting their cc mr;lunity property into separate
property of each."

8

Idaho Supreme Court has already decided this question and

8

9

that should conclude the matter. That's all.

9

COURT: Mr. Masingill.
MR. MASINGILL: Thank you, Your Honor.

112

I just wanted to address that last item that Corey

13

just provided to the Court and to just start, the Jackman

114

case itself doesn't say what Corey says it does. There's

10
11
12

I don't think it can be much clearer than that.

Jackman says just v hat Barg says and that is you can't go
after -- after you trc:nsrnuted the assets to separate
property, you cannc t go after the separate property of

15

nothing in the Jackman case that says that we reheard this.

i6

The reason we're making a different decision was because of

13
14
15
16

the 1993 change in the statute and that this case, Hildor's

17

18

and Lionel's, took place prior to the 1993 statute making

18

spouse when it's be,n transmuted and it doesn't say in here

19

it effective.

19

In the Jackman 2 case. This is only applicable to cases

117
1

that Jackman
have it on the

5

!11

I

1

2

6

10

')'2

1;3
24

25

the -- of the non-Medicaid receiving spouse. And Corey's
reference to it I thir k misstates what Jackman 1 and
Jackman 2 say.
Clearly Jack' nan 1 -- or Jackman 2 comes out and
says you can't go of after separate property of the other

20

that existed prior to 1993. The Supreme Court's deCision
doesn't reference trat at all.

specified exactly what Jackman says. This is the first

21
22

Jackman case and it says, "The federal definition is

23

because he was invllved In the case, he probably knows a

significant. Federal law includes within the recipient's

24

little bit more about it but I don't think from reading the

estate all real and personal property and other assets

25

Jackman case you on conclude that that was what they based

Corey says that but there's nothing in the decision

20

21
,

settlement

that says that and in fact on my -- in my brief, I

1

Corey's theml), one that makes that claim and

14

12
i

included within the individual's estate and any other real

1

2

or personal property and other assets in which the

2

3

individual had any legal title or interest at the time of

3

latest pronouncemEnt for the State of Idaho is you can't go

death."

4

after the separate

5

That's exactly what Ba'-g said. Barg, that case out of

4

5

That's the provision of the federal statute that

this on.
In fact, they don't mention that at all and so the

~

roperty of the non-Medicaid spouse.

6

gives life to Medicaid in any state that wants to sign up

6

Minnesota, interpre:ed what the federal statute granted to

7

for it. That definition is absolutely significant because

7

the states and said you can't do it. Jackman says you

8

it only includes in the definition of the things that the

8

can't do it. Yet the deQartment has continued to go after

State can go over are those things in which the reCipients

9

the separate propel ty of the non-Medicaid soouse and we

110

of the Medicaid had and, second, on the third page of my

I 11

brief, I showed what Jackman said about Hildor's assets and

10
11

I

12

13
1
, 14
15

'16
17

I
I
I
1

it says, "The agreement does not affect the status of
assets the federal law considers to be part of the

12
13

includes income or resources which the individual or such

14
15

individual's spouse is entitled to but does not receive

16

recipient'S estate because the definition of assets

because of action by a person with legal authority to act

believe that after Yllu've read all of the lega! statutes
and all of the brieflllg and so forth that you'll conclude
that the present St2 te of law in Idaho is Emerson's
separate property 11 this estate is not recoverable under
the Medicaid statut:. Thank you.
COURT: Your response.
MR. CARTWRIGHT: Yes, Your Honor. Your Honor, I'd

17

like to refer to a quote that's on page 11 of the reply
brief.

18
19

in place of or on behalf of the Individual or such

18

individual's spouse." And they quote -- or they refer to

20

40 USC 139(e)(1)(B).

19
20

COURT: Give me just a second. Go ahead.
MR. CARTVV RIGHT: Okay. This quote takes up the

21

center of the page there and it's out of the-- not the

and remember Jackman is Barbara Jackman -- "signing of the

22

original Jackman dl~cision but the substitute opinion

23

agreement constituted action by a person on behalf of

23

released by the court Nhere the court explains exactiy

24

Hildor and Lionel."

24

why -- why they

21
, 22

1 25

And the Supreme Court said, "Jackman's signing --"

The significance of that is that that's the r-eason

or anqed their decision here.

It says here,

conclude that the definition of assets is not

15
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IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE THRID JUDICIAL D [STRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VIASHINGTON
MAGISTRATE DIVISION

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: )
)
)
VIVIAN WIGGINS and
)
EMERSON D. WIGGINS
)
Deceased.
)

CV 2009-1926
ORDER ON A1 TORNEY
FEES

Hearing on the state's request for an award of attorney fees lrade pursuant to
Idaho Code 12-117 was held on April 21, 2010. The court granted the estate 14 days to
file a brief and the Department of Health and Welfare 14 days to file a responsive brief.
The estate filed a motion to strike the Department's Post Hearing Memorandum
and affidavit of Cory Cartwright. The Department's Post Hearing 1\1 emorandum was
filed on May 19,2010. The estate's memorandum was filed on May 5,2010 and was
served on the Department May 6, 2010. The court at hearing on the motion for attorney's
fees set a briefing schedule different than IRCP 54.
The Department's filing complied with the courts direction. The estate also asks
that the Department's brief and affidavit be struck by the court because the Department
attempts to litigate issues already decided by this court (the denial ofthe Department's
claim). Since an inquiry into the legal and factual basis for the Depnrtrnent's claim must
be evaluated by the court before an award of attorney's fees could be granted pursuant to

ORDER ON ATTORNEY FEES

Idaho Code 12-117 the original positions of the parties and their arguments must be
considered. Even though much of the briefing and argument goes to issues not before the
court in this matter, but to the behavior and posturing of the parties the court is able to
determine what is relevant from what is not. The motions to strike are therefore denied.
Idaho Code 12-117 provides that a prevailing party shall be awarded reasonable
attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable expenses in a judicial proceeding involving
as adverse parties a state agency ..... and a person, if the court finds tbat the party against
whom the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in ftct or law.
The Department of Health & Welfare is a state agency who made a claim against
the joint estate of Vivian M. Wiggins and Emerson D. Wiggins for r.,ledicare funds
expended by the state for the care of Vivian M. Wiggins. In a memo randum decision and
order the Department's claim for reimbursement was denied.
To determine if attorney's fees should be awarded to the estace the court must
consider the legal and factual basis of the Department's claim and e\ aluate whether the
legal and factual basis is reasonable or groundless or arbitrary. Rincover v. State Dep 't of

Finance, 129 Idaho 442, 926 P.2nd 626 (1996).
The Supreme Court described the purpose ofLC. section 12-117 in Bogner v.

State Dep'tofRev. and Taxation, 107 Idaho 854, 693 P.2

nd

1056 (1984) as follows:

We believe the purpose of that statute is two fold: (1) to serv,~ as a deterrent to
groundless or arbitrary agency action; and (2) to provide a remedy for persons who have
borne unfair and unjustified financial burdens defending against gromdless charges or
attempting to correct mistakes agencies should never have made.

ORDER ON ATTORNEY FEES

The court later reversed an award of attorney fees under I.C. J 2-117 where the
Insurance Department improperly filed a complaint against an insurance agent, stating:
If an error in a case involved a reasonable, but erroneous, interpretation of an
ambiguous statue, then attorney fees generally would not be Ilwarded. [Id.]
However, if the error involved either an unreasonable interpretation of an
unambiguous statute or an erroneous interpretation of an ambiguous statute, then
the court stated that a fee award may well be warranted. [Id.]
Utilizing [that] analysis in the application of I.C. 12-117 to the facts ofthis case,
we hold that the district court's award of costs and attorney D;;es was in error. We
think the department's actions fall into the first category outlJned above, namely a
reasonable, yet erroneous interpretation of an ambiguous, or at least confusinglyworded state. Cox v. Dep't ofIns., 121 Idaho 143, 148,823 P.2 11d 177, 182 (Ct.
App. 1991).
Since the factual and legal basis was originally evaluated by the court, the court
will adopt its original Memorandum and Decision denying the Depaiment's claim and
will incorporate it hereby as if set out in full.
It is clear that funds were expended by the state for the care (lfVivian Wiggins
and that the Department has a legal right to recover Medicaid funds
care. Federal law allows for the claim as does state law. Federal

~xpended

M(~dicaid

for her

eligibility law

applies to all of the states. Some are community property states, but the majority are not.
Federal law does not prohibit spouses in community property states from transferring
assets to their spouses for eligibility purposes. But the practice as applied in this case by
the Department is in contradiction to the community property laws of this State.

ORDER ON ATTORNEY FEES

The court finds that this case is one of first impression under current state and
federal Medicaid laws in Idaho. The Department has a legal duty to collect Medicaid
funds expended on behalf of its citizens. The Wiggins received Medicaid funds to pay
for Vivian's care until her death and therefore the Department had a [actual basis to make
its claim against the joint estate.
The legal basis for the Department's claim was based on an interpretation of an
ambiguous and conflicting set of federal and state laws. This court determined in its
memorandum decision that the interpretation of the law expanding collection from a
spouses separate property to be in contravention ofIdaho's community property law and
"was not reasonable". Perhaps the appropriate term should have been "too expansive"
since that interpretation would render Marital Settlement Agreement;) recognized by
Idaho to be meaningless. The law on this matter is not settled and each party had a basis
to make its arguments. The actions and arguments by the Department are neither
arbitrary nor groundless. The court simply chose the less expansive j nterpretation of the
law.
The claim for attorney's fees and costs pursuant to I.e. 12-1) 7 is therefore denied.

BE IT SO ORDERED this:23. day of

ORDER ON ATTORNEY FEES

e 2010.

BRAD MASINGILL
Attorney at Law
27 W. Commercial Street
P.O. Box 467
Weiser, Idaho 83672
Telephone (208) 414-0665
Fax (208) 414-0490
email bmasingiH{a}hotmail.com

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TmRD JUDICIAL OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATES OF:
VIVIAN M. WIGGINS and
EMERSON D. WIGGINS,
Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.: CV-2rtI09-1926

NOTICE OF CROSS APPEAL

COMES NOW, The above entitle estate, by and through its aHorney of record, R. Brad
Masingill, of Weiser, Idaho, hereby cross-appeals the Department I)f Health and Welfare's
Appeal tiled on March 18,2010.

1. The title of the Court from which the appeal is taken is the Magistrate Division of the
District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State ofIdaho in and for the County
of Washington, Magistrate Gregory F. Frates, presiding.
2. The title of the Court to which the cross-appeal is taken

i~:

the District Court of the

Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Washington,
District Judge Renae J. Hoff, presiding.

Notice of Cross Appeal - 1

3. The Estate cross-appeals from two decisions of the Magistrate: (a) that Order on
Attorney Fees filed Jllle 23, 2010 (and therein only that portion of the decision which
failed to award attorney's fees to the Estate) and (b) that Order Re: Attorney's Fees
and Costs filed on April 30, 2010.
4. This cross appeal is taken upon matters of fact and law.
5. This matter was heard by oral argument on February 3, 2010, but proceedings were

also held on April 21, 2010, and the transcript for each is fi'~quested. It is cOlllsel's
belief that the same were recorded and the recordings are in the possession of the
clerk.
6. The issues on cross-appeal are:
a. Did the Magistrate err in failing to grant the Estate its a:itomey's fees pursuant to

Idaho Code 12-121 and 12-120?

h. Did the Magistrate err in failing to grant the Estate its atomey's fees pursuant to
Idaho Code 12-117?
7. The basis for the right to cross-appeal derives from the appeal taken by the Appellant
and from the two orders ofthe Magistrate denying attorney'ii fees to the Estate.
S. Appellant will pay the costs of the transcript when made available and will pay the
estimated costs thereof when an estimate is made availahle. The Cross-Appellant
requests the entire transcript of the proceedings to the extent they are not akeady
included in the Appellant's request. It is unnecessary tc duplicate the transcript,
however, the Cross-Appellant wants the transcript of the hearing on April 21, 2010 to
be included as well as all briefing done on both sides throl\ghout the entire case, not
just the briefing relative to the attorney's fees issues as presented at the April 21,

Notice of Cross Appeal- 2

2010 hearing, but to include the subsequent briefing on the issue of the applicability
ofIdaho Code 12-117, which was referenced in the June 23, 2010 Order on Attomey
Fees and in the Order Re: Attorney's Fees and Costs filed April 30, 2010.
9. Additional Transcript:

The Cross-Appellant further reqllests that the stipulation

put on the record on February 26, 2010 and the entire transcript of that hearing be
made part of the record.
10. Designation of documents to be included in clerk's record: In addition to those
documents automatically included in the record pursuant to IAR 28, and in addition to
those designated by the Appellant in the original Notice of Appeal shall be as follows:
The Cross-Appellant requests that all filings in the

Magistra~e

case be included in the

record, including all motions, all memorandums, all briefs all affidavits, including
but not limited to the following:
a. Notice of Disallowance of Claim dated November 24, 2009; and
b. Memorandum in Support of Denial of Lien Agains: Emerson D. Wiggins'
Property dated January 29, 2010; and
c. Responsive Memorandum in Support of Denial of ben Against Emerson D.
Wiggins' Property dated February 2,2010; and
d. Supplementary Post-Hearing Memorandum Re: Legi~;lative History of Idaho
Code 56-218 dated February 8,2010; and
e. Affidavit of Peter Sisson filed May 05, 2010; and
f.

Affidavit of Counsel In Support of Motion for AttJrney's Fees and Costs,
Including the Factors in IRCP 54 dated April 6, 2010; and

g. Plaintiff's First Supplemental Memorandum in Support of the Estate's Motion for
Attorney's Fees and Costs dated May 5, 2010; and

Notice of Cross Appeal - 3

h. Memorandum in Opposition to Department's Motion for Stay re Attorney's Fees
dated April 20, 2010; and
i.

Memorandum in Opposition to the Department's Motion to Stay dated April 9,
2010; and

j. Memorandum in Support of the Estate's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs
dated April 6, 2010; and

k. Reply to Department's March 18 Memorandum dated Mmch 31, 2010; and
l.

First Supplemental Post-Hearing Memorandum Re: Estate of George D. Perry,
Ada County Case No. CVIE0905214 dated March 15,2010; and

ID.

Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs dated April 6, 2010.

11. Cross Appellant further requests that the transcript of the hearing of February 3,2010

be part of the record.
12. Appellant further agrees to pay any cost of preparation of the clerk's record or the

transcript as required by law when such is submitted.
13. Appellant requests attorney fees and costs on appeal.

;;TV

DATED this~day of July, 2010.

i1/~~~R. Brad Masil'2gill
Attorney for the Appellant
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a Memorandum Decision disallowing a creditor's claim in a
probate proceeding. It involves Medicaid, also known as "medical assistance," and estate
recovery, as provided by Idaho Code § 56-218. Estate recovery is a program required by federal
and state law that seeks to recover assets of deceased Medicaid recipients, from their estates, to
reimburse the taxpayers for expenditures made during the Medicaid recipient's life. This matter
involves the Department's claim filed in the joint estate of a deceased 1tledicaid recipient and her
spouse.
Course of Proceedings
The personal representative was appointed in this estate on May 22, 2009. The
Department filed a claim, in the amount of $264,674.45, on November 23,2009. On November
24,2009, the Department received a Notice of Disallowance of Claim £am the personal
representative. On November 30, 2009, the Department filed its Petition for Allowance of
Claim. Hearing was held on the Department's Petition on February 3, 201 O. On March 30,
2010, Judge Frates issued his Memorandum Decision Denying Petitioner's Claim Against the
Estate. This appeal followed.
Statement ofthe Facts
Emerson Wiggins ("Emerson") was born
the age of98. Vivian Wiggins ("Vivian") was born

and died February 9, 2009, at
, and died January 30,

2009 at the age of 98. At all times material to this proceeding, until the death of Vivian,
Emerson and Vivian were husband and wife. About June 7,2002, Vivian was admitted to a
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nursing home. Emerson and Vivian applied for medical assistance, also known as Medicaid, on
November 18, 2002, to help pay for Vivian's medical care. Vivian became eligible for Medicaid
on September 1, 2003, and between that time and Vivian's death the Department provided
payment for Vivian's medical care, through the Medicaid program, in the sum of at least
$272,134.68. 1 The property of this estate consists of a bank account with an inventory value of
$78,659.44.

IThe Department received a voluntary payment in April, 2008, in the amount of $7,460.23, resulting in thee
Department's claim amount of $264,876.45.
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ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Did the Magistrate err in detennining that a Marriage Settlement Agreement

(MSA) existed and that such MSA transmuted Vivian Wiggins and Emerson Wiggin's
community property to separate property (of Emerson Wiggins), and thiit such MSA was
executed in 2002, and that such MSA met all of the fonnalities required by Idaho law, and that
the Department was not in error in granting Medicaid benefits to Vivian Wiggins?
2.

Did the Magistrate err in its application and interpretation ofIdaho Code § 56-

218, in refusing to allow the Department's claim against the estate of Emerson Wiggins?
3.

Did the Magistrate err in its application and interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p as

pre-empting application of Idaho Code § 56-218?
4.

Did the Magistrate err in failing to apply the Idaho SuprEme Court holding in

Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213 (1998) to the facts of this
case?
5.

Is the Department entitled to attorney fees on appeal?
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ARGUMENT

I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This matter involves the interpretation of state and federal law and state administrative
rules. The interpretation of a statute is a question oflaw over which the court exercises free
review. Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 224P.3d 458 (2008) citing

State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 829,25 P.3d 850, 852 (2001).
The Department has also challenged some of the Magistrate's findings of fact. In

Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423, 196 P.3d 341 (2008) the Idaho ~;upreme Court
explained:
Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. LR.C.P. 52(a). A
court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous if they are supported by
substantial and competent, though conflicting, evidence.

Johannsen, 146 Idaho at 431, 196 P .3d at 349.
II.

IDAHO CODE § 56-218 CLEARLY AUTHORIZES THE
RECOVERY IN THIS ESTATE.
A.

This Is an Ordinary Estate Recovery Case.
This appeal arises from a common and ordinary Medicaid estate recovery claim.

Emerson and Vivian Wiggins were an elderly couple. Due to her advanced age, Vivian needed
nursing home care. Nursing home care is very expensive and Emerson and Vivian applied for
medical assistance, also known as Medicaid, from the Department. Vivian was determined to be
eligible for Medicaid and between September 1, 2003, and the time ofter death, the Department
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provided medical assistance benefits to Vivian in the sum of$272,134.68. Emerson died less
than two weeks after Vivian and probate was opened. The property of the estate consists of a
bank account which the estate inventory values at $78,659.44. The Department filed its Claim
Against Estate which was disallowed by the personal representative. The court upheld the
disallowance and this appeal resulted.
The Magistrate held that the property of the estate was Emerson's separate property when
Vivian died, and held that this precludes the Department from recovering those assets.
B.

Idaho Law Clearly Authorizes the Department to Recover the Ajisets of this Estate.
Idaho Code § 56-218(1) permits the Department to recover from the estate of the spouse

of a Medicaid recipient:
Except where exempted or waived in accordance with federal law medical
assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual who was
fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the individual received such assistance
may be recovered from the individual's estate, and the estate oLhe spouse, if any,
for such aid paid to either or both;
Idaho Code § 56-218(1) (underline added). This section oflaw is clear and unambiguous.
Nothing in the law suggests that recovery is limited to the community or other property the
Medicaid recipient owned at death. Indeed, there is no limitation of any kind on what property of
the spouse's estate is subject to recovery. Where a statute is unambiguous, there is no need for
construction. Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. Idaho State Dept. o/Agriculture, 143 Idaho
366,368, 146 P.3d 632, 634 (2006).
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By rule the Department recovers only property which had been community property or
jointly held property after October 1, 1993 (the effective date of OBRA '93).2 IDAP A
16.03.09.900.20 states:
20. Limitations on Estate Claims.

***
A claim against the estate of a spouse of a participant is limited to the value of the
assets ofthe estate that had been, at any time after October 1, 1993, community
property, or the deceased participant's share of the separate property, and jointly
owned property. * * *
IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20 (underline added). However, the rules also make it clear that a transfer
of property between spouses will not eliminate the Department's right of recovery. Assuming, as
the Magistrate held, there was a marriage settlement agreement in this case, such an agreement
would have no affect on the Department's recovery. IDAPA 16.03.09.900.24 states:
24. Marriage Settlement Agreement or Other Such Agreem("nt.
A marriage settlement agreement or other such agreement which separates assets
for a married couple does not eliminate the debt against the estal;e of the deceased
participant or the spouse. Transfers under a marriage settlement agreement or
other such agreement may be voided if not for adequate consideration. (3-30-07)
IDAPA 16.03.09.900.24 (underline added). The Department's rules have the same force and
effect as law. Mallonee v. State, 139 Idaho 615,619,84 P.3d 551,555 (2004).
The Magistrate seemed concerned that the property of the estate was Emerson's separate
property. Of course, it had not always been so. Moreover, it would have been Emerson's
separate property at the time of his death whether there was a marriage !;etnement agreement or
not. If there was a marriage settlement agreement, it would have divided the couple's property
while Vivian was alive. However, even without a marriage settlement Lgreement, there is really

2This exception was required by the holding of the Idaho Supreme Court in IdaA 0 Department ofHealth and
Welfare v< Jackman, 132 Idaho 213,970 P.2d 6 (1998), discussed below beginning at page 15.
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no difference, since upon Vivian's death, the couple's property would have become Emerson's
separate property. Idaho Code § 15-2-102. As long as the property had originally been the
couple's community property, whether it later becomes the separate property of the nonMedicaid spouse is not relevant.
Clearly, Idaho law permits the Department's claim in this estate" regardless of whether
the estate consisted of community property or separate property, and the claim should have been
allowed against the estate.
III.
FEDERAL MEDICAID LAW ANTICIPATES RECOVERY
OF ASSETS THAT HAD BEEN COMMUNITY PROPERTY.

lbe Magistrate's Memorandum Decision and Order refers onlyindirectIy to federal
Medicaid law and it is difficult to determine whether federal law had an effect on his ruling.
However, federal law also anticipates recovery in this case.
A.

Medicaid Estate Recovery Is Simple in Concept.
Medicaid for elderly couples is simple in concept. Long term care is very expensive.

Many elderly couples are unable to pay for needed medical care. Medicare does not cover long
term care. Medicaid is not insurance as Medicare or Social Security is. There is no payroll tax to
support it. It is a public welfare program funded by the general funds of the state and federal
government. It is intended to be the payer of last resort. The elderly cml obtain medical
assistance (Medicaid) without divesting themselves of all their assets. Wbere a couple is
involved, there are complex rules to allow one spouse to obtain needed medical care while the
other remains living in the community. These rules permit spouses to transfer property between
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themselves. When both spouses have passed away, their assets are recovered to reimburse the
Medicaid program and provide for others who are in need.

B.
The History of Estate Recovery Reveals a Clear Intent to Recov'~:r the Assets of this
Estate.
The history of Idaho's estate recovery program is relevant here. While Idaho has long
had estate recovery laws relating to public assistance, the first iteration ofIdaho's modern estate
recovery law was passed in 1988. The first paragraph provides as followB:
56-218 Recovery of certain medical assistance.
(1) Medical assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an
individual who was sixty-five (65) years of age or older when th{~ individual
received such assistance may be recovered from the estate, or if lhere be no estate
the estate of the surviving spouse, if any, shall be charged for su\:h aid paid to
either or both; provided, however, that claim for such medical assistance correctly
paid to the individual may be established against the estate, but there shall be no
adjustment or recovery thereof until after the death of the surviving spouse, if any,
and only at a time when the individual has no surviving child who is under
twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind or permanently and totally disabled.
Transfers of real or personal property by recipients of such aid without adequate
consideration are voidable and may be set aside by an action in the district court.
Idaho Code § 56-218(1) (1988). Not coincidentally, 1988 was the year Congress passed the
Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act (MCCA). The MCCA included provisions that for the first
time permitted one spouse to qualify for Medicaid long term care withollt impoverishing the
community (or at-home) spouse. 3 This process includes allowing spouses to make transfers
between themselves. The concern of the legislature to be able to recou} these transferred assets
can be read in the language of the original estate recovery statute.
Congress has always sought to counter the attempts of some to lBe the Medicaid program,
not as a payer oflast resort, but as an estate planning tool to protect and retain their own assets.

3The

MCCA was later repealed, but the anti-spousal-impoverishment provisiom for Medicaid were retained.
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The language ofthe congressional committee, cited by the court in Cohen v. Commissioner of
Div. of Medical Assistance, 423 Mass. 399,668 N.E.2d 769 (1996) is oj:en quoted:
The Committee feels compelled to state the obvious. Medicaid is, and
always has been, a program to provide basic health coverage to people who do not
have sufficient income or resources to provide for themselves. When affluent
individuals use Medicaid qualifying trusts and similar "techniques" to qualify for
the program, they are diverting scarce Federal and State resources from
low-income elderly and disabled individuals, and poor women and children. This
is unacceptable to the Committee.
H.R.Rep. No. 265, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 72 (1985).
Cohen, 423 Mass. at 403-4,668 N.E.2d at 772. By 1988, the committee report for the MCCA
continued to echo these same concerns:
The Committee is informed that a number of States have not made
effective use of the authorities under current law to prevent afflu>ent individuals
from disposing of resources in order to qualify for Medicaid nur::ing home
coverage. In the view of the Committee, Medicaid-an entitlem~mt program for
the poor-should not facilitate the transfer of accumulated wealt;h from nursing
home patients to their non-dependent children.
H.R. Rep. No. 105(II), 100th Cong., 1ST Sess. 1987, p. 73 (reprinted at 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
857,896,1987 WL 61566, p. 31).
The battle had not ceased, of course, in 1993, when OBRA '93 was passed. 4 This law
included provisions which expanded the powers of the states to recover Medicaid benefits. The
accompanying legislative history shows Congress's intent that assets di"ided for purposes of
Medicaid eligibility be tracked and recovered.
Under the Committee bill, States are required to establish an estate
recovery program that meets certain requirements. The program must identify

4The battle still hasn't ended, of course. In 2006 the president signed the Defici t Reduction Act of 2005 giving
the states additional tools to assure couple's assets are used for their own care or available for recovery, rather than being
protected for the Medicaid couple's heirs. The provisions ofthe DRA go to enhanced ast,et transfer penalties and the
treatment of annuities and are not in issue here.
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and track resources (whether or not excluded for eligibility J!urposes) of
individuals who receive nursing facility, home and community-t~3.sed services,
and other specified long-term care services. The program must I=Tomptly ascertain
when the individual and the surviving spouse, if anv, dies, and must provide for
the collection of the amounts correctly paid by Medicaid on behialf of the
individual for long-term care services from the estate of the individual or the
surviving spouse. The term "estate" is defined as all real and personal property of
a deceased individual and all other assets in which the individual had any legally
cognizable title or interest at the time of his death, including ass~;ts conveyed to a
survivor, heir, or assign through joint tenancy, survivorship, life t~state, living
trust, or other arrangement.
H.R. Rep. 103-111, P.L. 103-66, OBRA 1993 (May 25, 1993), Section 5112. (emphasis added).
Among the tools provided in OBRA '93 is the addition of a definition of "assets" for
purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p which provides as follows:
(h) Definitions
In this section, the following definitions shall apply:
(1)
The term "assets", with respect to an individual, includes all
income and resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse, including
any income or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse is
entitled to but does not receive because of action(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse,
(B) by a person, including a court or administrative body, with legal
authority to act in place of or on behalf ofthe individual or such individual's
spouse, or
(C) by any person, including any court or administrative body, acting at
the direction or upon the request of the individual or such individual's spouse.

42 U.S.c. § 1396p(h)(1) (emphasis added). "This section," of course, i:; 1396p. "Assets"
includes the "resources" of the individual and the spouse and includes re;sources transferred by
the individual to the spouse. "Resources" are defined in subsection (h)(:5):
(5) The term "resources" has the meaning given such terrn in section
1382b of this title, without regard (in the case of an institutionalized individual) to
the exclusion described in subsection (a) (1 ) of such section.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(5). The reference to section 1382b and the exclusion in subsection (a)(1),
is to the couple's home. In other words, the "assets" defined in subsecfon (h)(l) includes the
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 10
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couple's home whether held by one, the other or both. Clearly, "assets" in this case include any
property Vivian may have transferred to Emerson through a marriage settlement agreement.
Another tool given to the states by OBRA '93 was the expanded definition of estate found
in 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4):
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", w:l:h respect to a
deceased individual(A) shall include all real and personal property and othe;: assets included
within the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; and
(B) may include, at the option of the State (and shall include, in the case
of an individual to whom paragraph (1)(C)(i) applies), any other real and personal
property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at
the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including sucha.ssets conveyed to
a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual throughjoir:t tenancy,
tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (emphasis added). Subsection (b)(4) is, of course, part of 42 U.S.c. §
1396p. Therefore, the term "assets" used here includes any property which Vivian may have
transferred to Emerson.
C.

There Is No "Automatic-on-Death" Requirement in Subsection (Q)ill.
Recall that subsection (b)( 4) was part of OBRA '93 and that part of the intent of OBRA

'93 was to "identifY and track resources (whether or not excluded for eligibility purposes) ... and
... provide for the collection of the amounts correctly paid by Medicaid ... from the estate of the
individual or the surviving spouse." H.R. Rep. 103-111, P.L. 103-66, OBRA 1993 (May 25,
1993), Section 5112 (cited above). Section (b)(4) is very broad and expansive:
(4) For purposes of this subsection,S the term "estate", with respect to a
deceased individual(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included
within the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; and

5The "subsection" is 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) which includes the federal mandate t lat states pursue estate
recovery. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1).
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(B) may include, at the option ofthe State (and shall include, in the case
of an individual to whom paragraph (l )(C)(i) applies), any other real and personal
property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at
the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including SUch.!lssets conveyed
to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through i!~nt tenancy,
tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or otht~r arrangement.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)( 4) (emphasis added).
\Alhen this language is read in context with the remainder of the

~mbsection

and the

definition of "assets" in subsection (h), it becomes clear. The phrase beginning with "including"
shows the breadth of this section. In case the drafters missed something, they included the words
"or other arrangement." The North Dakota Supreme Court found this language sufficiently
expansive to include property such as that at issue in this case. In re Es.tate o/Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d
882 (N.D. 2000).
The Magistrate felt that subsection (b)(4) would not apply to

thi:~

case because it lists

several transfers that occur automatically on death and the Magistrate deduced that only
automatically-an-death transfers were included. This distinction, howe\'er, is not found
anywhere in the law and is not supported by the language of the law itself. For example, where a
living trust is created the "legal title or interest" is passed immediately. Estate 0/ Hull v.
Williams, 126 Idaho 437, 443,885 P.2d 1153, 1159 (App. 1994). The reneficiary holds only the
beneficial, not legal, interest, and no legal interest passes on death. Subsection (b)(4), when read
in context, is clearly intended to capture all property the Medicaid recip ,ent, by whatever means,
may have attempted to shelter or protect.
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D.
The Correct Question Is Whether the Propertv of this Estate,
It Remains an "Asset" Subject to Estate Recovery.

Ev~n

If Vivian Transferred

The Magistrate stated: "The Department may only recover against property in which the
recipient spouse had an interest at the time of death." The underlying assumption was that if
Vivian had entered into a marriage settlement agreement, then the property was no longer an
"asset" subject to recovery. This assumption, of course, was incorrect. The correct question was
whether the property of the estate was "assets" of the individual as defined by state and federal
law. This is the correct question because, the whole point ofthe definition of assets in 42 U.S.c.
§ 1396p(h)(1) is that the term "assets" includes property transferred by tIle Medicaid recipient to

the spouse. It wasn't important when the asset was transferred (so long as it was after OBRA
'93), or even if it was transferred. The important question was whether, even after any purported
transfer, it is subject to recovery under the expanded definition of estate found in 42 U.S.C. §
1396p(b)(4). In this case, it clearly was.
There are several factors that make this so. The first, of course, is the definition of asset
found in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(1) which has been discussed. Another if: Idaho Code § 56-218(1)
itself, which effectively alters marital property law in Idaho when it comes to the property of
Medicaid recipients and their spouses. Idaho Code § 56-218(1) states that:
... medical assistance ... may be recovered from the individual's estate, and the
estate of the spouse, if any, for such aid paid to either or both ....
Idaho Code § 56-218(1). This statute affects both probate and marital property law. The
legislature is not required to put all statutes affecting probate in the prohate code and is not
required to put all statutes affecting marital property in the marital property law. It can place
statutes affecting these matters anywhere it likes.
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A clear example of this is found in another part of Idaho Code § 56··218: subsection
(4)(b). That section, which adopts the language found in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) states, in part,
as follows:
(4) For purposes of this section, the term "estate" shall include:

***
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets ... including
such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual
through . .life estate ....
Idaho Code § 56-218(4). This section modifies the common law in Idaho when it comes to life
estates. In essence, it says that where a Medicaid recipient transfers real property to a "survivor,
heir, or assign" and retains a life estate, that life estate interest is not exti.nguished on death, but
remains an "asset" of the estate. 6 The question here, involving the recoyery of property which
has become the separate property of the non-Medicaid spouse, is the same thing. The legislature,
through Idaho Code § 56-218, has modified Idaho probate and marital property law to say that if
a person transfers community property to her spouse, and receives Medicaid benefits in the
future, the property remains subject to recovery.
Because the correct question is, under Idaho law (together with the federal definition of
assets and expanded definition of estate), is the property in this estate ar. "asset" subj ect to
recovery, the "at the time of death" argument becomes irrelevant. This is not an attempt to grab
back property transferred away. Rather, this is merely recognizing that under Idaho and federal
law, whether transferred or not, the property of this estate, like the life estate discussed above, is
an "asset" of Vivian's subject to estate recovery.

6See e.g. State Dept. ofHuman Services v. Willingham, 206 Or.App. 156, l36 PJd 66 (2006) ("For purpcses of
the recovery of medical assistance paid by the state during the lifetime of the holder of a Iife estate interest, the life estate
continues to exist after the death of the person holding the interest"); In re Estate ofLaughec.d, 696 N.W.2d 312 (Iowa
2005) (life estate in farm owned by deceased Medicaid recipient was required to be inc1u:led in the estate for purposes of
estate recovery).
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IV.

THE IDAHO SUPREME COURT HAS ALREADY
DECIDED THIS ISSUE.
In the case of Idaho Department a/Health and Welfare v. Jackrr:an, 132 Idaho 213, 970
P.2d 6 (1998), the Idaho Supreme Court upheld recovery from the estate of the non-Medicaid

spouse. In the Jackman case, just as alleged here, the Medicaid spouse, Hildor, transferred an
her property to her spouse, Lionel, by a marriage settlement agreement. Hildor passed away first
and Lionel passed away two weeks later. Jackman was appointed personal representative of
Lionel's estate and the Department filed an estate recovery claim. The personal representative
challenged the Department's claim on numerous grounds including federal preemption. The
Idaho Supreme Court upheld Idaho's spousal recovery law, holding that the expanded definition
of estate permitted by federal law, together with the definition of assets

:~und

at 42 U.S.C. §

1396p(h)(l), validated recovery of property that had, at any time after Qctober 1, 1993, been
community property.
The Jackman decision must be read carefully because of the wa) it was decided. The
final decision is an edited version, altered on re-hearing, of the original decision of the court. It
is helpful to understand the original decision and the reason for the court's alteration on
rehearing. In the court's first decision, the Supreme Court held whollyn favor of the
Department. Upon Petition for Rehearing, the Supreme Court modifiec its decision because the
effective date of the federal law on which the Court had relied in its oril~nal opinion was after
the date of the couple's marriage settlement agreement. The court, therefore, held that recovery
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would be limited to property that had been community property after the effective date of the
federal law, "OBRA 93.,,7
The Magistrate seemed to believe that Jackman held that only property which remains
community property at death is subject to recovery. This is incorrect. If the Magistrate were
correct, the Supreme Court's entire discussion of OBRA '93 and its effe:tive date, the definition
of assets in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e) (now 1396p(h)), and the expanded definition of estate, would
all be superfluous. The Court could just as well have said, "since there \Vas a marriage settlement
agreement and the property was transferred before death, there can be no recovery." That is not
what the Court did. The discussion of the effective date ofOBRA '93

central to the court's

holding, and Jackman is an important case because it demonstrates what Congress did in
enacting OBRA '93, and how the outcome of the case would have been different had the transfer
been after the effective date of OBRA '93, as it was in this case.
The court began with the over-arching holding:
The Department asserts that I.C. § 56-218, as it existed a, times applicable
to this case, authorized recovery of the balance of the Medicaid payments from
Lionel's estate. We agree.

Jackman, 132 Idaho at 8, 970 P.2d at 215. The Court then goes on to stlte that the Department
was preempted from recovering the assets conveyed by the Medicaid rel~ipient to her husband
before the effective date of OBRA '93. If the Court had believed there '~ould be no recovery of
property transferred before death, it could have simply said that transferred property was out of
the Department's reach forever. However, the Court went to great pain:; to discuss the effective
date of OBRA '93 and the effect that had on their holding in the case. ~:ne court discussed the

7This limitation is embodied in IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20, limiting spousal recowry to property that had been
community property at any time after October 1, 1993.
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expanded definition of estate enacted by OBRA '93 and discussed the f;;deral definition of
"assets." There was no disagreement by the court on the legal effect of the federal definition of
"assets." Rather, the court merely concluded that because the marriage E;ettlement agreement was
executed before the effective date of OBRA '93, the new federal laws did not apply to the
transferred property:
We conclude that this definition of "assets" is not applicable to the
a!rreement which Jackman signed on behalf of Lionel and HildQr on March 8,
1993. The definition of "assets" contained in the 1993 amendm~mts to the federal
statute does not apply "with respect to assets disposed of on or before the date of
the enactment ofthis Act [Aug. 10, 1993]." Pub.L. 103-66, § 13611(e).
Therefore, it does not apply to the agreement and does not allow the Department
to recover the balance of the Medicaid payments from Lionel's separate property.
This is true even though 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4), which appUes to Medicaid
payments for calendar quarters beginning on or after Octob\~r 1, 1993,
authorizes the Department to recover the Medicaid payments from "other
assets." Without the definition of "assets" contained in 42 U.S.C. §
1396p(e)(I), "other assets" are only those included within Hildor's estate, as
dermed by I.C. § 15-1-201(15). Lionel's separate property, including the
community property transmuted by the agreement, is not part of Hildor's estate.

Jackman, 132 Idaho at 9-10,970 P.2d at 216-7 (emphasis added). The obvious and necessary
inference is that with "the definition of 'assets' contained in 42 U.S.c.

f 1396p([h])(1), 'other

assets'" would include the property transferred by the Medicaid recipiert to her husband through
the marriage settlement agreement. Things that are necessarily implied ca."':} have legal effect.
There can be implied consent (State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302-03, 161) P.3d 739, 741-42
(2007», implied authority (Jones v. HealthSouth Treasure Valley Hasp., 147 Idaho 109, 112,206
P.3d 473,476 (2009)), and implied promises (Gray v. Tri-Way Canst. Services, Inc., 147 Idaho
378,387,210 P.3d 63, 72 (2009)) among other things. There is no need to guess at the mea:'1ing
of the Court here. The Court was clearly explaining the effect of OBRA '93 when it comes to
spousal recovery in Idaho.
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Since even if there was a marriage settlement agreement in this case it would have been
post-OBRA '93, then under Jackman the property is subject to estate recovery.

V.
THE DEPARTMENT DID NOT STIPULATE TO THE
FACTS UPON WHICH THE lVlAGISTRATE RELIED.
The Magistrate made findings of fact that included the following:

1. The Department of Health & Welfare treated Vivian 1vViggins and
Emerson Wiggins as though they had a Marriage Settlement Agreement
(hereinafter MSA) which divided their assets.
2. The MSA transmutted (sic) Vivian Wiggins and Emerson Wiggin's
community property to separate property.
3. Although no executed copy or original MSA was presented to the court,
the parties agreed that one was executed in 2002.

***

5. Unless the MSA had been executed, Vivian Wiggins would not have
been eligible for Medicaid Benefits.

***
Memorandum Decision Denying Petitioner's Claim Against Estate, p. 2. While finding number
1 is correct, findings 2 and 3 are not part of the stipulation the Department made. Finding 5 is
correct, except that the inference that a MSA must have existed is not supported since the
Department may have been in error in believing an MSA existed. 8
The actual stipulation is as follows:
MR. MASINGILL: Your Honor, this is what we've stipulated to. That the
department treated the couple, Emerson and Vivian, as though olley had a
marriage settlement agreement that divided their assets. The manage settlement
agreement would have transmuted the property from community property to
separate property to each party. The marriage settlement agreement would have
been dated approximately 2002. That we agreed to the admissio t1 -- stipulate to
the admission of the exhibits that I've presented which are Exhibits A through G I
believe is the last one. At any rate, they're Bates nos. 001 through 097.

SIf an error was made and the Department paid Vivian's Medicaid benefits in elTor, it would still have recovered
those payments as a creditor of this estate, Idaho Code § 56-224.
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"'We stipulate that the first application for Medicaid took place in 2002 and

it is shown as Bates nos. 033 through 03S. That the second application was
applied for on 8/27/03 and it is Bates nos. OS8-060.
We'd stipulate that unless the MS -- the marriage settlement agreement
had been -- unless it had been executed. Vivian would not have been eligible to
receive Medicaid benefits and we stipulate to Cory's two exhibit:; from his latest
reply brief. I believe they're lien documents.
MR. CARTWRIGHT: They were Exhibits A and B to the reply brief.
COURT: Okay. Just a second. And Mr. Cartwright, is th;3t the stipulation
on behalf of the State -- the claimant?
MR. CARTWRIGHT: That is correct, Your Honor. I would offer one
other stipulation at this point and that's that neither party has been able to locate
the original marriage settlement agreement.
Tr. p. 4, 1. 20 to p. 5, 1. 25 (emphasis added). That is the extent of the stpulation. The
Department does not disagree with the statements made, only the broad inferences drawn by the
Magistrate from those statements.
As discussed above, from the Department's perspective, whether a marriage settlement
agreement existed or not was not relevant. The Department agreed that Vivian had been made
eligible as if a MSA existed. Since Vivian was made eligible in 2003, tle marriage settlement
agreement, ifit existed, would have been executed about that time. This is as far as the
Department was willing to stipulate. The Department did not stipulate 'hat an agreement actually
existed. Had the Department been aware that the existence of the MSA w:mld become a critical
issue for the Magistrate, it would have been more cautious to clarify the scope of its stipulation.
There is no substantial competent evidence that a MSA actually existed. Even if it can be
inferred, from the Department's stipulation, that an MSA existed, there is no basis for inferring
the tenus of the agreement or that the agreement included the fonualities required in Idaho Code
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§ § 32-917 and 918. 9 There was no evidence from anyone who claimed to have seen the

document or drafted it, and therefore could have known of its existence and contents. Evidence
that the Department acted as if a MSA existed is not sufficient to infer the contents or terms of
any such agreement.
VI.

THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY
FEES ON APPEAL.
Idaho Code § 12-117 provides as follows:
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative proceeding
or civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state a!~ency or political
subdivision and a person, the state agency or political subdivision or the court, as
the case may be, shall award the prevailing party reasonable attomey's fees,
witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
Idaho Code § 12-117 (underline added). Idaho Code § 56-218(1) clearly and unambiguously
permits the Department's claim in this estate. The personal representati ve has advanced an
erroneous interpretation of an unambiguous statute. The personal representative, in disallowing
the Department's claim, has acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law and the Department
should be awarded its attorney fees on appeal.
VII.

CONCLUSION
1.

Did the Magistrate err in determining that a Marriage Se:tlement Agreement

(MSA) existed and that such MSA transmuted Vivian Wiggins and Em;rson Wiggin's

9 The Magistrate found it significant that the Department had not sought to set adde the MSA under Idaho Code
§ 56-218(2). As explained, above, there was no need to set aside any transfers between be spouses because transferred
assets are already "assets" subject to estate recovery. However, it would not have been p)ss;ble to bring an action to set
aside a MSA that couldn't even have been shown to have existed.
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community property to separate property (of Emerson Wiggins), and the:: such MSA was
executed in 2002, and that such MSA met all of the formalities required by Idaho law, and that
the Department was not in error in granting Medicaid benefits to Vivian Wiggins?
Yes. The evidence only showed that the Department treated Emerson and Vivian as if
they had a MSA. There is no substantial competent evidence that one a·~:tually existed, nor of the
terms of any such agreement, nor that any such agreement met the required formalities under the
law.
2.

Did the Magistrate err in its application and interpretation of Idaho Code § 56·

218, in refusing to allow the Department's claim against the estate of Emerson Wiggins?
Yes. Idaho Code § 56-218 clearly and unambiguously permits fhe recovery in this case.
There is nothing in section 56-218 that suggests that assets that had become the separate property
of the non-Medicaid spouse are not included in recoverable assets.
3.

Did the Magistrate err in its application and interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p as

pre-empting application ofIdaho Code § 56-218?
Yes, assuming this was, in fact, the Magistrate's conclusion and reason for not applying
the plain language ofIdaho Code § 56-218. Federal Medicaid law expands the definitions of
assets and estate, for purposes of Medicaid estate recovery, to include p:operty spouses have
transferred between themselves.
Did the Magistrate err in failing to apply the Idaho Supreme Court holding in

Idaho Department a/Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213 (1998) to the facts ofthis
case?
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Yes. The necessary and unavoidable implication ofthe Supreme Court's holding in

Jackman upholds the recovery of assets which had, at any time after the adoption of OBRA '93,
been community property.
5.

Is the Department entitled to attorney fees on appeal?

Yes. Since, Idaho Code § 56-218 clearly and unambiguously pe;~mits the Department to
recover in this case, the personal representative's disallowance of the Depfu-tment's claim was
without any reasonable basis in fact or law.
DATED this 17 day of September, 2010,

/:~~ ~:><1
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a Memorandum Decision disallowing a creditor's claim in a probate
proceeding and Respondent's application for attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code 12117 and Idaho Code 12-121.

This case involves the State seeking to impose it's Medicaid lien

against the separate property of Emerson Wiggins (hereinafter Emerson) based on "medical
assistance," provided to Emerson's spouse, Vivian Wiggins (hereinafter Vivian). The attempted
imposition of it's lien is based on Idaho Code § 56-218, and the federal statute, 42 U.S.C. §

1396p, upon which the State's statute finds its existence.
Course of Proceedings

The Personal Representative was appointed in this estate on May :~2, 2009. The Department
filed a claim in the amount of $264,674.45 on November 23, 2009.

On November 24, 2009, the

Department received a Notice of Disallowance of Claim from the Personal Representative. On
November 30, 2009, the Department filed it's Petition for Allowance of Claim. Hearing was held
on the Department's Petition on February 3, 2010.

At the hearing, the State entered into a

stipulation which provided that in order for Vivian to have been qualified to receive Medicaid funds
there must have been an agreement transmuting Vivian and Emerson's property to their sole and
separate property. The transmutation agreement detennined the amount of spend-down required of
Vivian before she could be eligible for Medicaid. Over the course of a year or two after the
transmutation agreement was executed, the Department detennined that Vivian had spent down her
separate property and because she had no interest in any other property, including Emerson's,
Vivian was granted Medicaid eligibility.
It was upon this eligibility that the claim arose. The attempted imposition of the lien is
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based on that eligibility of Vivian, but the Department now seeks to impose a lien upon
Emerson's separate property. It is with slight- of- hand that the State seeks to impose it's lien

against property owned solely by Emerson. This was accomplished by the transformation
agreement so that Vivian could be eligible for Medicaid. The State supervised the spend-down
of Vivian's only assets. The State made the determination that Vivian had spent down all her
assets and by virtue thereof qualified for Medicaid. The State provided Medicaid to Vivian in
the amount of the claim. Vivian died and was followed in death by Emerson. By virtue of he
transmutation agreement the only property in the probate was the separate property of Emerson.
After assisting in divesting Vivian of any assets, the State filed a claim for lien against
Emerson's separate property. The State, with a straight face, and despite being involved in
transmuting his property into separate property so Vivian would qualify for Medicaid, now
seeks to recover all of Emerson's separate property.
It is the contradictory, attempted imposition of it's lien against Emerson's separate

property which was the subject of the Magistrate's decision that the lien could not apply to
Emerson's separate property under the law in effect at that time.
The State has appealed the denial of it's attempted imposition of a lien on Emerson's
separate property.

The Estate being the prevailing party in this action sought attorney's fees

and costs against the State pursuant to Idaho Code 12-117 and/or Idaho Code 12-121. The
Magistrate, despite finding the State's assertion of it's lien against Emerson's separate property
was due to it's unreasonable interpretation of the federal statute, failed to grant the Estate
attorney's fees and some costs.
Another case was making it's way through the probate system in Ada County, descrihed
herein as In Re the Estate of Perry. The Magistrate also denied a li,;m in favor of the State
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based on the same statutory and case law. The Perry Magistrate, however, found in favor of the
Perry estate on it's motion for attorney's fees and costs.
Neither the Idaho, nor the Federal statutes permit the State's lien and because the

statutory and case law is clear the Respondent estate is entitled to attorney's fees and costs both
on the underlying case and on appeal.
The simple way to state the issue before the court is that the two cases in the Magistrate
level found that the separate property of the non-recipient spouse is not subject to a Medicaid
lien.
The Respondent timely filed it's appeal of the denial of attorney's fees and costs. Both
appeals are now before this Court.
Statement of the Facts

and died February 9,

Emerson Wiggins ("Emerson") was born
2009, at the age of 98. Vivian Wiggins ("Vivian") was born
January 30, 2009 at the age of 98.

and died

At all times material to this proceeding, until the death

of Vivian, Emerson and Vivian were husband and wife.

The State describes the "facts" in

it's Appellate Brief without mention of the transmutation they participated in, nor the spend
down of Vivian's assets to allow her to qualify for Medicaid. The State instead states:
"About June 7, 2002, Vivian was admitted to a nursing home in Weiser, Idaho.
Emerson and Vivian applied for medical assistance, also known as Medicaid, on or about
November 18,2002, to help pay for Vivian's medical care. As the State's brief indicates,
Vivian became eligible for Medicaid on September 1, 2003, and between that time and
Vivian's death the Department provided payment for Vivian's 111edical care, through the
The property of this estate
Medicaid program, in the sum of at least $272,134.68. 1
consists of a bank account with an inventory value of $78,659.44.
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The State's participation in the transmutation is entirely inconsistent with it's

subs.e~quent

effort to impose a lien on property they helped to be transferred and transmuted into Emerson's

separate property. The facts also show the State did not inform either Vivian or Emerson, who were
blind and cared for by their son, the Personal Representative, of it':; intention to come after
Emerson's separate property prior to filing it's claim in the probate.

The State's participation in

the transmutation caused Vivian to have no interest in Emerson's property. Emerson's separate
propel1y is all that is involved in this action. There is an inherent contradiction created by the
State's participation in the transmutation, then "interpreting" the

statute~;

and case law in Idaho as

providing that Emerson's separate property is subject to it's lien, and of course for the purpose of
paying itself.

ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Stipulation.

Did the Magistrate correctly interpret the State's stipulation on

the record that a Marriage Settlement Agreement (MSA) existed, had apparently been lost,
and that such MSA transmuted Vivian Wiggins and Emerson Wiggin's community property 10
separate property?

2.

State Statute.

Did the Magistrate correctly determ;ned that Idaho Code

56-218(1) did not provide for the State's lien against Emerson's separate property?

3.

Federal Statute.

Did the Magistrate correctly interprtt 42 U.S.c. § 1396p, and

it's subsections and definitions, as prohibiting the State a lien against the separate property of
Emerson?

4.

Barg. Was Barg directly on point, pointing out the preclusion of recovery from
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Emerson's separate property?
5.

Jackman.

Did the Magistrate properly interpret the Idaho Supreme Court's

holding in Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213 (1998) as
precluding a lien to the State against Emerson's separate property?
6.

Did the Magistrate correctly interpret Perry as agreeing with his interpretation

of the law prohibiting a Medicaid lien against the separate property of the non-recipient
spouse, Emerson?
7.

Attorney's Fees at Magistrate Level.

Is the Estate entitled to an award of

attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code 12-117 and/or Idaho Code 12-121 at the trial level?
8.

Attorney's Fees on Appeal.

Is the Estate entitled to attorney's fees and

costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code 12-117 and/or Idaho Code 12-121?
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ARGUMENT
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This case involves the interpretation of state and federal statutory and case law.

The

interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which an appellate court exercises free
review. Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391 (2008) citing State v.

Hart, 135 Idaho 827 (2001).
It is hopeful this case is not a common and ordinary Medicaid estate recovery case (as the

Appellant's Brief indicates) because it shows significant flaws by the State Department of Health
and Welfare (hereinafter Department) in both it's procedural and substantive processes, it's flawed
interpretation of the State statute, it's equally flawed analysis of the controlling Federal statute, as
well as failure to follow case law in Idaho and elsewhere on this issue.

The Department has

commented that they have taken other citizen's separate property in cases similar to this one, but no
one has objected. It is respectfully submitted that reliance on the failure of other citizens to take on
the State of Idaho (despite being absolutely correct as a matter of law and fact) should not be
construed that the Department's actions are, or have been proper. Indulgence in the Department's

"we have always done it this way" approach to this case is

disturbinl~

for past recoveries and

inapplicable to the instant case.
The standard of review of issues of law by this Court will simply require proper statutory
and case law interpretation, all of which is clearly inapposite to the State's position.
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II.
IDAHO CODE § 56-218 DOES NOT PERMIT A LIEN
AGAINST EMERSON'S SEPARATE PROPERTY

A.

The Stipulation.

To understand the predicate for the Stipulation it is best to review the procedure used in the
underlying Medicaid processes. Vivian was determined to be eligible for Medicaid as previously
discussed, and between September 1, 2003 and the time of her death the Department provided
medical assistance benefit's to Vivian in the sum of $272,134.68.
weeks after Vivian and a joint probate was opened.

Emerson died less than two

The property of the Estate consists of a bank

account which the estate inventory valued at $78,659.44, all of which
Emerson.

i:;;

the separate propelty of

In fact, the funds still in existence are the funds transmuted to Emerson by the

Department, or with its help. The funds were declared Emerson's sepamte property at the time of
the transmutation and the amount still on hand is due to the fact he did not spend it down as did
Vivian.

The Magistrates in both the Ada County case and in the case at bar ruled the lien do(~s not

attach to the separate property of the non-recipient surviving spouse. Tht: Department now appeals
Judge Frates' ruling.
The State stipulated in open court that it is impossible for Viviar to have been eligible for
Medicaid without the transmutation. See the Transcript of the hearing on the 3rd day of February,
2010, which states in pertinent part as follows::
"Judge Frates: And it my understanding after having met with both counsel in
chambers that there would be at least some stipUlation of facts we can put on the record.
Mr. Masingill: Your Honor, this is what we've stipulated [0. That the Department
treated the couple, Emerson and Vivian, as though they had a marriage settl€;ment
agreement that divided their assets. The marriage settlement agreement would have
transmuted the property from community property to separate property to each party.
The marriage settlement agreement would have been dated approximately 2002. That we
RFSPONDENT'S BRlEF-7

agreed to the admission-stipulate to the admission of the Exhibit's that I have presented
which are Exhibit A through G, I believe is the last one. At any rate, they're Bates nos. 001
through 097.
We stipulate that the first application for Medicaid took plaee in 2002 and it is shown
as Bates nos. 033 through 097. That the second application was applied for on 8-27-03 and
it is Bates nos. 058-060.
We've stipulated that unless the ]\tIS-the marriage settllement had been - unless
it had been executed, Vivian would not have been eligible to received Medicaid
benefit's .....
Judge Frates: Okay. Just a second. Mr. Cartwright is tbat the stipulation on
behalf of the State-the claimant?
Mr. Cartwright: That is correct, your Honor. I would oHer one other stipUlation at
this point and that's that neither party has been able to locate the original marriage settlement
agreement." (emphasis added).

See also Judge Frates' comment after the stipUlation was entered on the record:
Judge Frates: This appears, based on the stipUlation, to be, you know, a matter of
law. It involves federal laws and state laws and there are a ::ouple of cases involved.
Judge Frates was well within his judicial province to accept the stipulation and treat this case
as one of determination of the law applied to those facts.

The State's

~;sertion

that there is some

factual dispute after the stipulation, and that the stipulation did not me:m what it clearly said, is
inappropriate considering the Magistrate's proper reliance thereon.
Frankly, the attempts by the State to avoid the application of its stipulation is factually
dishonest. In fact, when the facts are stipulated the parties and the Court is entitled to rely thereon.
Judicial admissions are favored by the law.

The State had the obligation to make clear to the

Magistrate, and opposing counsel, that reliance on its judicial admission was misplaced and that
somewhere down the road in the proceedings the State would attempt to back out of the same. In
fact, the Estate had a witness who was going to testify that the Department regularly used Marriage
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Settlement Agreements and that a substantial amount were lost by the Department after being
transmitted from her (the local) office to the Department. The stipulation on the record came about

on the date of hearing after the Department's counsel was advised in chambers of the nature of the
witnesses' proposed testimony. Given the propensity to lose the written agreements and the fact that
Vivian could not have become eligible for benefits without one, directly preceded the stipulation.

Judicial Admissions. The Idaho Supreme Court in In re Universe Life Ins. Co.,

B.

144 Idaho 751 (Idaho, 2007) described the nature and effect of a judicial admission:
"A judicial admission is a statement made by a party or lttorney, in the course of
judicial proceedings, for the purpose, or with the effect, of dispensing with the need for proof
by the opposing party of some fact." Sun Valley Potato Growels, Inc. v. Texas Refinery
Corp., 139 Idaho 761, 765, 86 P.3d 475, 479 (2004). itA judicial admission is a deliberate,
clear, unequivocal statement of a party about a concrete fact vrithin the party's peculiar
knowledge, not a matter of law.... [and] not opinion." 29A Arr. Jur. 2d, Evidence § 770
(1994).
In prior OpInIOnS, we have held that judicial admissions include admitting an
allegation in an opposing party's pleading, Griff, Inc. v. Curry Bean Co., Inc., 138 Idaho 315,
341, 63 P.3d 441, 447 (2003); a stipulation entered into by pal!'ties or their counsel,
Reding v. Reding, 141 Idaho 369, 109 P.3d 1111 (2005); and counsel's admission at trial
of a factual issue upon which the opposing party had the burden of proof, McLean v.
City of Spirit Lake, 91 Idaho 779, 782-83,430 P.2d 670,673-74 (1967).

The stipulation on the record resolves any issue, illusory or not, that Emerson's property was
transmuted into his separate property.

C.

Idaho Code 56-218(1) Does Not Permit the Department to Lien the NonRecipient Spouse's Separate Property.
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Idaho Code § 56-218(1) reads as follows:
Except where exempted or waived in accordance with federal law medical
assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual who was fifty-five (55)
years of age or older when the individual received such assistanGe may be recovered from
the individual's estate, and the estate of the spouse if any, for such aid paid to either or
both;
The glaring problem with Idaho Code § 56-218(1) is its failure to define the "estate of the
syouse".

As the Court is aware, Idaho is a community property state and property held by an

individual can be characterized as community property or separate propelty (this is not intended to
imply those are the only types of property holding allowed in Idaho, but are those at issue).
To determine what the legislature meant by the "estate of the spolse", the usual method is
finding a definition of the same. However, the Idaho legislation does ne,t contain a definition. A
review of the legislative history of the statute contradicts the State's position that separate property
is part of the "estate of the spouse" for purposes of the lien.
Furthermore, the very beginning of Idaho Code 56-218(1) contains a pre-condition. That
pre-condition is that the federal statute must first exempt any action by the State. As hereinafter
discussed, that pre-condition defeats the Department's attempted recovery.
When the language of a statute is ambiguous, the intention (J the legislation can be
ascertained by its history. The following is the language from the Senate bill, thereafter becoming

Idaho Code 56-218. The legislative history specifically states that its purpose is to limit recovery
to the community property of the non-institutionalized spouse, not the separate property of the noninstitutionalized spouse:
"MEDICAL ASSISTANCE - Amends existing law to clarify when medical assistance may
be recovered; and to specify when the cause of action accrues to void a transfer which was
made without adequate consideration.
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LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
RS 13525
Under federal and state law, the state is authorized to set aside transfers of assets owned by
recipients of Medicaid where the transfer is made without adequate consideration and those
assets could have been used to pay for the medical assistance provided through Medicaid. In
a recent decision, a state district court ruled that the state's action was barred by a four year
statute of limitations which ran from the date of the transfer even though the circumstances
of the transfer were not reasonably discovered by the state until after the four years had
elapsed. The proposed legislation adds language to Idaho Code Section 56-218 that would
prevent the statute of limitations from running until such time is the state discovers, or
reasonably could have discovered, that the asset transfer was without adequate consideration.
"Discovers" or "reasonably could have discovered" as used in proposed subsection 56-218(8)
is intended to have the same meaning as "discovery", as inte-preted by the courts, in
subsection 5-218(4), Idaho Code. The proposed legislation also makes a technical correction
to Idaho Code 56-218 to clarify that the non-Medicaid spouse of 1 Medicaid recipient need
not survive the Medicaid recipient in order for the department te, file a claim against the
"community property" of the non-Medicaid spouse's estate. (emphasis added)."

The foregoing legislative history shows that the legislature never intended the statute to
permit a lien for repayment of Medicaid from the separate property of the :mrviving spouse.
The Department's position encompasses, within its ambit, such sit lations as occur when two
older folks marry, both having substantial separate property from their 'urmer relationships. The
Department's position is such that the subject couple can do nothing to protect each other's separate
property from the Medicaid lien. It is unconscionable to think that folks who get married the second
or third time around, presumably in their later years, would lose their separate property to a
Medicaid lien against the non-recipient spouse. The statute as applied in the manner demanded by
the Department, is overbroad and unconstitutional. State v Bitt, 118 Idaho 584 (1990).
The statute need not be interpreted as unconstitutional, as it is clear the legislature intended
only "community property" of the non-institutionalized spouse to be subject to the Medicaid lien.
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The Department's claim that its lien also applies to the non-institutionalized spouse's separate
property is not supported by the legislative history of Idaho Code 56-218(1).
The claims of the Department in its Appellant's Brief that their own rule provides that it has
the right to assert its lien against the non-institutionalized spouse's separate property is contrary to
the legislative history and thus has no effect on the case at bar.

A rule promulgated in error is

entitled to no weight.

D.

Property Which was Community "at Some Time" Does Not Makes it Subject to
the Lien.

The Department argues in its Brief on appeal for the first time, (and we hereby move to
strike the same) that it does not matter if the property it is seeking a lien against is now separate
property, so long as it was community property at some time in the past. .Such a conclusion is not a
substitute for reading the statutory and case law on this subject. In the case at bar, it is the
Department's own actions which transmuted the community property of Emerson and Vivian into
separate property. It cannot now claim its action in doing so had no effecl.
In fact, once property is deemed separate, Idaho law applies. Idaho law does not distinguish
between "once upon a time community by now separate property" and other forms of property
ownership. No case law makes that distinction that this author could locate. The definitions of
separate and community property are supplied by statute. The legislature did not mention in Idaho
Code § 56-218(1) such a distinction, nor does the legislative history dhcuss such a thing.

It is

presumed the legislature knows its other enactments when it signs new law into effect. Had the
legislature made such a distinction between kinds of separate property, it had an obligation to
supply new law to that effect.
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Its failure to do so requires construction of the statute by the definitions of separate and
community property already in existence.

Despite the attempt by the Department to create a new

kind of separate property, it is the legislature which has the right to do so, not the Department.
By way of conclusion, there are no set of facts, no law either statulory or case law, in Idaho,
which supports the Department's right to a lien against the separate properly of Emerson.

III.
FEDERAL MEDICAID LAW DOES NOT ALLOW
RECOVERY OF EMERSON'S SEPARATE PROPERTY.
A.

Motion to Strike Narrative Statement as Not Part of the R~cord.

The Department supplies this Court with its analysis of Medicaid law and how and why it
applies to elderly couples. However, all the information gratuitously nbmitted is not a pmt of
the record and the respondent requests the Court to strike those unsolicited statements made in
paragraph IIICA) of Appellant's brief.
B.

The History of Estate Recovery is Not Relevant.

The Department again tries in its Brief to avoid a discussion ah)ut the language of the
statutes, and case law which interprets them, in favor of the "we have always done it this way"
legal concept. Despite attempts, this author could not locate any cases which stand for the
proposition that improper application of the law becomes the law itself.
In the Department's reference to the first paragraph of the 1988 version of Idaho Code
56-218, no mention of extending a lien to the separate property of the surviving spouse is
found. It is the same ambiguous language found on the present statute ruld thus provides no
guidance for the court on the issues presented in this appeal.
C.

Federal Statute Definitions.
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The Federal statute granfng the States the right to

impose liens for recovery of Medicaid benefits is central to this case.

The Department made

conclusions [Appellant's Brief at paragraph IIl(B)] about the language of the statute, but despite
those conclusions they do not overcome the language of the statute as set lorIh below.

D.

The General Portion of the Statute.

The federal statute , pertinent to

this case, starts with the general statement that no recovery will be allowed, ~xcept for those items
set forth in 42 U.S.c. J396p(b)(J):
(b) Adjustment or recovery of medical assistance correctly paid urder a State plan.
(1) No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an
individual under the State plan may be made, except that the State shall seek adjustment
or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the
State plan in the case of the following individuals:

(A) In the case of an individual described in subsection (a ,(1 )(B) of this section, the
State shall seek adjustment or recovery from the indivMual's estate or upon sale
of the property subject to a lien imposed on account of medical assistance paid
on behalf of the individual.
(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when the
individual received such medical assistance, the State shall seek adjustment or
recovery from the individual's estate, but only for medical assistance consisting of
(i) nursing facility services, home and community-hased services, and related
hospital and prescription drug services, or
(ii) at the option of the State, any items or services under the State plan.'<'
As the Court can readily see, there is absolutely no federal statutory basis for recovery from
the spouse's estate.

The word "individual" cannot be reasonably ccnstrued as meaning from

another's separate property.
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E.

The Definition Section.

The federal statute has defi:r5,tions which explain the

intention of the recovery legislation (contrary to the Idaho statute). The definition section, 42
U.S.c. J396p(b)(4), is quoted in pertinent part:

"(4) For purposes ofthis subsection, the term "estate", with respect to a deceased individual

(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included within the
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State prohate law; and
(B) may include, at the option of the State (and shall include, in the case of an

individual to whom paragraph (1)(C)(i)* applies) [*if the Medicaid was
improperly granted], any other real and personal property and other assets in
which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the
extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or
assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common,
survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.
(emphasis
added)
The definition section of the federal statute specifically menticns only "individual" and
"individual's estate".

At no place in the entire federal statute will the Court find any language

which mentions a spouse, a spouse's assets, a spouse's estate, a spouse':; separate property, or the
like.

This case does not include any of the arrangements such as joint tenants, etc described in

U.S.c. J396p(b)(4). The Magistrate specifically found that the federal E:ta1ute mentioned some of

the arrangements to which a lien would apply, and found that those arrangements do not exist in the
case at bar.
In fact, applying statutory principles of construction, the failure to specifically grant a
remedy against a spouse, or a spouse's separate estate, or a spouse's separate property, when the
right to recovery is only given as an exception to the anti-lien rule, shows there is no right of
recovery against Emerson's separate property. Without it, all of the Appellant's arguments faiL
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If Congress intended the separate property estate of the non-Medicaid spouse to available for
recovery, it would have been included in the language of the statute.

Its failure to do so is, by

statutory construction, is evidence of Congress prohibiting recovery from the non-Medicaid
spouse's separate property. Barg, supra; C. Forsman Real Estate Co. v. Jlatch, 97 Idaho 511, 515,
547 P.2d 1116, 1120 (1976); Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 478, 50 P.3d 488,493
(2002); and Callies v. O'Neal, 216 P.3d 130 (Idaho, 2009).
See also State v. Maybee, Docket No. 35200 (Idaho 1115/2010) (Idaho, 2010) which stated:
"rules of statutory construction dictate that a reviewing court shall not interpret a statute in a
manner that leads to an absurd result, In re Daniel W., 14,5 Idaho 677, 183 P.3d 765, 768
(2008), and the legislature in drafting a statute is charged with knowledge of applicable
statutory background and legal precedent. DrufJel v. State, Deptt of Transp., 136 Idaho 853,
856,41 P.3d 739, 742 (2002). "
There has been no authority offered by the Department which agrees with its interpretation
of the federal statute. The federal statute is clear and unambiguous, and s:ates that only the "estate"
of the recipient or property to which the recipient had an interest at death, are liable for recovery.

F.

In re the Estate of Barg.

The Department has not pointed this Court to any decision which contradicts the wellfounded and articulated case of In re the Estate of Barg, 752 N. W. 2

nd

54(Afinn. 2008), hereinafter

Barg. The Barg case was not cited by the Jackman court because Barg was decided nearly 10

years later. If the Jackman court had been privy to the analysis of the B{jrg case, it is likely the
flawless logic ofthat decision would have found its way into the Idaho SUJreme Court's decision.
The law as it stands today, has the Jackman case disallowin~; recovery from the nonrecipient spouse's separate property. It was the post-1993 federal statute, which was analyzed by
Barg. Despite the Department's attempt to paint Jackman with a pre-1993 statute, and disregard
Barg, is pre versus post-1993 statute analysis is without any substance. As the Court is aware, State
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statutes are trumped by the federal legislation, and the Idaho Supreme Court has so stated recently in

Hudelson, 146 Idaho 439 (2008):
"The Court considered 42 U.S.C. § 1396p, the anti-lien provision of the federal Medicaid
statute, and found that it limited a state's ability to recover medical expenses it paid on a
Medicaid recipient's behalf. Id. at 284,126 S. Ct. at 1763,164 LEd.2d at 473-74. A state

Medicaid plan must comply with section 1396p, which generally prohibit's states from
placing liens against a Medicaid recipient's property. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(18)."
(emphasis added).

Hudelson brings home the truth about the Medicaid statute. It is a prohibition against any
recovery unless specifically authorized by the exceptions in the fede:ral statute. The statute is
"anti-lien". Thus, there is no right to recovery (under Idaho law) unless tte federal Medicaid statute
authorizes it specifically as an exception to the mandatory lien prohibition of the statute.
rd

Barg was quoted in a Missouri case, In re the Estate of Bruce, 2(0 S.W. 3 398 (Mo. App.
2008) where an award in favor of the State of Missouri was reversed where tenancy in entirety was
involved. In Bruce, supra, the Supremacy clause required Missouri

":0

comply with 42 USC

1396p(b)(4)B. Missouri's claim was disallowed based on the same rationale as in the case at bar.
Bruce makes the very same distinction as Respondent and Judge Frates a~, to subsection (b)(4)B, as
well as agreeing with Respondent's interpretation of subsection (b)(4)A. In fact, tenancy by the
entirety is very similar to Idaho's Community Property.

G.

Jackman.

The case of Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Jackmal,!, 132 Idaho 213 ([998),
hereinafter Jackman, as it applies to this case is interesting, but not helpflll to the State. Should the
State attempt to use before this Court what it has previously described as a "draft" of the Jackman
case, the Court should entirely ignore the same and not give it any weight whatsoever.

The

Respondent states its position relatively thereto hereinafter, but the same should not be construed as
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an admission that such has any legal right or weight in this case, but only as rebuttal to any such
claim of the Appellant.

Jackman is cited in national pUblications for the following proposi;:ion:
"States have, however, occasionally been aggressive agaim:t the estate of a surviving
spouse, even when this appears to fly in the face of the law. [See Idaho Dep't of Health and
Welfare v Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6 (1998), which permitted recovery after the
death of the surviving spouse,

to the extent of the predeceasing recipient-spouse's

community interest acquired after institutionalization." See Elder Law Answer Book,
Second Edition, Aspen Publishers, Robert B. Fleming and Lisa .Nachmias Davis, authors.
Other than the Department's contention that the Idaho Supreme C)urt decided the Jackman
case incorrectly, and revised it (the evidence of which is an unsigned and unfiled draft presented by
Mr. Cartwright), the reported Jackman case, found at 132 Idaho 213 (1998) reads exactly the way
the national publications have depicted it.
The Court is not authorized to use the unpublished, unsigned, and unauthenticated "draft" as
authority for the position of the Idaho Supreme Court in any case, let alone this one.
What is probative is the language of the federal statute and statutory construction.

IV.
STATE PROPERTY LAW
A.

Separate Property. As to Emerson's separate property, Idaho law clearly states

that separate property is exempt from any interest of a spouse.

Idaho Code 32-903 states as follows:
"All property of either the husband or the wife owned by him 0.' her before marriage, and
that acquired afterward by either by gift, bequest, devise or deSCEnt, or that which either he
or she shall acquire with the proceeds of his or her separate property, shall remain his or her
sole and separate property. "
Separate property in Idaho is guarded by the Courts. The owner i:; free to do with his or her
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separate property as he or she pleases, including gifting, devising, or transferring, without any notice
to a spouse. See Simpiot v. Simpiot, 96 Idaho 239,526 P.2d 844 (Idaho, 1974) which stated:
"The right to preserve separate property was acknowledged in the 1vfalone case."
In Vanwassenhove v. Vanwassenhove, 134 Idaho 198 (Idaho App., 2000) the Idaho Court of
Appeals reinforced this concept by holding:
"It is a well-settled principle of Idaho community property law that only net income
from separate property becomes community property. Malone v. Malone, 64 Idaho 252,261,
130 P.2d 674, 678 (1942); Weilmunster v. Weilmunster, 124 Idaho 227, 236, 858 P.2d 766,
775 (CLApp. 1993).
The Idaho Supreme Court has explained that to "hold otherwise
would cause the community to, in time, entirely consume the separate estates of the members
thereof and would nUllify [§ 32-903] and [§ 32-906] of the code." Malone, 64, Idaho at 261,
130 P.2d at 678. Thus, the net income rule protects both "the rights and interests of
individual spouses in the preservation and maintenance of separa~)roperty as well as ...
the interests of the community." Houska v. Houska, 95 Idaho 568, 571,512 P.2d 1317,1320
(1973). (emphasis added).
The right of the Department to recover money, lawfully paid on behalf of an institutionalized
spouse, hereinafter the Medicaid spouse, is restricted by the terms of thE federal statute governing
Medicaid, and by Idaho's separate property statute and case law. The C:mrt is asked to remember
that even if this legislature subsequently sees fit to lay claim to the non-Medicaid spouse's separate
property, it is not lawful to do so unless the federal Medicaid statute authorized it as an exception to
the prohibition against recovery.

B.

Statutory Construction Belies the Department's Entire Case.

Had

the

Idaho

legislature have intended to apply Ida/tO Code 56-218(1) to the separate property of the nonrecipient spouse, it could have so stated.

Its failure to do so is deemed to have expressed its

intention not to do so. With the (a) legislative history showing community property of the nonrecipient spouse to be the only target available to the statute, (b) the legislature's failure to state
therein that separate property was a part of the estate of the non-recipient spouse, and (c) it's failure
to provide for the same in a definition section of the statute, there is no way to read Idaho Code 56RESPONDENrS BRIEF-19

218(1) to include separate property of the non-recipient spouse as recoverable. In fact, statutory
construction makes such an interpretation unreasonable.
The Idaho Supreme Court stated in Kelso & Irwin, PA v. State ins. Fund, 134 Idaho 130
(Idaho, 2000) as follows:
"An interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which we exercise free
review. See State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, 130 Idaho 727, 732, 947 P.2d 400, 405
(1997). Additionally, if it is necessary for this Court to interpret a statute, then we will
attempt to ascertain legislative intent. Id. at 733, 947 P.2d at 406. Finally, in construing a
statute, this Court may examine the language used, the reasom.bleness of the proposed
interpretations, and the policy behind the statute. Id."
As mentioned infra, the legislature in drafting a statute is chHrged with knowledge of
applicable statutory background and legal precedent.

c.

Transfer Not Important Argument.

The

Depanment

claims

ill

it's

Appellant's Brief that the proper analysis is as follows: "The Correct Question L'i Whether The

Property Of This Estate, Even

If Vivian Transferred It, Remains An Asset Subject To Estate

Recovery." However, that conclusion still must be supported by the definition of "assets" under 42
U.S.c. J396p(h)(J) which the Department has seriously misinterpreted.

42 U.S.c. 1396p(h)(J)

applies a definition for property not received by either spouse. This provision clearly is intended to
prohibit a Medicaid recipient from transferring property into such an entiTY as a living trust, LLC or
other entity, or transferring to an insider within five years of eligibility.

It does not prohibit a

transfer over five years prior to the application for Medicaid, so long as a spouse ends up with it. If
it ends up in an entity to which the federal statute has allowed the states to seek recovery, then it is
recoverable. We don't have that case here.

It is likely, although not pertinent to this case, that a

person may transfer his or her separate property in any manner it sees fit, so long as it is not into an
entity in which the Medicaid recipient spouse has a legal interest.
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The proper statute for assessing if an asset is recoverable is 42 0.8.(;. 1396p(b)(4).

It has

been discussed infra, however to fully rebut that issue disguised by <{he Appellant's Brief, an
"estate" has been defined by 42 U.S.C J396p(b)(4) as follows:
"(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", with respect to a deceased individual
(A)

shall include all real and personal property and other a:,sets included within the
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; and

(B)

may include, at the option of the State (and shall include, in the case of an individual
to whom paragraph (1 )(C)(i)* applies) [*if the Medicaid was improperly granted],
any other real and personal property and other assets in which the individual had anv
legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including
such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual
through ioint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorsbi111life estate, livingjrust,
or other arrangement.

D.

Automatic Transfers at Death.

Just as Idaho Code 56-218m does not allow a

life estate to avoid recovery, it is following 42 U.S.C 1396p(b)(4)(B) which specifically allows
(contrary to the anti-recovery statute) recovery against certain types of attempts to remove assets
from a Medicaid recipient's estate, such as joint tenancies, life estates, aild those other specifically
allowed recoveries. Judge Frates properly interpreted the same.

The Department criticizes Judge

Frates' insight into the intricacies of the federal statute, but that critiGism is unfounded as the
automatically transferred methods are clearly excluded from the anti-recovery portion of the statute
and thus makes them recoverable.
recoverable under subsection (b)(4)(B).
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Nothing else, including Emerson's separate property, is

V.

PERRY DECISION

The Department was not only having trouble applying the "we have always done it this 'Nay"
theory of recovery in the case at bar, but it was under attack for it's failure to follow the law
regarding the same issue as before this court. In Perry, the Department was trying to lien separate
property. The case was in Ada County, before Judge Beiter.

Attached hereto is a copy of the

Affidavit of Pete Sisson, attorney representing the estate in the Perry decision. It includes the claim
of lien of the Department, the Notice of Disallowance of the Departments Claim, Petition for
Allowance of Claim and Objection thereto, Order Disallowing the Claim, i.e. the Perry decision.
Further, it is counsel's understanding that Judge Bieter allowed attorney's fees and costs against the
Department in Bieter.
The Perry decision represents the flaws in the Department's "we have always done it this
way" theory as to the same issues as presented in the case at bar. Perry was another defeat of the
Department's theory of recovery, i.e. "we will do it until someone stops us."
In this case, the flaw is exposed. Neither Pete Sisson nor this aubor knew of the contest of
each of their respective clients until after the Perry decision was handed down. The Department
failed to advise the Court, or opposing counsel, of the companion case in Ada County.
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VI.
THE ESTATE IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS
PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE 12-117

A.

The Statute.

Idaho Code 12-117 was enacted to provide mandatory relief to

estates which have incurred attorney's fees and costs because a governmental agency acted without
any basis in law or fact.

Idaho Code 12-117 reads as follows:
"In any administrative or civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state
agency, a city, a county or other taxing district and a person, 1he court shall award the
prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court
finds that the party against whom the judgment is rendered acted without a reasolllable
basis in fact or law."
In the Memorandum decision, Judge Frates found the Department's interpretation of federal
law to be unreasonable. Such is all that is required for an award of attomey's fees pursuant to this
code section.
B.

Case Law.

This statute has been applied against the State of Idaho regarding it's improper attempt to
impose its lien under the very same code section, Idaho Code 56-218.

See In re the Mmter of

Estate (~r Elliott which stated as follows:

" [I]n any administrative or civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state
agency, a city, a county or other taxing district and a person, ;:he court shall award the
prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court
finds that the party against whom the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis
in fact or law. I.e. § 12-117(1)(2004). This Court has held thai the purpose of this statute
is "two-fold: '(1) to serve as a deterrent to groundless or arbitrary agency action; and (2) to
provide a remedy for persons who have borne unfair and unjustified financial burdens
defending against groundless charges or attempting to correct mistakes agencies never
should ha[ve] made." Rincover v. State, Dep't of Fin., Secs. Bureau, 132 Idaho 547, 549,976
P.2d 473,475 (1999) (quoting Bogner v. State Dep't of Revenue & Taxation, 107 Idaho 854,
859, 693 P.2d 1056, 1061 (1984)). If the Court determines that a party acted without a
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reasonable basis in fact or law, an award of attorney fees under I.C § 12-117 is mandatory.
Id."

c.

No Facts.

Idaho Code 12-117 is applicable to the present case. The State had no

law upon which it could make a cogent argument.

Furthermore, the facts of the case clearly

showed, as the State so stipulated, that the property the State was seeking to lien was not community
property of Mr. and Mrs. Wiggins, not the separate property of Mrs. \Viggins, but the separate
property of Emerson D. Wiggins. There are no facts upon which the Staff could have been justified
in bring this lien claim.
D.

On Appeal. The Respondent requests attorney's fees and costs on appeal pursuant to

Idaho Code 12-117.
VII.

THE ESTATE IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS
PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE 12-121
The Estate was clearly the prevailing party in every issue in this case. The Estate is entitled
to attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code 12-121, becam:e of
unreasonable actions and positions taken by the State.

the frivolous and

Idaho Code 12-121 confers the broad

power of the court to "award reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing patty or parties" in any civil
action. An award under this code section requires an analysis of IRep 54(e), which generally
provides that attorney fees can only be awarded when the Court finds, fro m the facts presented, that
the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.
By way of synopsis, the following reasons show the State's attempt to lien Emerson's
separate property was frivolous under Idaho Code 12-121:
a.

Joint Probate:

First, the Department claimed that the filing of a joint probate

rendered it's lien valid against Emerson. The filing of a joint
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probml~,

when the schedules of

property show that all the money in the estate was the separate property of Emerson, is completely
valid. In fact, joint probates are filed all the time, but which decedent owns property is set forth in
the schedules. The claim that a joint filing makes the State's lien effective is frivolous.

Filing a

joint probate did not transmute Emerson's separate property into community property or into
property to which the State's lien attaches.
b.

Emerson's Separate Property: Second, the Department claimed that the fact that

there was no Marriage Settlement Agreement or the like had an impact on the Court's decision.
That claim is frivolous. In open Court, as well as by written stipulation, the Department stipulated
that the property at issue in this case is Emerson's separate property.
c.

Perry: The Department claimed the Perry decision did nJt address the dispositive

authorities. That claim is frivolous. The Perry decision discussed the appropriate statutes, both
federal and state and the dispositive case, In re the Estate of Barg, 752 N W 2nd 54(Minn. 2008).
d.

Failure to Alert. The State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare, lost the

identical issue in the Perry case. The State failed to alert the Court or opposing counsel of the Perry
decision, despite it's obvious relevance to this case. The failure to disdose disposition, relevant
case law would be the subject of a bar reprimand if done by private counsel. The State of Idaho's
counsel should be held to a higher standard. The State's blatant failure to disclose is relevant to the
issue of attorneys fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code 12-121.
e.

The State has denied the obvious intention and effect of it's own stipulation put on

record before the Magistrate.
f.

The State attempted to convince the Magistrate that the Personal Representative had

a conflict whereby the Estate could not collect attorney's fees despite Idaho Code 15-3-720 which
provides in pertinent part:
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"a personal representative who defends or prosecutes any proceeding in good faith, whether
successful or not.... is entitled to receive from the estate his necessary expenses and
disbursements including reasonable+ attorney's fees incurred."
g.

On Appeal. The Respondent requests attorney's fees and costs on appeal pursurmt to

Idaho Code 12-121.

VIII.
COSTS
A.

Costs Generally:

In Idaho, "costs" incurred in an action are to be paid as set fortb in the rules of the court.
Idaho Code 12-101 states as follows:
"12-101. Costs. Costs shall be awarded by the court in a civil trial or proceeding to the
parties in the manner and in the amount provided for by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure."
B.
54(d)(1)(C).

Costs as a Matter of Right.

Costs as a matter of right [Lre set forth in lRCP

Those costs include service fees. The cost of subpoenaing witnesses is such a cost.

The Estate is entitled to recover the $20.00 it spent for the subpoena service. The Court on appeal is
requested an award of those costs, as more fully set forth in Exhibit A to the Affidavit of R. Brad
C~lse

in chief. Further, costs

Discretionary costs are also allowed pursuant to IRCP 54(d)(I)(n).

The Court on appeal,

Masingill in Support of Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs filed in the
on appeal are requested.

in addition to an award of costs on appeal, is requested to affirm the award of costs for the
consultation with an elder law expert, Dennis Voorhees, in the amount of $700.00.
Additionally, IRCP 54(e)(5) provides for attorney's fees as costs. The fees incurred
to Dennis Voorhees were awarded by the Court and are requested to be further awarded on
appeal under the not to well known provision of IRCP 54.
present case by virtue of IRCP 54(e)(8) which provides:
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That awa:rd is applicable to the

"The provisions of this Rule 54(e) relating to attorney fees shall be applicable to all claims
for attorney's fees made pursuant to section 12-121, Idaho Code, and to any claim for
attorney fees made pursuant to any other statute, or pursuant to any contract, to the extent
that the application of this Rule 54(e) to such a claim for attorney fees would not be
inconsistent with such other statute or contract."

CONCLUSION
In summary, the following facts and law support the position that the Department's
attempted lien against Emerson's separate property must fail:
a. The lien filed by the Department only applied to property to which Vivian had an interest
as of the date of death, and does not apply against Emerson's sf'parate property; and
h. The Department provided Vivian and Emerson with a Marria ge Settlement Agreement
which transmuted their community property to their respective separate property; and
c. The Federal statute clearly provides what the State may recov'~r. It can only recover (i)
property in Vivian's estate, (ii) property Vivian had an interest in at death, and (iii)
community property of Emerson; and
d. Jackman, the only Idaho case dealing with this issue, has concluded that the Department
can only seek recovery against the community property of the spouse; and
e. Barg, the most thorough and logical interpretation of the fed,~ral statute, concludes the
federal statute does not permit recovery from Emerson's separate property; and
f.

All the documents in the Wiggins file, entered into evidencels Exhibit's A through G,
fail to advise the Wiggins of the remedy the Department nov! seeks against Emerson's
separate property; and

g. Transmutation of community property to separate property, only to seek recovery of the
separate property upon the death of the non-recipient spom;e, is contradictory to the
Department's position; and
h. The 1993 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993,42 V:S.C. 1396p(b)(1), and (4)
(the federal statute) allows recovery only against the "individmJ's estate; and
i.

Idaho Code 56-218 and Idaho case law makes recovery a:~;ainst Emerson's separate
property subject to the federal statute, which disallows it; and
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j.

Recovery against Emerson's separate property is not supported by federal law.

k. In re Perry supports the Magistrate's decision that the Department's lien
applicable to a non-recipient spouse's separate property.

IS

not

The Estate is the prevailing party and entitled to attorney's
Idaho Code 12-117, on the underlying case and on appeal.

£~es

and costs pursuant to

m. The Estate is the prevailing party and entitled to attorney's
Idaho Code 12-121, on the underlying case and on appeal.

:D~es

and costs pursuant to

1.

For all the reasons set forth above, this Court is left with no authority upon which to grant
the State a lien against Emerson's separate property.

Because the law is so clear, it is up to the

Department to appeal any decision and thereby explain to the Idaho Supreme Court why Idaho's
statute would be allowed to exceed its federal mandate.

Respectfully s~7/tted,

1JJj~---,,---it_~{}Jl_,
~.
Brad MasIngill
Attorney for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

ill.

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT on the ~ day of October, 2010, a tme and correct copy of
the foregoing Respondent's Brief was mailed by regular United States mail, postage prepaid thereon
to the following:

Lynn Wi1gins
1520 W. 2" Street
Weiser, ID 83672

Idaho Department of Health and Welfare
c/o Corey Cartwright
Estate Recovery Officer
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 836720-0036
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BRENDA
R. BRAD MASINGILL
Attorney at Law
27 W. Commercial Street
P.O. Box 467
Weiser, Idaho 83672
Telephone #1(208)414-0665
Fax #1(208)414-0490

Email: bmasingiUla).hotmail.com

IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE STATE OF ID \.[10
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTO''l

IN THE MATTER OF THE
ESTATES OF:
VIVIAN M. WIGGINS
EMERSON D. WIGGINS

)
)
)
)
)
)

AFFIDAVIT Of
PETER C. SISSii)N

)
Deceased.

)
)
)

STA TE OF IDAHO )
: S5.

County of Ada

)

PETER C. SISSON, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am legal counsel for the Personal Representative ("PR") of the Estate in"

The Matter of George D. Perry, Case No. CV IE 0905214, Fourth kdicial District Count
of Ada., State of Idaho (,"Perry Estate"). I make this affidavit based ml my personal

knowledge.
2.

Attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit.\ is a true and correct

copy of the State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare's ("Department") Claim
Against Estate filed in the Perry Estate on April 13,2009.
AfFlDA VIT OF PETER C. SISSON - Page 1

3.

The PR filed a Notice of Disallowance of Claim on ltne 2. 2009, a true

and correct copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit B.
4.

The Department then filed a Petition for Allowance of Claim on June 11th,

2009. a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto and incorpcrated herein as
Exhibit C.
5.

In response to the Department's Petition for Allowanc:: afClaim the PR

filed an Objection to Petition for Allowance of Claim on June 23, 2009. a true and correct
copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit n.
6.

The matter came before the Honorable Christopher M. Bieter, Magistrate

Judge, on February 26, 2010, for oral argument. Judge Bieter issued lis Order
Disallowing Claim on March 10.2010, a true and correct copy of which is attached
hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit E.

Funher your affiant sayeth naught.
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Exhibit A

LA WRENCE G. WASDEN
ATIORNEY GENERAL
STATE Of IDAHO
JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH
Deputy Attorney General
Chiet: Division of Human Services
LARRY L. GOINS
Deputy Attorney General
Division of Human Services
3276 Elder, Ste. B
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036
Telephone: (208) 332-7961
ISB No. 2295
(goinsJ@dhw-idahoogovJ

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICr OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF A 01\

rN THE MA TIER OF THE ESTATE
OF

)
)

Case No. CV IE 0905214

)

GEORGE D. PERRY,

Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)

CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE
(I.C. § 15-3-804)
EXEMPT: I.e. § 31-3212

COMES NOW the State ofIdaho, Department of Health and Welfare (the "Department"),
through undersigned counsel, and hereby makes claim against the above-captioned estate. This
claim is based upon the Claimant's statutory right to recover the amount of m{;dical assistance paid
on behalf ofthe Decedent's spouse, MARTHA 1. PERRY, as set forth at Idaho Code § 56-218. The
Claimant has paid medical assistance benefits on behalf of the Decedent's spouse MARTHA 1.
PERR Y in the amount of SI06,251.08, as of April 8, 2009. To the extent mat the Claimant is

CLAIM j\GAINST EST ATE - I
Y:\MR{o.._&I<:'J>m-yM\f"&o.wpd

obligated to make further medical assistance payments on behalfof the Dececent's spouse, it reserves
the right to supplement its claim.
IMPORTANT: This claim is made in accordance with the Departnerlt's right to establish
its claim pursuant to Idaho Code § 56-218. As long as the decedent's spou;;e survives, there is no

demand for payment of this claim. This claim is made against any property or estate which, at any
time, had been the community property of the decedent and decedent's spouse, or which had been
the property of decedent's spouse. The Department will Dot object to distribution of the estate
to the decedent's surviving spouse. However, the Department demands that. before any other

distribution of the estate, adequate provision be made for the furure paymeJlt of the Department's
claim pursuant to Idaho Code § 15-3-81O(b)(2). Transfers of property by either spouse (except to
one another), including transfers by will and the failure to claim probate allowances, may affect the
eligibility of the survivor for Medicaid services, and may be set aside in accordan~::e with Idaho Code
§ 56-218(2).

DATED this ~ day of April, 2009.

Deputy Attorney General
VERIFICATION

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

) ss.
)

JULIE RAICHART, being first duly sworn, deposes and statcs; That [am the Claimant's
Paralegal; that I have read the above and foregoing claim against the decedent's ~tate and know the
contents thereof; and that, to my knowledge and belief, the facts stated thereir: ar,~ true and correct.

LIE RAICHART, Parllegal
CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE -2
Y:'\MRC~"",~hl\CkD,"';>d

SUBSCRlBED AND SWORN to before me this

13th

day of AIlril, 2009.

Commission Expires:

g;--I tf-- ;;0 13

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

TIlE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES that duplicate originals of the foregoing
L3 day ofApril,

CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE were mailed first class, postage prepaid, on the
2009, to:

BARBARA K MCCORMICK
c/o PETER C SISSON
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2402 W JEFFERSON ST
BOISE 10 83702
ADA COUNTY CLERK
ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE
200 W FRONT STREET
BOISE 10 83702

~/W>J., 0 LC~

Marche e Premo, LegE!1 ASSistant
Division of Human Services

CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE - 3
Y:IMIU-ascs'f.sulcli'CflyMIC.tD-wpd

Exhibit B

Peter C. Sisson
SISSON & SISSON
The Elder Law Firm, PLLC
2402 West Jetferson Street
Boise. Idaho 8) 702
Tel: (108) 387-0729

Fax: (208) 331-5009
Idaho State Bar # 4682
Attorney for Personal Representative

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE Of IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IN THE MATIER OF:
GEORGE D. PERRY.
Deceased.

Case No. CV IE 0905214

NOTICE OF DISALLOWANCE
OF CLAIM
(I.e. 15-3-806)

TO: THE DEAPRTMENT OF IlEALTH AND WELFARE. Claimant.
The undersigned personal representative of the above-entitk-d estate hereby disallows
your claim for $ t 06.25) .08 (and any supplemental claim for further medical assistance payments
made on behalf of Decedent's spouse) presented on April 13.2009. Claimant's reliance upon

I. C. § 56-218 to make its claim "against any property or estate which. at any ti me. had been the
community property of the decedent and decedent's spouse, or which had heen the property of
decedent's spouse" exceeds the scope of recovery allo\\'cd by federal law. is preempted by
federal law. and is hereby disallowed.

NOTICE OF DISALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - I
File 1#11-197

Claimant"s demand that "before any other distribution of the estal.t~. adequate provision be

made for the future payment of the Department's claim pursuant to I.e. § 15-3-81O(b)(2)" is also
hereby disallowed because no assets of the estate are subject to the Claimant's claim. nor will
they be upon Decedent's spouse' s death.
Failure to protest the disallowance by filing a petition for allowanec in the above named
court. or commencing a proceeding against the undersigned. within sixty (60) days after the
mailing of this norice shall result in your claim for the disallowed amount indicated above being
forever barred.
DATED this

~day of June. 2009.

~ ,f4~<_zt?k ~

~BARA K. McCORlvHCK
Personal Representative

STA TE OF IDAHO
: 55.

County of Ada
On this ~ day of June. 2009. before me personally appeared Barbara K. McCormick.
known to me (or proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence) to be the person whose name
is subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that she e',ecuted the same.

ITNESS WHEREOF. I have hereunto set my hand and seal the day and year in

Notary Public in and for the State of Idaho
Residing at Ald7i1;?JJ. Idaho
My commission expires :2
Mil.

-1£ '.

NOTICE OF DISALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 2
File #OJI-197

Exhibit C
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH

Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Human Services Division
LARRY L. GOINS
Deputy Attorney General

Division of Human Services
3276 Elder Street., Suite B
P.O. Box. 83720
Boise, Idaho 8372()"'()()36
Telephone: (208) 332-7961
ISB No. 2295
[goinsl@dhw.idaho.gov]

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IN THE MATIER OF THE ESTATE OF

GEORGE D. PERRY,
Deceased.

)

Case No. CV IE 0905214

)
)
)
)
)

OF CLAIM

PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE

COMES NOW the State ofidaho, DepartmentofHeaJth and Welfare (Department), claimant
in the above matter, by and through its attorney, LARRY L. GOINS, Deputy Attorney General, and
pursuant to Idaho Code § 15-3-806(b), petitions the Court as follows:
1.

The Department has paid medical assistance (Medicaid) bmefits on behalf of the

decedent's surviving spouse, MARWA J. PERRY in the amount of $109,464.23 to date;
2.

After appointment and pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 15-3-804 and 56-218, a written

statement of the Department's claim in the amount of 106,251.08, was timely mailed to the Personal
Representative of the estate and filed with the Court on April 15, 2009;

PETITION FOR ALLOWANeE OF CLAIM - 2

.,
3.

The Department's statutory claim is just and valid, and paymcl'J should be allowed for

the total amount ofmedical assistance paid on behalf of the decedent' s surviving spouse to the fullest
extent possible.

WHEREFORE, THE DEPARTMENT REQUESTS that the Court (:[Iter an Order allowing
the above listed claim to be paid to the fullest extent possible.
DATED this ~ day of June, 2009.

~;.-Deputy Attorney Genera 1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing PETmON
FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM was mailed first class, postage prepaid on the U'
day of
June, 2009, to:
BARBARA K MCCORMICK

cIa PETER C SISSON
SISSON & SISSON

2402 W JEFFERSON ST
BOISE,ID

~C!t(J.Wh Q2:q
Marche Ie Premo, Legal Assistant

PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 2

Q

Exhi'bit D

N)----FiiRr-____
A~______~

Peter C. Sisson
SISSON & SiSSON
The Elder Law Firm, PLLC
2402 West Jefferson Street

JUN 252009
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
By Rrc NELSON
DeP01Y

Boise. idaho 83702
Tel: (20g) 387-0729
Fax: (208) 331-5009
Idaho State Bar # 4682
Attorney for Personal Representative

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DI~;TRlCT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY 0: ADA

IN THE MA TIER OF:

Case No. CV IE 0905214

GEORGE D. PERRY.

OBJECTION TO PETITION
FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM

Deceased.

COMES NOW. Barbara K. McConnick. the Personal Representative of the above-named
t.!state. by and through her attorney Peter C. Sisson. and hereby objects to the Petition for
Allowance of Claim tiled herein by the State ofIdaho. Department of Health mod Welfare.

This Objection is based on the Memorandum in Support of Objectiorl to Petition for
AlIO\\"ancc of Claim and affidavil(s) in support to be tiled in this matter. Oral argument is
requested at the hearing to be set on this matter. Time for creditor claims runs on August 10.

1009. The Personal Representative will notice up a hearing on this matter alter that date.
DATED this

&01"

June. 2009. ,.

~~-L.~

_ _ __

I hTER (. SISSON
Attorney for Personal Represen tative

O.J8ECTION TO PETITION fOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - I
Pile #fl8-197

Exh.ibit E

representative of George's estate, sold the Tendoy home and has preserved the net
proceeds of the sale in an estate account. This money is the only signiricant asset of
George's estate.

On April 15,2009, the Department filed its claim against George's estate and on
June 4,2009, Ms. McConnick filed a notice of disallowance of the cla1im. Pursuant to
Idaho Code 15-3-806, on June 15,2009. the Department filed its Petition for Allowance
of Claim which is now before the court.

ll. Issues Presented.
The ultimate issue is: May the Department recover Medicaid henefits that it has
paid to Martha (who is still living) from George's estate--the proceeru; of the sale of the
Tendoy home? Under the Department's reasoning, since Martha had an interest in the
Tendoy home during the marriage (and after federal statutory change!! in 1993), it may
recover benefits paid in an amount equal to Martha's ownership inten::st from the
proceeds of the sale of the home. The personal representative (PR) argues that the
Department may only recover, from George's estate, an amount equal. to Martha's
interest in the Tendoy home at the time of her death. Since Martha is still living and
neither this home nor its proceeds will ever pass to her, the PR denies that the
Department may recover any amount.
The foundation of the Department's claim is Idaho Code 15-:6-218( 1) which
provides:
Recovery of certain medical assistance.-(I) Except where exempted or waived
in accordance with federal law medical assistance pursuant t(, this chapter
paid on behalf of an individual who was fifty-five (55) year so age or older when
the individual received such assistance may be recovered from the individual's
estate, and the estate of the spouse, if an):. for such aid paid to either or both:

ORDER DISALLOWING CLAllvi P4J$ 2
~J

(b) While one (1) spouse survives, except where joint probate wiH be authorized
pursuant to section 15-3-111, Idaho Code, a claim for recovery under this section
may be established in the estate of the deceased spouse.
(emphasis added)
The only Idaho case dealing with recovery of Medicaid benefits from the estate of
the recipient's spouse is Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. lacilman 132 Idaho
213 (1998).2 lackman's essential holding is that the Department is not limited to the
estate of the recipient for recovery of Medicaid benefits, but may recovelf appropriate
amounts from the estate of the recipient's spouse. The case was remanded to the probate
court for a determination of whether the Medicaid recipient (Hildor Knudson) had an
interest in community property, at the time of her death, the value of wh:ich, the court
suggested, could be recovered from her husband's estate.

lackman does not directly address the critical question for our c;,lSe: To what
time, during the marriage, may the court look in assessing a Medicaid re.:;ipient's interest

in property-any time (after 1993) during the couple's marriage or the bme of the
recipient's death. 3
The Department's claim depends upon an interpretation of the definitions of
"estate" and "assets" found in Idaho and federal statutes. 42 U.S.c. 1396p{b)(1)
provides:
No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf
of an individual under the State plan may be made, except that tlite State shall seek
adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an
individual under the State plan in the case of the following individuals:
2 In ie Estate of Kaminsky 141 Idaho 436 (2005) involved a claim to .recover Medicaid benefits from the
recipient's estate and was decided on the grounds that the Department's daimwas unimely.
3 Jackman certainly suggests that the time of the recipient's death is the determinative time: '1'he record
before us does not disclose whether Lionel and Hildor had any community property !!2 the time of Hildor's
death. If they did, Lionel's interest in that community property property may therefO! e be part of Hilder's
"estate" that 42 U.S.c. 1396p(b)(l)(B) and (4) authorizes the Department to recover I nd apply against the
balance of the Medicaid payments." ld. at 216. (emphasis added)
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(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or olcler when the
individual received such medical assistance, the State shall see:}: adjustment or
recovery from the individual's estate,
This statute goes on to define "estate" in 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4):
For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", with respect to a deceased
individual(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included within
the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; and
(8) may include, at the option of the State ... any other real an!! ,personal property
and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or iI:tterest at the time
of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets cionveyed to a
survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy
in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.

(emphasis added)
Finally, 42 U.S.C.1396p{h) contains general definition provisions:
(1) The term "assets", with respect to an individual, includes 2111 income and
resources of the individual and of th~individual's spouse, including any income
or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse is entitled to but
does not recei ve because of action(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse,
(B) by a person, including a court or administrati ve body, with legal
authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or such
individual's spouse, or
(C) by any person, including any court or administrative body, acting at
the direction or upon the request of the indi vidual or such individual's
spouse.

To paraphrase the Department's argument, it may recover from George's estate because

Idaho Code 56-218(1) allows recovery from the estate of a recipient'; spouse; 42 U.S.C.
l396p(b)(4) includes the word "assets" in its definition of "estate" ard 42 U .S.C.
1396p(h)(1) says "assets" includes property that a person transferred to her spouse. The
court cannot accept this interpretation.
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The reasoning urged by the Department is similar to that presented in Estate of
Winz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N. Dakota 2000). Clarence Wirtz had received Medicaid

benefits and North Dakota sought to recover the payments from the esta!): of Vema Witt,
Clarence's wife. The Wirtz court analyzed the federal statutory definitions of "estate" and

"asset" as quoted above and held that " ... any assets conveyed by Claren,::e Wirtz to
Vema Wirtz before Clarence Wirtz's death are subject to the department's recovery
claim." Id at 886. This ruling depends, however, on an awkward interpreta.tion of the
tenn "other arrangement" in 42 U.S.c. 1396p(b)(4)(B). The North Dakota. court in Wirtz
interpreted the "other arrangement" language independently from the fest of the section.
The bulk of the section refers to transfers of property that occur in an automatic fashion
on the death of the owner, such as joint tenancies, survivorship transfe1rs and life estates.
It would have been a drafter's nightmare to list every imaginable transfer of property of

this type. Consequently, the more natural interpretation in the context of the surrounding
language is that "other arrangement" is meant to include transfers of a similar, automatic
nature not any possible transfer.
The case of Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. 2008) provides a more
reasonable interpretation of the federal statutory language.
We conclude that there is no principled basis on which to interpret the
federal law to allow recovery of assets in which the Medicaid recipient did not
have an interest in at the time of her death. As explained above, the rationale
for finding authority to recover from a surviving spouse's estlte at all emanates
from the authority granted in the federal law to recover from the "estate" of the
Medicaid recipient Property transferred prior to death would not be part of the
recipient's estate. Further, as recognized by every decision except Wirtz, to the
extent the 1993 amendments allow states to expand the defin ition of "estate" for
Medicaid recovery purposes, the language of the federal Jaw clearly limits that
expansion to assets in which the recipiem had an interest at tile time of her death.
ld at 71._{emphasis added)
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Ill. Conclusion.
The federal statutory definition of "estate" does not include transfers of propeny
made by a Medicaid recipient before she died. When making a claim against the estate of

a Medicaid recipient's spouse, the Department may only recover against property in
which the recipient spouse had an interest at the time of her death. Martha Perry
conveyed all of her interest in the Tendoy home during her lifetime. There was no joint
tenancy, right of survivorship or "other arrangement" that would have conveyed any
interest in this property to Martha at George Perry's death. The Department may not
recover Medicaid benefits paid to Martha from the proceeds of the sale of this property.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Department's Petition for AHow:mce of claim is
denied.
DATED This 10th day of March, 2010.

CHRISTOPHER M. BIErER
Hon. Christopher M. Bieter
Magistrate Judge
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ARGUMENT

I.
WHAT IS NOT IN EVIDENCE
Without citation to anything in the record, the personal representative advances "facts"
that are completely unsupported in the record. For example, the persom~l representative states:
The transmutation agreement determined the amount of spend-down required of
Vivian before she could be eligible for Medicaid. Over the course of a year or two
after the transmutation agreement was executed, the Department determined that
Vivian had spent down her separate property and because she had no interest in
any other property, including Emerson's, Vivian was granted Medicaid eligibility.
Respondent's Brief, p. 1. The personal representative goes on to say:
The State supervised the spend-down of Vivian's only assets. The State made the
determination that Vivian had spent down all her assets and by YTIue thereof
qualified for Medicaid.
Respondent's Brief, p. 2. These "facts" are nothing more than surmise and conjecture by the
personal representative. There is absolutely no evidence that the "transmutation agreement" if it
existed, "determined the amount of spend-down required," or that the D:epartment determined
"that Vivian had spent down her separate property" "[0 ]ver the course of a year or two after the
transmutation agreement was executed," or that "[t]he State supervised the spend-down." None
of this is in the record. At best, it can be inferred from the record that tl:.e Department determined
that Vivian was "over-resource," i.e., had too much money to qualifY for Medicaid, and notified
the couple of how much would have to be "spent-down" to qualifY for l'Aedicaid. It can also be
inferred that, at a later date, Vivian was determined to be eligible for M ;dicaid benefits which
would normally require her to have less than $2,000 of her own funds. There is nothing in the
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record to suggest that the Department ever was presented with a marriag;e settlement agreement
or "transmutation agreement" as the personal representative calls it. Instead, it may have simply
been told that one existed. or assumed that one had been executed. The Denartment
"

1.

acknowledges that ifthis is so, it would have been an error on the part ofthe case worker.
The personal representative further asserts as "facts" that the Department "participated"
in the "transmutation agreement" (Respondent's Brief, p. 4), that the Department "did not inform
either Vivian or Emerson ... of it's intention to come after" the estate property (pp. 4 and 27),
that it was the "Department's own actions which transmuted the community property" (p. 12),
and that the "Department provided Vivian and Emerson with a Marriage Settlement Agreement"
(p. 27). None of these "facts" is supported by the record and are, at best, speculation by the
personal representative. The only evidence that a marriage settlement a,§;reement even existed is
the Department's stipulation that it treated Vivian "as though" she had one.! Assuming that one
existed at all, there is no evidence as to who drafted it, what its terms w,:re, when it was signed,
or by whom, or whether it met the formalities required by Idaho Code § 32-917. There is no
evidence that the Department provided it, or had anything to do with it at all. There is no
evidence that the Department supervised or participated in it. Nor can these "facts" be inferred
from the Department's stipulation that "the department treated the couple, Emerson and Vivian,
as thoug,.1} they had a marriage settlement agreement." Tr. p. 4, 11. 21-23 (underline added).

J The personal representative complains that the Department is "back[ing] out" of its stipulation, (Respondent's
Brief, p. 8), and further that the Department "denied the obvious intent and effect" of its stipulation (p. 25). The
Department continues to stand by what it stipulated to. It merely disagrees with the wild ;:xtrapolations drawn by the
personal representative to the Department's stipulation that "the department treated the ccuple, Emerson and Vivian, as
though they had a marriage settlement agreement." Tf. p. 4, 11. 21-23; see also Appellant's Brief, § V.
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Further, the personal representative tells the court, as if it were e~tab1ished fact, that its
witness was going to say that a "substantial amount" of marriage settlement agreements were lost
by the Department (Respondent's Brief, p. 9), then goes on to refer to the Department's "[g]iven
propensity to lose written agreements," while no such thing is in eviden.:e. 2 Id. The personal
representative then claims that the Department must not have told the decedents about future
recovery because there is no document affirmatively stating as much in the Department's case
file. Respondent's Brief, p. 27. There is no requirement in law or rule tix a written estate
recovery advisory to be given Medicaid applicants. 3 But if, as the personal representative seems
to think, there were such a requirement, the personal representative apparently believes the
Department's records are one hundred percent complete on every matter except the marriage
settlement agreement.
Finally, the personal representative falsely states that "[t]he Perry 'Magistrate, however,
found in favor of the Perrl estate on its motion for attorney's fees and costs." Respondent's

2The personal representative implies that the Department only stipulated that it treated Vivian as though she had
a marriage settlement agreement when confronted with what his witness was going to say. Respondent's Brief, pp. 8-9.
The personal representative may have forgotten that the Department assisted him in searching for a marriage settlement
agreement by voluntarily providing the entire case file, including narratives, and stipulating to its admission into the
record. There was no reason for the Department to deny that it had acted as though there 'Nere a marriage settlement
agreement, but the Department was never willing to stipulate that such an agreement actually existed. Moreover, the
claimed "propensity to lose written agreements" was never part of any stipulation.
3The personal representative leaves the court with the impression that the deced.;;nts didn't know that the
Department would seek to recover their assets after their deaths. However, neither the Dt;partment's ordinary advice
regarding estate recovery, nor any lack of notice is in evidence or inferrable from the record. Even in the unlikely event
the decedents were not advised of estate recovery after their deaths, as stated by the Supreme Court in Ada County
Highway Dist. v. Total Success Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 371, 179 P.3d 323,334 (2008), "Our entire legal
system is based upon the principle that persons are charged with constructive knowledge ufthe statutes and laws" quoting
Powers v. Canyon County, 108 Idaho 967,970,703 P.2d 1342, 1345 (1985). Moreover, ,here is no explanation as to how
the decedents would have paid the $272,134.68 paid by the Department had they declined Medicaid since there was only
$78,659.44 left in their estates at their deaths.

4In the matter o/George D. Perry, Ada County Case # CV IE 0905214. As discussed below, the magistrate's
disallowance of the Department's claim in Perry is on appeal to the District Court, Judge Kathryn Sticklen, presiding.
Oral argument is scheduled for November 18,2010.
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p. 3. Likewise, the personal representative states: "Further, it is ccul1se!'s understanding
that Judge Bieter allowed attorney's fees and costs against the Department in Bieter (sic)."
Respondent's Brief, p. 22. It would have been a simple matter to check the record in Perry to
discover the falseness of these claims. No costs or attorney fees were awarded in Perry.
The personal representative is also fond of quoting things the Department never said. For
example, the personal representative states, and puts the statement in quotes as if stated by the
Department: "we have always done it this way". Respondent's Brief, pp. 6, 13, and 22. On page
22, the personal representative adds, in quotations, the Department saying, ''we will do it until
someone stops us." Of course, the Department has never made any such statements, and if they
are intended as satire, they are of the crudest form.
Similarly, the personal representative states that "[t]he Department has commented that
they have taken other citizen's separate property in cases similar to this one, but no one has
objected." Respondent's Brief, p. 6. Again, if this is intended as a caricature or satire, it is of
such a crude form that any actual statement by the Department it is supposed to represent is
unidentifiable, and becomes merely a smear.

II.

REGARDING "CLAIMS" AND "LIENS"
The personal representative frequently refers to the Department's claim in this matter as a
"lien." He then cites State Dept. o/Health and Welfare v. Hudelson, 146 Idaho 439, 196 P3d
905 (2008) for the proposition that, "[a] state Medicaid plan must comj:ly with section 1396p,
which generally prohibit's states from placing liens against a Medicaid recipient's property."
Respondent's Brief, p. 17. However, Hudelson (a decision favorable tc the Department) was a
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casualty case under Idaho Code § 56-209b, not Idaho Code § 56-218, and therefore involved a
Medicaid recipient. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(a)(1) provides, in part:
(a) Imposition of lien against property of an individual en account
medical assistance rendered to him under a State plan
(1) No lien may be imposed against the property of any :l:1dividual prior to
his death on account of medical assistance paid or to be paid on his behalf under
the State plan, except ....
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(a)(I) (underline added). While it has little real use where there is no real
property involved, such as in this case, it is the current practice of the DC'Partment to file
electronic liens in the office of the Secretary of State in estate recovery cases. These liens are
authorized by Idaho Code § 56-218(6) which permits the Department to file a lien "against the
property of any estate subject to a claim." In this case, the electronic liens were filed November
17,2009, well after the death of both decedents. Therefore, section 1396p does not restrict the
liens filed here.
More importantly, this is not a lien foreclosure case. The Department has made no
attempt to foreclose its Medicaid liens. Rather, this matter involves a pmbate claim against the
decedent's estate. Idaho Code § 56-218(1) provides for this estate claim, which is distinct from
any lien. In fact, Idaho Code § 56-218(6), specifically states: "Failure tn file a notice oflien does
not affect the validity of claims made pursuant to this section." Therefcre, the Department's
claim against these decedents' estate stands independently from its Medcaid liens.
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III.
THE QUESTION OF SEPARATE VERSUS COMMUNITY
PROPERTY IS A RED HERRING IN THIS CASE.
The personal representative complains bitterly that the Department is seeking recovery of
property that, while formerly the decedents' community property, had h;;come the separate
property of Emerson Wiggins before his death. See e.g. Respondent's Brief, pp. 2 and 4. The
fact that the estate property had become Emerson Wiggins's separate property, however, is
completely irrelevant for several reasons: First, the property of the last to die of a couple will
always be separate property; Second, Idaho Code § 56-218(1) makes no distinction as to whether
estate property had been separate or community property; and Third, the Medicaid "debt" is a
debt chargeable against the spouse's separate property.
A.

11 a Joint Probate. the Estate Property Is Always the Separate Pr)perty of the Last to Die.
This is a joint probate. Idaho Code § 15-3-111 provides for join: probate and states as

follows:

15-3-111. Joint probate on death of survivor of marriage dissolved by
death - In cases in which a marital community has been dissolved by the death of
either spouse at any time, the survivor was then entitled to all of the property
of the decedent by will, law, or both. and the survivor died before any
proceeding had been commenced for the probate of the estate of the spouse whose
death occurred first, the estates of both decedents may be joined for probate in a
single proceeding in any court having jurisdiction of the estate 0 f the spouse
whose death occurred last. The three (3) year provision of section 5-3-108, Idaho
Code, applies only to the death of the spouse whose death occurred last. The
initial application or petition filed in any such joint proceeding ~hall contain a
statement of the facts upon which such joint proceeding is basee, b addition to all
other statements required by this code to be made therein.
Idaho Code § 15-3-111 (emphasis added). The very definition of a join t probate is a case where
the survivor is entitled to all of the property of the decedent, by whatever means. In other words,
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where joint probate is authorized, such as in this case, all of the couple's property has become the
separate property of the survivor. Idaho Code § 56-218(1) provides, in ~\art, for claims in joint
probate cases such as this:
(b) While one (1) spouse survives, except where joint pre bate will be
authorized pursuant to section 15-3-111, Idaho Code, a claim for recovery under
this section may be established in the estate of the deceased spouse.
(c) The claim against the estate of the first deceased spouse must be made
within the time provided by section 15-3-801(b), Idaho Code, if the estate is
administered and actual notice is given to the director as required by subsection
(5) of this section. However, if there is no administration of the estate ofthe first
deceased spouse. or if no actual notice is given to the director as required by
subsection (5) of this section. no claim shall be required until the tL.'TIe provided
for creditor claims in the estate of the survivor.
Idaho Code § 56-218(1)(b) and (c) (underline added). These sections recognize that under joint
probate, the property of the first deceased spouse passes to the survivor. There is only one estate
in a joint probate. That estate always consists of the separate property cfthe survivor.
The personal representative argues that the Statement ofPurpost! or the 2004 amendments
to Idaho Code § 56-218 suggests that recovery is only to be made from:he community property
of the Medicaid spouse. Respondent's Brief, p. 11. But that's not what it says:
The proposed legislation also makes a technical correction to Idaho Code 56-218
to clarify that the non-Medicaid spouse of a Medicaid recipient need not survive
the Medicaid recipient in order for the department to file a claim a~ainst the
community property of the non-Medicaid spouse's estate.
Statement of Purpose, RS 13525 (2004) (emphasis added). Since, as noted above, the property in
the estate of the survivor will always be his separate property by operat on of law, the reference
to community property must be to the property that had been community property prior to death.
Importantly, the Statement of Purpose does not refer to the community property of the Medicaid
spouse, but the community property of the non-Medicaid spouse. The reason for this is clear
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when it is understood that the non-Medicaid spouse's estate is only obligated for property which
had been community property or the property of the Medicaid spouse:

20. Limitations on Estate Claims.

***

A claim against the estate of a spouse of a participant is limited 1:0 L~e value of the
assets of the estate that had been, at any time after October L 1993, communitv
property, or the deceased participant's share of the separate propert'j, and jointly
owned property. * * *
IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20 (underline added).
This is why the personal representative is wrong about what happens "when two older
folks marry." Respondent's Brief, p. 11. Contrary to the assertions of the personal
representative, the Department does not recover from property which hes always been the
separate property of the non-Medicaid spouse. When a couple marries late in life, bringing their
separate property with them, they are not obligated for the Medicaid debt of the spouse, from
property which they retain as their separate property. That is what IDAP A 16.03.09.900.20 does,
it limits the Department's recovery to property which had been the couf Ie's community property,

or the property of the Medicaid recipient. 5
B.
Idaho Code § 56-218 Makes No Distinction Between Separate Fro"oerty and Propem:
Which Had Been Community Property.
The personal representative complains that:
The Department argues in its Brief on appeal for the firs"; time, (and we
hereby move to strike the same) that it does not matter if the prcperty it is seeking
a lien against is now separate property, so long as it was commt:nity property at
some time in the past.

5This provision implements the intent of Congress to track the resources of the .;:ouple, including assets
excluded for eligibility, for later recovery. See discussion in Appellant's Brief, ll(B), ad section IV, below.
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Respondent's Brief, p. 12. However, the Department's position has always been that whether
Vivian transferred her property voluntarily to Emerson or whether the property became
Emerson's bX operation oflaw doesn't make any difference. See e.g. Department's
Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance (filed about Deceml:er 1, 2009), where the
Department states:
Idaho law clearly permits the Department to recover from this estate, regardless of
whether it had become Emerson's separate property through transfers from Vivian
or upon Vivian's death or both. The characterization of Emersofl 's property as
"separate" makes no difference in this case.
Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance, p. 6.
The reason the Department made, and continues to make this po int is because Idaho Code
§ 56-218 simply permits the Department to recover from the estate oftre rvIedicaid recipient's

spouse and contains no limitation with regard to the source of the property:
Except where exempted or waived in accordance with federallaw 6 medical
assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual who was
fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the individual received such assistance
may be recovered from the individual's estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any,
for such aid paid to either or both;
Idaho Code § 56-218(1) (underline added). The only limitation is that found in IDAP A
16.03.09.900.20, discussed above. There is no ambiguity here. The le~;islature meant what it
said.
The personal representative contends that section 56-218 is ambiguous because it doesn't
define "estate ofthe spouse." Respondent's Brief, pp. 10 and 13. It is difficult to imagine how

6In quoting this language, the personal representative states that "the federal st:::.tute must first exempt any action
by the state." Respondent's Brief, p. 10. The personal representative seems to be saying; that Idaho Code § 56-218 can
only be applied where the Department can find some exemption in federal law. Actually, the personal representative has
this backward. As Idaho Code § 56-218 shows, the burden is on the personal representa:::ve to show that there is some

federal provision that exempts or waives recovery here.
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the legislature could have been more clear. "Spouse" is clearly defined in Idaho's marriage laws.
"Estate" is clearly defined in Idaho Code § 56-218(4):
(4) For purposes of this section, the term "estate" shall include:
(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within the
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law; and
(b) Any other real and personal property and other asset~; in which the
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such
interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or a:;sign of the
deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life
estate, living trust or other arrangement.
Idaho Code § 56-218(4). There is no missing definition.
Similarly, the personal representative argues that "[h]ad the Idal:.o legislature have (sic)
intended to apply Idaho Code 56-218(1) to the separate property of the Hon-recipient
spouse, it could have so stated." Respondent's Brief, p. 19. However, isn't it more accurate to
say that if the legislature had intended to carve out an exception to the simple "estate of the
spouse" language, it could have so stated? There is nothing in the law, or its history, to suggest
that the legislature didn't mean exactly what it said: the Department may recover from the estate
of the spouse.
The personal representative speaks dismissively of what it calls "once upon a time
community by now separate property," (Respondent's Brief, p. 12), ane further states that the
Department is trying to "create a new kind of separate property" (Respondent's Brief, p. 13).
However, it is not the Department, but the personal representative that is trying to make a
distinction based on the characterization of the estate property as community or separate. From
the Department's point of view, this is not a distinction found in the la']!. The statute merely
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states the Department may recover from the estate of the spouse. It is the personal representative
who is trying to impose a requirement the legislature did not.
C.
The Department's Medicaid Claim Is the Type of Debt That Is C~hargeable to Separatie
Property.
It should not be a surprise that the legislature permitted a broad recovery that would
include property that had become the separate property of the non-Medkaid spouse. Idaho
recognizes the responsibility of spouses to provide for one another. Idaho Code § 32-901 states
that "Husband and wife contract toward each other obligations of mutual respect, fidelity and
support." In the case of Edminston v. Smith, 13 Idaho 645, 92 P. 842 (1907), a wife entered into
a contract for lodging and her landlord brought an action to recover fron the husband. The
question before the court was whether the husband could be liable for a contract for lodging
entered into only by the wife. The Idaho Supreme Court held in the affirmative:
On the part of the husband, it is contended that he is not liable, for the reason that
the complaint shows that the credit was extended to the wife on her promise, and
not upon any implied liability of his.

***

The liability of the wife, if any, rests on her contract and promis e to pay, while the
husband's liabilitv for a necessary. such as board and room. grows out of and is
incident to his marital duties. and arises therefrom by operation oflaw. The wife
is entitled to these necessaries at the husband's expense, but, ifhe neglects to
furnish them and she cannot secure them on his credit, and can do so on the faith
of her own promise to pay the bill, she is certainly entitled to procure them in that
manner. If the creditor parts with his goods on the faith of the wife's promise to
pay, he is entitled to recover against her if the debt is not paid. The fact that she is
obliged to obligate herself can in no way relieve the husband of his duty and
responsibility in the matter. The wife has a right, on the other h~1!ld, to have the
husband holden for the debt, so that, if it can be collected from him, she may be
relieved ofthat obligation. The creditor is entitled to hold the husband, although
he is not willing to part with his goods without the additional assurance of the
wife's personal obligation to pay the debt.

***
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We conclude that the husband is unquestionably liable for the d(~bt" and that a
good cause of action is stated against him.

Edminston, 13 Idaho at _,92 P. at 843-44. Clearly, the Idaho legislature's choice in Idaho
Code § 56-218, of making one spouse's estate liable for medical

expen~';s

paid on behalf ofthe

other is not unusual or unprecedented. Indeed, it only makes sense that rone couple's money
should be used first for their own care, and only after Medicaid is reimb~lrsed, can the remainder
be distributed to the heirs. 7

IV.
RECOVERY OF ASSETS SUCH AS THOSE IN THIS CASE
IS A PLANNED AND ANTICIPATED PART OF
PROVIDING MEDICAID FOR THE ELDERLY.
A.
Federal Medicaid Law Anticipates the Assets of Both Spouses V/ill Be Obligated for the
Medicaid Debt.
To the uninitiated, Medicaid law can be obscure and unintuitive 8 While outsiders may
view Medicaid as a federal program administered by the state, it is in fa~t a joint state-federal
program. Federal statutes provide a framework and the states then enact their own laws to
provide medical assistance to their own citizens and receive federal fimncial participation.
Medicaid is intended to provide care for the needy. Unlike socill security disability or
Medicare, there are no premiums or payroll taxes for Medicaid. Instead, it is a welfare program
funded by state and federal general fund revenues. It is intended to be the payer of last resOJt.

7While the heirs sometimes complain that Medicaid recovery takes their inherit IDee, this program benefits them
as well as the needy couple. Without the Medicaid program, the couple would have to liquidate their assets to pay for
their own care. Medicaid rates are substantially lower than private pay medical rates, an·j therefore, the heirs are more
likely to have something left for their inheritance because their decedent was a Medicaid recipient.
8Indeed, one federal court has noted that Medicaid law is of "labyrinthine complexity" and called it "almost
unintelligible to the uninitiated." Friedman v. Berger, 547 F.2d 724,727 (2nd CiT. 1976).
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Medicaid is a strictly means-tested program, available only to those ofee most limited
resources. For example, an elderly single person must have no more theL'l $2,000 in available
resources to qualify for assistance.
'Where a married couple is involved, and only one of them needS" nursing home care, the
law takes care not to impoverish the at-home spouse. Resources such as the couple's home and
automobile are not counted in establishing eligibility. In this way, the nursing home spouse can
qualify for Medicaid while the at-home spouse9 can retain the resources needed for his support.
However, there is a trade-off for the public's largesse. Restricticns are imposed on both
spouses' ability to transfer assets to third parties. Penalties are imposed for transfers of assets
within federal "look back" dates, which are either three or five years prior to Medicaid
application, depending on the circumstances and date of transfer. See generally 42 U.S.C. §
1396p( c). Likewise, Idaho law criminalizes transfers of assets to qualif/ for Medicaid, and
transfers of assets by either spouse, without adequate consideration, can be set aside by the
courts. Idaho Code §§ 56-227 and 56-218(2).
Medicaid has always been intended to provide only for the needy. In 1993, Congress
strengthened federal law relating to estate recovery and asset transfers i:1 response to widespread
reports of abuse. Among the changes made were longer look back periods, an expanded
definition of assets subject to estate recovery, and penalties for asset translers. The legislative
history accompanying these actions shows Congress' intent that a coup:.e's assets be traced to
facilitate recovery:

9In Medicaid parlance, this person is known as the "community spouse." This has nothing to do with
community property law, since federal Medicaid law ignores state community property principles, but rather refers to the
spouse that lives "in the community" rather than in an institution.
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Under the Committee bill, States are required to establish an estate
recovery program that meets certain requirements. The progral!l must identify
and track resources (whether or not excluded for eligibility nurposes) of
individuals who receive nursing facility, home and community-based services,
and other specified long-tenn care services. The program must promptly ascertain
when the individual and the surviving spouse, if any, dies, and n!ust provide for
the collection of the amounts correctly paid by Medicaid on beh:!lf of the
individual for long-tenn care services from the estate of the individual or the
surviving spouse. The tenn "estate" is defined as all real and personal property of
a deceased individual and all other assets in which the individual had any legally
cognizable title or interest at the time of his death, including assets conveyed to a
survivor, heir, or assign through joint tenancy, survivorship, life estate, living
trust, or other arrangement.
H.R. Rep. 103-111, P.L. 103-66, OBRA 1993 (May 25, 1993), Section 5112. (emphasis added).10
The federal Medicaid framework anticipates transfers between spouses for the sole
purpose of providing a necessary living for the at-home spouse. See generally 42 U.S.C. §
1396p(c). The federal law uses tenns such as "for the sole benefit of the; individual's spouse." 42
U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(B)(i), (ii). When eligibility is detennined, all of the assets of both spouses
are taken into consideration, without regard to whether the property is separate or community
property or whether it has been transferred from one spouse to the other. See IDAP A
16.03.05.735 to .752. The eligibility process involves complicated provisions meant to ensure
that the at-home spouse has enough resources to provide for himself. See id. It is obvious that
these provisions are not intended to provide an inheritance for the couple's heirs. To the

IOAfter citing some of the legislative history ofIdaho Code § 56-218 (Respondent's Brief, p. 11), the personal
representative contends, on the one hand, that legislative history is irrelevant (Respondent's Brief, p. 13). Th,e
Department believes these passages explaining the intent of Congress are valuable in navigating the compleXity of
Medicaid law. The personal representative has, further, asked the court to strike part of the Department's argument.
Respondent's Brief, p. 13. The personal representative has offered no authority or argument for striking the
Department's argument.
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contrary, they are intended to make necessary medical care available to one spouse and provide
for the necessary living expenses of the other, and that is all. II

B.

Estate Recovery Is Part ofthe Whole Process of Medicaid for th~: Elderly.
The 1993 amendments to the Medicaid law (often referred to as OBRA '93) made estate

recovery mandatory to the states. OBRA '93 also enacted the expanded definition of estate
found in 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4) and Idaho Code § 56-218(4)(b). Of course, these enactments
are all related and support the legislative intent quoted in the house repol1, above. The intent was
to prevent the impoverishment of the at-home spouse, but at the same time, provide for recovery
of the couple's assets after both had passed away and no longer needed them.
The process for this is estate recovery. Estate recovery involves the recovery of the assets
of the couple from the probate estate. Probate law is uniquely state law; there is no federal
probate law. Accordingly, there is no part of the federal-state Medicaid partnership that is more
completely governed by state, rather than federal, law. It is state probate and marital property
law that defines what property is available for payment of creditors frOIn the probate estate.
Likewise, 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) specifically anticipates that the states will define what other
property, not included in the probate estate, will be included in Medicaid recovery:
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", with respect to a
deceased individual(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included
within the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; and
(B) may include, at the option of the State (and shall include, in the case
of an individual to whom paragraph (1 )(C)(i) applies), any othel: real and personal
property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at
the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such i:tssets conveyed to

I I There

are also provisions to provide for minor or disabled children, but those provisions are not relevant here.
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a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy,
tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or otht~r arrangement
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (underline added).
Estate recovery is an anticipated and expected part of providing Medicaid for the elderly.
The restrictions on the amount of assets and resources the couple can retain are relaxed, but the
trade-off is that once the needs of the couple for those assets has ended, they must be repaid into
the treasury to offset the expense to the taxpayers and provide for the neleds of others similarly
situated. Federal and state law is not intended to provide an inheritance to the non-dependent
heirs of Medicaid recipients and their spouses, at taxpayer expense, but only to provide for the
elderly couple and return the retained assets to the treasury when they are no longer needed.
C.
It Is Not Inconsistent for the Department to Allow Couples to Divide Their Property
Through a Marriage Settlement Agreement and Then Recover after the J)eath of Both.
The personal representative claims that it is inconsistent for the Department to permit
couples to divide their assets and then to seek recovery from both estates following their deaths.
Respondent's Brief, pp. 4 and 27. However, there is nothing inconsistent in any of this. The
division of assets at eligibility time is for the purpose of protecting the ability of the nonMedicaid spouse to live in the community. Once that need is met and both spouses have died,
there is nothing inconsistent with recovering the couple's assets to reimburse, to the extent
possible, the Medicaid program so the needs of other needy couples may be met
What would be inconsistent would be for a public welfare program to pay the expenses of
a needy person so that her non-dependent heirs can reap a windfall l2 by receiving the assets that

12n is not unfair to use this word. If Medicaid had not paid their antecedent's medical bills, their inheritance
would have been consumed by those costs.
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could have paid for her care. 13 Understanding that Congress has said that Medicaid is for the
poor,14 that it "should not facilitate the transfer of accumulated wealth fi'om nursing home
patients to their non-dependent children,,,15 and that the state should "track resources (whether or
not excluded for eligibility purposes)" and collect them "from the estate of the individual or the
surviving spouse,,,16 one can only make one of three conclusions: (1) Congress didn't mean what
it said; (2) Congress made a huge mistake in drafting the law; or (3) the personal representative is
wrong.

v.
THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE RELIES UF\ON TWO
\VORDS, READ OUT OF CONTEXT, IN THE FEDERAL
MEDICAID LAW.
The personal representative contends that the words "individual's estate" found in 42
U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1) and (4), mean that recovery cannot be made from the estate of the spouse.
Respondent's Brief, pp. 14 and 21. This simplistic argument, however, ignores both the plain
language and the context of the statute.
Subsection (b)(4) of section 1396p defines the term "estate" as used in this subsection:
(4)
For purposes of this subsection, the term "estat,(;", with respect
to a deceased individual-

13The personal representative states that the Department has "the purpose of paying itself." Respondent's Brief,
p.4. Perhaps he has forgotten that the Department paid $272,134.68 and seeks to recover $18,659.44. The Department
is not profiting from this arrangement.

l"H.R. Rep. No. 265, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 72 (1985), cited in Cohen v. CommissionerofDiv. of
Medical Assistance, 423 Mass. 399, 668 N.E.2d 769 (1996).
15H.R. Rep. No. l05(II), lOOth Cong., 1ST Sess. 1987, p. 73 (reprinted at 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
857,896,1987 WI. 61566, p. 31).
16H.R. Rep. 103-111, P.L. 103-66, OBRA 1993 (May 25,1993), Section 5112.
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(A)
shall include all real and personal property and other
assets included within the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of
State probate law; and
(B)
may include, at the option of the State (and shall include,
in the case of an individual to whom paragraph (l)(C)(i)17 applies), any
other real and personal property and other assets in which the
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent
of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a sllrvivor, heir. or
assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in
common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other_anangement.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (emphasis added). Importantly, the individual';, estate, for purposes of
section 1396p, goes far beyond traditional concepts of a probate estate18 and includes "other
assets" of the individual, as well as "assets ... conveyed to a survivor." This is important
because "assets" has a special meaning in Medicaid law. "Assets" is de1ined in subsection (h) of
section 1396p to include the property of the spouse of the recipient:
(h)
Definitions
In this section, the following definitions shall apply:
(1)
The term "assets". with respect to an individuat, includes all
income and resources of the individual and of the individual' ~~llouse,
including any income or resources which the individual or such individual's
spouse is entitled to but does not receive because of action(A)
by the individual or such individual's spouse,
(B)
by a person, including a court or admini~;trative body,
with legal authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or
such individual's spouse, or
(C)
by any person, including any court or administrative
body, acting at the direction or upon the request of the individual or
such individual's spouse.

17The personal representative incorrectly states that the reference to (l)(C)(i) is to Medicaid improperly granted.
Respondent's Brief, p. 21. However, this actually refers to those who receive benefits under a long-term care insurance
policy. See 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(1)( C)(i). Such policies are not relevant here and this reference was added by the
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005. Medicaid improperly paid is always recoverable.
18See also Belshe v. Hope, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 917 (Cal. App. 1995) ("Estate" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p,
must be interpreted broadly, and included the assets of a non-testamentary trust which ccntained property placed there by
the decedent recipient and which attempted to convey property to decedent's heirs avoid;.ng estate recovery).
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42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h) (emphasis added). Thus, for estate recovery purposes, "assets" includes
income and resources of the individual's spouse, including property trangferred to the spouse
from the Medicaid recipient.
Therefore, by definition, the estate of the individual, for purposes. of section 1396p,
includes the property of the spouse.
The personal representative asserts that "[i]f Congress intended the separate property
estate of the non-Medicaid spouse to available for recovery, it would have been included in the
language of the statute." Respondent's Brief, p. 16. However, the marital property laws of the
many states are distinct. Only a handful of states are "community prope:iy" states. Thus,
Congress made no distinctions relating to state marital property laws. Rather, it attempted to
paint in broad strokes and create a framework within which each state would be able to enforce
its own law, policies and marital property principles. Idaho has set forth its law in Idaho Code §
56-218. This section is entirely consistent with federallaw. 19
VI.

MINNESOTA'S IN RE ESTATE OF BARG CASE IS NOT
APPLICABLE IN IDAHO.
A.
Only If Minnesota's In re Estate ofBarg Case Is Followed in Id;lho Is the Existence of a
Marriage Settlement Agreement Important.
While the court below did not cite In re Estate o/Barg, 752 N.Vl.2d 52 (2008) cert.
denied by Vos v. Barg, 129 S.Ct. 2859 (2009), the personal representative relied on this case

19The personal representative states that "State statutes are trumped by the fedemllegislation." Respondent's
Brief, p. 17. However, the federal law relating to estate recovery has not materially changed since the Idaho Supreme
Comt's approval of spousal recovery in Idaho Department ofHealth and Welfare v. Jad man, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6
(1998).
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below and again relies on it in Respondent's Brief. Respondent's Brief, p. 16. The Minnesota
Supreme Court in Barg said that Minnesota could only recover from property that was owned by
the Medicaid recipient at death. That is why the personal representative: raises the Barg case
here. If the Barg case were the law in Idaho, the issue of whether there was a marriage
settlement agreement becomes relevant. Under Barg, if there was a transfer during life, the
transferred property is forever out of reach of estate'recovery. However" if there was no transfer,
then the property is recoverable.
The personal representative asserts that the Department was frivolous because it "claimed
that the fact that there was no Marriage Settlement Agreement or the like had an impact on the
Court's decision." Respondent's Brief, p. 25. However if, as the personal representative
contends, Barg must be followed in Idaho, then the lack of a marriage settlement agreement is
important because if there is no agreement, Barg does not stop recovery of this estate. It is for
this very reason that the personal representative both adamantly advances the existence of the
never-found marriage settlement agreement and the application of Barg in Idaho. Only if both
are true is the Department's claim barred.
As discussed in Appellant's Brief, § IV, the Department has always set forth Idaho
Department ofHealth and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P .2d 6 (1998) as establishing

the validity of spousal recovery in Idaho. The personal representative c~mtends that "[i]fthe
Jackman court had been privy to the analysis of the Barg case, it is likey the flawless logic of

that decision would have found its way into the Idaho Supreme Court's decision." Respondent's
Brief, p. 16. However, the Minnesota Supreme Court was interpreting\1innesota law, and it did
not even consider the issues the Idaho Supreme Court found critical in Jackman. In Barg the
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Minnesota Supreme Court found that Minnesota's spousal recovery statute was partially
preempted by federal law. As discussed in Appellant's Brief, § IV, the.!ackman case relied on
the interaction between Idaho law and federal law. Therefore, the Barg holding and the Jackman
holding, in which each state's highest court is interpreting its own law, :2Te not necessarily
inconsistent. 20

B.

The Barg Decision Did Not Consider the Decisive Issue in JackInan.
The Idaho Supreme Court, in Jackman, found the federal definition of assets, then in 42

U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(1)21, important in its analysis. The original decision ::;tated the following:
Federal law encompasses recovery both from the estate of the recipient as
well as from the estate ofthe surviving spouse. The federal definition of asset is
significant. Federal law includes within the recipient's estate "aU real and
personal property and other assets included within the individual's estate ... " and
"any other real and personal property and other assets in which the individual had
any legal title or interest at the time of death ..... " 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4); I.C. §
56-218(4). Under federal law, Hildor's assets would include he' income and
resources as well as Lionel's income and resources. The agreement does not
affect the status of the assets that federal law considers to be part of the recipient's
estate because the definition of assets includes "income or resources which the
individual or such individual's spouse is entitled to but does not receive because
of action by a person ... with legal authority to act in place of or on behalf of the
individual or such individual's spouse." 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(1)(B). Jackman's
signing of the agreement constituted action by a person on beha:.f of Hildor and
Lionel. Federal law does not prohibit the Department from reccvering the balance
of the Medicaid payments from Lionel's estate.

20This was recognized by the Solicitor General in its brief before the United St~ tes Supreme Court on
Minnesota's Petition for Certiorari: "The different results reached by the North Dakota Sllpreme Court and the court
below on similar facts thus may reflect not conflicting interpretations offederal Medicaid law, but only different views of
when, under state law, a spouse retains a legal interest in property conveyed to his or her spouse." Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae on Minnesota's Petition for Certiorari, p. 14. Brief available online at:
www.scotusblog.comlwp/wp .. .J06/08-603_ cert_amicus_ us.pdf
21Now 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(h)(l).
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Jackman, original opinion, p. 4 (Exhibit C to Reply Brief (February 3, 201 0)) (underline
added).22 On rehearing, the Supreme Court did not retreat from their original holding except to
recognize the marriage settlement agreement was executed before the "assets" definition of 42
U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(1)(B) became effective:
We conclude that this definition of "assets" is not applicable to the
agreement, which Jackman signed on behalf of Lionel and Hildor on March 8,
1993. The definition of "assets" contained in the 1993 amendm~nts to the federal
statute does not apply "with respect to assets disposed of on or before the date of
the enactment of this Act [Aug. 10. 1993]." Pub.L. 103-66, § 13611(e). Therefore,
it does not apply to the agreement and does not allow the Department to recover
the balance of the Medicaid payments from Lionel's separate property. This is true
even though 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4), which applies to Medicaid payments for
calendar quarters beginning on or after October 1, 1993, authorizes the
Department to recover the Medicaid payments from "other assets." Without the
definition of "assets" contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(1). "other assets" are
only those included within Hildor's estate, as defined by I.C, § 15-1-201(15}.
Lionel's separate property, including the community property trcffismuted by the
agreement, is not part ofHildor's estate.

Jackman, 132 Idaho at 216-7,970 P.2d at 9-10 (emphasis added).23 Th,~ Supreme Court did not
change its mind about the effect of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(1). In fact, by necessary implication, it
stated that with the definition of assets contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(1) the transferred
assets would have been part ofHildor's estate, and therefore, subject to recovery.
This is the same reasoning used by the North Dakota Supreme Court in In re Estate of

Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 2000):

22-rhe personal representative refers to this document as "an unsigned and unfil~d draft." Respondent's Brief, p.
18. The exhibit, however, contains the certification of the clerk of the Supreme Court on page 5. The document is
offered, not as precedent, but to provide context for the court's ultimate ruling in the Jadman case.
23 At p. 18 of Respondent's Brief, the personal representative cites "Elder Law. \nswer Book" for its
interpretation of the holding in Jackman. The Department submits that Idaho courts and attorneys, when fully informed,
are better able to interpret Jackman than an out-of-state editor of an advocate's handbook
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Our inquiry, therefore, is narrowed to whether Clarence Wirtz had "real and
personal property and other assets in which [he] had any legal title or interest at
the time of death, including such assets conveyed" to Vema Wirtz through "other
arrangement. "
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(1), asset is defined as:
(1) The term "assets", with respect to an individual, includes all income
and resources of the individual and of the individual's s.r:0use, including
any income or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse
is entitled to but does not receive because of action(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse,
(B) by a person, including a court or administrative body" with legal
authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or such
individual's spouse, or
(C) by any person, including any court or administrative body, acting at the
direction or upon the request of the individual or such individual's spouse.
See Idaho Department ofHealth and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213,970
P.2d 6, 9 (Id.1998) (concluding the definition does not apply to assets disposed of
on or before August 10, 1993).
Thus, the department can assert a claim against real or personal property,
and other assets in which Clarence Wirtz had any legal title or other interest at his
death, including income and assets conveyed through "other arrangement."
Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d at 885 (underline added). The North Dakota Supreme Court then went on to
decide what the terms "interest" and "other arrangement" mean in the f{~deral statute and
concluded:
We conclude consideration of all the relevant statutory rrovisions, in light
of the Congressional purpose to provide medical care for the nel~dy, reveals a
legislative intention to allow states to trace the assets of recipients of medical
assistance and recover the benefits paid when the recipient's surviving spouse
dies.
We hold any assets conveyed by Clarence Wirtz to Verna 'Nirtz before
Clarence Wirtz's death and traceable to her estate are subject to the department's
recovery claim. However, the recoverable assets do not include all property ever
held by either party during the marriage. Cf Estate ofJobe, 590 N.W .2d 162, 166
(Minn.Ct.App.l999). 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) contemplates only that assets in which
the deceased recipient once held an interest will be traced. It do~s not provide that
separately owned assets in the survivor's estate, or assets in which the deceased
recipient never held an interest, are subject to the department's claim for recovery.
Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d at 886 (italics in original; underline added).
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The Minnesota Supreme Court, in Barg, did not even consider th.e effect of this important
definition of "assets" found critical in both Jaclanan and Wirtz. It cannot be said that if the
Minnesota Supreme Court had been informed of this definition it might not have reached the
same conclusion as the Idaho and North Dakota Supreme Courts.
C.

The Holding in In re Estate ofBarg Isn't Even Good Law in Mirmesota Any More.
The Barg decision is an anomaly with limited application. It runs directly contrary to

other state supreme court decisions such as Jaclanan and Wirtz. It is understandable, then, that
Minnesota has already amended its state law to overcome the holding orits supreme court in
Barg. The Department provided a copy of changes made to Minnesota law in 2009 (Exhibit D to

Reply Brief (February 3,2010)), for the express purpose of remedying the Barg decision. These
changes are now codified at Minnesota Statutes, 256B.l5. 24 This legislltion makes it clear that a
Medicaid recipient's marital assets, at death, include assets jointly owni~d at any time during
marriage, even when transferred by the Medicaid spouse to the non-Medicaid spouse. This is
exactly the effect of the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Jaclanan.
Obviously, if Minnesota can overrule Barg by a statutory change, it is state law and not
federal law, per se, that creates the problem. The Idaho Supreme Court's interpretation of
Idaho's existing law already overcomes the Barg decision. Like the North Dakota Supreme
Court in Wirtz, the Idaho Supreme Court has already held that Idaho's Jaw permits recovery
under the circumstances of this case. These holdings are not necessaril y inconsistent with Barg.
The Barg decision has limited application to Minnesota and has already been made irrelevant by
a change in Minnesota law.

24This statute can be found online at: https:llwww.revisor.mn.gov!statutesl?id=256B.15
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D.

The Personal Representative Incorrectly Limits the Federal Defi:gition of Assets.
The personal representative claims that the Department "seriously misinterpret[s]" 42

U .S.C. § 1396p(h)(1) and states that the definition only applies to "property not received by
either spouse." Respondent's Brief, p. 20. While the definition includeB property not received, it
also includes the property of both spouses:

(h) Definitions
In this section, the following definitions shall apply:
(1)
The term "assets", with respect to an individual, includes all
income and resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse,
including any income or resources which the individual or such individual's
spouse is entitled to but does not receive because of action(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse,
(B) by a person, including a court or administrative bod:,!, with legal
authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or such individual's
spouse, or
(C) by any person, including any court or administrative body, acting at
the direction or upon the request of the individual or such individual's spouse.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(l) (emphasis added).
E.
The Case of Estate of Bruce, Cited by the Personal Representati ve, Supports the
Department's Position.

The personal representative cites the case of In re Estate ofBruee, 260 S.W.3d 398
(Mo.App. 2008)25 and argues:
Missouri's claim was disallowed based on the same rationale a~ in the case at bar.
Bruce makes the very same distinction as Respondent and Judg'~ Frates as to
subsection (b) (4)B, as well as agreeing with Respondent's interpretation of
subsection (b)(4)A.
Respondent's Brief, p. 17. The Estate ofBruce case, however, is contrary to the claims of the
personal representative and supports the Department's position in this ease.

25 Copy

attached as appendix hereto.
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In Estate of Bruce, Minnie Bruce received Medicaid benefits from October 1990 until her
death in 2002. Orville Bruce, her husband, died in 2005 and his estate was liquidated to $97,000.
The state of Missouri sought reimbursement for Medicaid costs paid on behalf of Minnie, from
Orville's estate, in the amount of$150,528.63. The lower court granted Missouri's claim. On
appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the estate property was not part of
Orville's probate estate. However, the court noted that it reached this result only because
Missouri had not adopted the expanded definition of estate found in 42 .u.S.C. § 1396n(b)(4):
Section 1369p(b)(4)B, on the other hand, by using "may," grant:;; Missouri
permission to include any of the recipient's other property and assets that would
traditionally fall outside the recipient's probate estate. Estate of Parker, 25 S.W.3d
611,616 (Mo.App.2000) (" '[M]ay' in a statute implies alternare possibilities and
that the conferee of the power has discretion in the exercise ofthe power.").
Section 1396p(b)(4)B empowers Missouri to define "eshte" broadly and
thereby to pursue property that a recipient owned jointly with ar10ther individual
when the recipient died but that would not be included in the de:edent's estate. If
a surviving spouse's estate includes property that was owned jointly with a
deceased Medicaid recipient, Section 1396p(b) permits a state to trace this
property back to the recipient and to recover it as a reimbursemt:nt Hence,
although Section 1396p(b) does not permit recovery from a sponse's estate,
Missouri's Medicaid program could still recover from the estate of a recipient's
spouse if Missouri's probate law defined a Medicaid estate to include property not
susceptible to probate, including property owned by tenants by 1he entirety.

Estate of Bruce, 260 S.W.3d at 402-3 (citations omitted; underline add(~d). The court further
explained that recovery from the spouse's estate would be permitted if <mly the Missouri
legislature would adopt the expanded definition of estate as permitted by 42 U.S.C. §
1396p(b)(4):
Nor could the State recover from Orville Bruce's estate because the General
Assembly has not taken the step required by Section 1396p(b)('nB to adopt a
definition of estate for the purpose of Medicaid recovery to include such property.
For example, the New Jersey legislature, unlike Missouri, has adopted a definition
of estate that includes:
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[A]ll real and personal property and other assets included in the recipient's
estate as defined in NJ.S. 3B:l-l, as well as any other red and personal
property and other assets in which the recipient had any legal title or
interest at the time of death, to the extent of that interest,inc1uding assets
conveyed to a survivor, heir or assign of the recipient through joint
tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust or other
arrangement.
NJ.Rev.Stat. Section 30:4D-7.2a(3) (1995). Until the General A.ssemblytakes
this step, Missouri's Medicaid program will not be able to recovsrr..,nroperty
possessed by a successor by virtue of being owned as a tenant bv the entirety.

Estate ofBruce, 260 S.W.3d at 403-4 (footnote omitted; underline added).
Idaho, like the state of New Jersey cited by the court in Estate ofBruce, has adopted the
expanded definition of estate almost word for word. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) with
Idaho Code § 56-218(4):
(4) For purposes of this section, the term "estate" shall include:
(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within the
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law; and
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which the
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such
interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or cssign of the
deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life
estate, living trust or other arrangement.
Idaho Code § 56-218(4). Clearly, Idaho has already done what the

COUlt

in Estate ofBruce said

was necessary to authorize recovery from the estate of the spouse. 26

26The dissent in Estate ofBruce agreed that adoption of the expanded definition of estate would authorize
Missouri to recover from the spouse's estate, but believed Missouri law was already sufficiently broad to encompass that
expanded definition. In re Estate ofBruce, 260 S.W.3d 398, 406-17 (Mo.App. 2008). The dissenting opinion contains a
very good history of spousal recovery under the federal Medicaid law.
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VII.

THE PERRY CASE IS NOT RELEVANT HE:RE.

The personal representative cites the case of In the matter of George D. Perry, Ada
County Case # CV IE 0905214 as ifit is some sort of dispositive authority in this case. In Perry
the Medicaid recipient, Martha, owned real property she had acquired in her prior marriage, as
her sole and separate property. She conveyed an undivided interest in the property to her
husband, George. George then, using a general power of attorney, conveyed the remainder of
Martha's interest to himself. After George died, while Martha was still living and on Medicaid,
George's heirs opened probate in order to distribute the real property to themselves. The
Department filed a contingent claim against the estate pursuant to Idaho Code § 15-3-810 which
was disallowed by the personal representative. The Magistrate upheld the disallowance of the
Department's claim, upholding the gift made by George using the powm' of attorney, and applied
the reasoning of In re Estate ofBarg, 752 N.W.2d 52 (2008). The Department appealed to the
District Court. The matter has been briefed and is set for oral argumenz November 18,2010, in
Ada County. Therefore, Perry is not a final decision.
Perhaps more importantly, from the Department's point of view, L1.e primary issue in
Perry deals with the validity of the purported gift made by George to hlffi:self. The application of
Barg is important, but will only arise if the District Court affinns the rv[a~~strate on the issue of
the gifting.
Also, the Magistrate in this case did not rely on Barg, but instead, based his decision on
Idaho community property principles. In this case, money is involved ;md a claimed marriage
settlement agreement. The Perry case involves two deeds and real property. In this case, the
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Medicaid recipient died first. In Perry, the Medicaid recipient was alive when George died and
the Department's claim was filed. So, while there are similarities and the briefing regarding

Barg and Jackman has overlapped on these two cases, the differences 2:re more striking than the
similarities. 27

VIII.
ABSURDITY, INEQUITY AND UNFAIRNESS W(JfUI,D
RESULT FROM THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S
INTERPRETATION.
The personal representative cites the case of State, ex reI. Wasden v. Maybee, 148 Idaho
520,224 P.3d 1109 (2010) stating "a reviewing court shall not interpret a statute in a manner that
leads to an absurd result." Respondent's Brief, p. 16, citing Maybee, 148 Idaho at _, 224 P .3d at
1124. However, it is the interpretation ofthe personal representative that would lead to absurd
results.
If the personal representative's argument is correct, then those who are single must
reimburse Medicaid and can pass no property to their heirs until Medicaid is paid in full, while
those with spouses have no obligation to reimburse Medicaid and their non-dependent children
receive a windfall at taxpayer expense.
Likewise, if a married couple (or perhaps the couple's children) get the advice of an
attorney, they will not have to reimburse Medicaid, but if they are too ignorant or unsophisticated
to transfer their assets away, their estate will have to pay.

27 When this case was first decided, undersigned counsel had hoped to stay it pc:nding the outcome of Perry,
expecting it to be dispositive, and in fact filed a Motion to Stay (April 7, 2010). However, the two cases developed so
differently and the decisions of the Magistrates were so wholly divergent, that this was not possible and the Department
was forced to abandon its motion.
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Again, under the personal representative's argument, where the Medicaid spouse dies
first, assets which become the sole and separate property of the surviving spouse by operation of
law will be subject to recovery, but on the other hand, if the Medicaid fpouse had signed a
marriage settlement agreement, making the assets the non-Medicaid sp)use's sole and separate
property, a moment before death, there can be no recovery.
In this case, the spouses died only two weeks apart. Under the interpretation of the
personal representative, if the order of death were reversed, the Department would recover
because Vivian would have received Emerson's property, whether sepf.rate or not, by operation
oflaw. 28 Only because of the chance order of death does the Department not recover.
These are absurd results.

IX.
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

The personal representative appeals the Magistrate's refusal to lward attorney fees
against the Department. Attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-117 can only be awarded to the
prevailing party. The Department should be determined to be the prevailing party herein.
A.

The Personal Representative Is Not Entitled to Double Costs.
In this matter, the Magistrate awarded costs as a matter of right See Order re: Attorney

Fees and Costs filed April 30, 2010. In that order, the Magistrate awarded $20 for witness fees
and $700 for the services of Dennis Voorhees. The Department did not appeal this order. The

28 Even if the property is separate property, Vivian would have received the fint $50,000 by virtue of the probate
homestead allowance. Idaho Code § 15-2-402. She would have received all the persomJ property up to $10,000 in
value. Idaho Code § 15-2-403. And she would have received the spouse share of whatever was left. Idaho Code § 15-2-

102.
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personal representative now appears to be asking the court to award these same costs again.
Respondent's Brief, p. 26. There is no authority for awarding duplicate costs on appeal, nor does
it make any sense. The costs have been paid.
B.
It Has Become Well Settled That Idaho Code § 12-117 Is the E;j:clusive Means for
Awarding Attorney Fees for the Entities to Which it Applies.
The personal representative claims the Department has acted fri volously and
unreasonably in this action. Respondent's Brief, p. 24. While patently false, even if it were true,
Idaho Code § 12-121 does not apply in this case. As stated in Potlatch Educ. Ass 'n v. Potlatch

School Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630, 226 P.3d 1277 (2010):
The School District also requests attorney fees under I.e. § 12-121, which
permits fee awards to prevailing parties in "any civil action." This request is
denied because I.C. § 12-117 is the exclusive means for awarding attorney fees for
the entities to which it applies. See Westway Const., Inc. v. Idaho Transp. Dep't,
139 Idaho 107, 116, 73 P.3d 721, 730 (2003) (citing State v. H{;lgerman Water
Right Owners, Inc., 130 Idaho 718, 723, 947 P.2d 391,396 (1997) (stating that §
12-117 is the exclusive basis for seeking attorney fees against a state agency).

Potlatch Educ. Ass 'n, 148 Idaho at _,226 P.3d at 1282 (underline adcied); accord Smith v.
Washington County Idaho, _

P.3d _,2010 WL 3895341 (Idaho, 2010). Attorney fees can

not be awarded against the Department under Idaho Code § 12-121. 29

29 In support of his claim that the Department has acted frivolously, the persona I representative again, and
disingenuously, advances the claim the Department somehow failed to notify the court of the decision in the Perry case.
Respondent's Brief, pp. 22 and 25. The personal representative, knows, or should know by now, that the Magistrate was
advised of the Perry decision before the Department's counsel even knew of it. See Affidavit ofW. Corey Cartwright
(April 20, 2010).
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C.

The Personal Representative Is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees uuder Idaho Code § 12-117.
The personal representative seizes on certain language in the Memorandum Decision

Denying Petitioner's Claim Against the Estate where the Magistrate st8teci:
A transfer of community property by a Marriage Settlement Agreement is
not an automatic transfer like those specifically listed in 42 U.S .C. 1396(b)(4)(B).
Another remedy for recovery is provided in Idaho Code 56-218(2). The
Departments expansive interpretation to include all transactiom! is not reasonable.
Memorandum Decision Denying Petitioner's Claim Against the Estate" p. 6. The personal
representative contends that the use of the words "not reasonable" means that attorney fees must
be awarded under Idaho Code § 12-117. The fact that the Magistrate said the "interpretation"
was not reasonable does not mean the Department acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
The Magistrate explained:
Now, with regard to the claim under Idaho 12-117 and lAT. Masingill again
honed in on the section on the Department's expansive Interpretation to include
all transactions is not reasonable.
Although the Court found that that expansive interpreta'iion was not
reasonable, I don't find that the department's position was unreasonable. I find
that the definition that they tried to apply was so expansive that it rendered - it
rendered the community property law as the separate property llWS of Idaho
marriage settlement agreement provisions meaningless effectiv~ly but I'm going
to reserve that issue.
Tr. (April 21, 2010) p. 31,11. 12-23 (underline added). In his Order on Attorney Fees, filed June
23, 201 0, the Magistrate further explained:
The legal basis for the Department's claim was based on an interpretation
of an ambiguous and conflicting set of federal and state laws. 1hiB court
determined in its memorandum decision that the interpretation of the law
expanding collection from a spouses separate property to be in contravention of
Idaho's community property law and "was not reasonable". Perhaps the
appropriate term should have been ''too expansive" since that interpretation would
render Marital Settlement Agreements recognized by Idaho to he meaningless.
The law on this matter is not settled and each party had a basis to make its
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arguments. The actions and arguments by the Department are ns:ither arbitrary nor
groundless. The court simply chose the less expansive interpret.?Ltion of the law.
Order on Attorney Fees, p. 4 (underline added). Therefore, the fact that the magistrate used the
word "unreasonable" does not mean he was required to award attorney fees.
The personal representative has not advanced any other facts or law not discussed below
and the Department respectfully adopts its points and authorities cited in its Post Hearing
Memorandum re: Idaho Code § 12-117 (May 17, 2010).
D.
The Question of the Conflict ofInterest of the Personal Represl~ntative Is Not Yet Before
this Court.
Among the "reasons" the personal representative offers to show the Department has acted
frivolously in this matter is listed on page 25 of Respondent's Brief:
f.
The State attempted to convince the Magistrate that the Personal
Representative had a conflict whereby the Estate could not collect attorney's fees
despite Idaho Code 15-3-720
Respondent's Brief, p. 25. This claim arises out of the personal representative's attempt to
distribute the estate after the Notice of Appeal was filed. The Departrr.ent objected to the
proposed distribution and filed a Memorandum in Support of Objection (April 14, 2010).
Included in the Department's objection and memorandum was oppositlon to the personal
representative's intention to pay $14,623.71 in attorney fees from the f:ssets of the estate. See 1st
Amended Schedule of Final Distribution Annexed to Petition for Final Distribution (appro:c.
ApriIS,2010). At § III of the Department's Memorandum in Support of Objection, the
Department set forth numerous authorities both from Idaho and elsewhere demonstrating that the
personal representative was not pennitted to pay attorney fees from the estate for litigating in
pursuit of his own personal interest.
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Ultimately, this issue was not decided because at the hearing the _Magistrate determined
he did not have jurisdiction, after the filing of the Notice of Appeal, to entertain a Petition to
distribute the estate. It was further learned at the hearing that the personal representative had
already paid the attorney and the Magistrate concluded he did not have jurisdiction to either
approve payment or order the money returned to the estate. Ultimately, an Order Staying
Distribution of Estate Pending Appeal, staying any further distribution" was entered by the
Magistrate on April 21, 2010.
The issue of whether the personal representative's payment to his attorney will be
approved or not may yet come before the Magistrate, however, this issue is not yet before this
court. The Department believes its authorities cited in its Memorandur.l in Support of Objection
are strong support for its position in that matter.

X.
CONCLUSION
This matter is not as complex as the scattergun approach of the personal representative
makes it appear. The real, and primary, issue is whether Judge Frates was correct in holding that
general Idaho community property principles somehow change the pIa-in language ofIdaho Code

§ 56-218 which clearly permits the Department to recover assets ofthi8 estate which had
previously been the couple's community property, whether they became Emerson's separate
property by voluntary transfer or by operation oflaw. Idaho Code § 5f-218 is straightforward
and unambiguous and its application to the property of this estate is both expected and weB
supported by law.
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DATED this 10 day of November, 2010,
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West law
Page 1
260 S.W.3d 398
(Cite as: 260 S.W.3d 398)

Missouri Court of Appeals,
Western District.
In re the ESTATE OF Orville BRUCE.
No. WD 68051.
May 13, 2008.
Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme
Court Denied July 1, 2008.
Application for Transfer Denied Aug. 26, 2008.
Background: Estate sought review of judgment of
the Circuit Court, Jackson County, Kathleen A.
Forsyth, J., ordering it to reimburse State for its
Medicaid payments made to decedent's deceased
wife.
Holding: The Court of Appeals, Paul M. Spinden,
P.J., held that State statute authorizing State to obtain reimbursement from Medicaid recipient's estate
after recipient's death or from estate of recipient's
spouse after spouse's death was preempted by federal statute prohibiting such recovery from recipient's spouse.
Reversed and remanded.

Joseph M. Ellis, J., issued dissenting opinion.
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State statute authori~dng State to obtain reimbursement from Medicaid recipient's estate after recipient's death or from es.tate of recipient's spouse after
spouse's death was preempted by federal statute
prohibiting such recovery from recipient's spouse,
thus requiring reversal of judgment ordering estate
to reimburse State for its Medicaid payments made
to decedent's deceased wife; although federal statute authorized spocsal recovery, State did not
define "estate" in such a way that permitted recovery from traditionall:f non-probated property, such
as decedent's estate that was held by tenants in the
entirety. Medicaid Act, § 1917, 42 U.S.C.A. §
1396p; V.A.M.S. § 473.399.

[21 States 360 <£:;:=>lU
360 States
360I Political Sta'us and Relations
360I(B) Federal Supremacy; Preemption
360k18.3c Preemption in general. Most
Cited Cases
Federal law preempts state law in three situations:
(1) express preemption, when a federal directive
expressly declares that the federal law preempts
state law; (2) implkdfield preemption, when the
scheme of federal r{:gulation is so pervasive as to
make reasonable the inference that Congress left no
room for the States to supplement it; and (3) conflict preemption, wh ~n compliance with both federal and state regulati,)lls is a physical impossibility,
or where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Ccngress. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 6,
cl. 2.
[3] Health 198H £:;:::>462

198H Health
198HIII Government Assistance
198HIII(B) Medical Assistance in General;
Medicaid
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198Hk462 k. State participation in federal
programs. Most Cited Cases
If a state opts to participate in the Medicaid program, it must comply with all federal statutory and
regulatory requirements.
[41 Health 198H

~457

198H Health
198HIlI Government Assistance
198HIII(A) In General
198Hk457 k. Preemption. Most Cited
Cases

States 360

~18.79

360 States
3601 Political Status and Relations
360I(B) Federal Supremacy; Preemption
360k18.79 k Social security and public
welfare. Most Cited Cases
Since Medicaid is a cooperative program, it is not
susceptible to express or implied field preemption;
it is susceptible only to conflict preemption.

151 Statutes 361 €;::::;::>181(1)
361 Statutes
361 VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k180 Intention of Legislature
361k18l In General
361k181(l) k. In general. Most
Cited Cases

Statutes 361 €;::::;::>188
361 Statutes
361 VI Construction and Operation
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k187 Meaning of Language
36lk188 k. In general. Most Cited
Cases
When interpreting a statute, the judiciary's primary
task is to ascertain legislative intent; the preferred
means for doing this is to accord the statute's language its plain and ordinary meaning.

[6] Husband and Wife 205 €:;:::::>14.2(1)
205 Husband and Wite

2051 Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities
205k14 Conveyances to Husband and Wife
205k14.2 Tenancy by Entirety in General
205kH,2(1) k. Nature and incidents.
Most Cited Cases

Husband and Wife :;;05 €:;:::::>14.2(6)
205 Husband and Wife
2051 Mutual Righ,:s, Duties, and Liabilities
205k14 Conve:1ances to Husband and Wife
205k14.2 T,~nancy by Entirety in General
20S':14.2(6) k. Survivorship. Most
Cited Cases
Probate's non-applic:"tion to tenancy by the entirety
results from its bein g a form of ownership that is
created by marriage in which each spouse owns the
entire property, rather than a share or divisible part;
it is based on a legd fiction that the husband and
wife own the property jointly as a single person.

[7] Husband and Wife 205 €:;:::::>14.2(1)
205 Husband and Wife
2051 Mutual Rigl::ts, Duties, and Liabilities
205k14 Conveyances to Husband and Wife
20Sk14.2 Tenancy by Entirety in General
205k14.2(1) k. Nature and incidents.
Most Cited Cases

Husband and Wife 205 €:;:::::>14.2(6)
205 Husband and Wfe
20S1 Mutual Righs, Duties, and Liabilities
20Sk14 Conveyances to Husband and Wife
205k14.2 Tenancy by Entirety in General
20Sk14.2(6) k. Survivorship. Most
Cited Cases
In a tenancy by the entirety, each spouse has an undivided interest; ane. thus, when one of the spouses
dies, the surviving spouse becomes the property's
sole owner by virtu< of being owner of 100 percent
of the property.
*399 William Lee Hubbard, Kansas City, :MO., for
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appellant.
Lawrence D. Love, Kansas City, MO., for respondent.

*400 PAUL M. SPINDEN, Presiding Judge.
The Estate of Orville Bruce appeals the circuit
court's judgment for the State in its claim against
the estate for reimbursement of Medicaid payments
made to Orville Bruce's deceased wife, Minnie. The
State asserted a right to the reimbursement pursuant
to Section 473.399, RSMo 2000. The estate responded that federal law, 42 U.S.C. Section 1396p,
preempts reimbursement under Section 473.399.
We agree and reverse the circuit court's judgment
for the State.
Minnie Bruce received Medicaid benefits from October 1990 until she died on February 28, 2002. No
probate estate was administered for her. On April
17, 2005, Orville Bruce died. He never received
Medicaid benefits. His estate consisted of a house
and an automobile. Bruce had owned the house
jointly with his wife as tenants by the entirety. His
estate was liquidated to $97,000. Pursuant to Section 473.399, the State sought $150,528.63 from the
estate for reimbursement of the Medicaid payments
to Minnie Bruce. The circuit court granted the
State's claim.
[1 )[2] In its only point on appeal, Bruce's estate asserts that the circuit court erred because, although
Section 473.399 permits the State to seek reimbursement from a spouse's estate, the United States
Congress enacted Section 1396p that forbids such a
claim. The estate argues that the federal statute
preempts enforcement of Section 473.399 pursuant
to the United States Constitution's supremacy
FNl
clause.
This clause says that federallaw "shall
be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, c1. 2.
Federal law preempts state law in three situations:

(1) express preemptioL, when a federal directive
expressly declares that the federal law preempts
state law, (2) implied field preemption, when "the
scheme of federal regulation is so pervasive as to
make reasonable thenference that Congress left no
room for the States t) supplement it," and (3) conflict preemption, when "compliance with both federal and state regulz.tions is a physical impossibility, or where state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress." Jensen v. Missouri
Department of Heaith and Senior Services, 186
S.W.3d 857, 860 (M:.App.2006).
FN 1. Although the parties did not raise an
issue conceming jurisdiction, we have a
duty sua sI"Jnte to address issues of our
jurisdiction. State v. Miller, 172 S. W.3d
838, 843 (Mo.App.2005). Article V, Section 3, of Missouri's constitution, grants
the Suprerr.e Court "exclusive appellate
jurisdiction in all cases involving'the validity of a tn:aty or statute of the United
States, or 0;: a statute or provision of the
constitution of this state[.]" This provision
gives the S;lpreme Court exclusive jurisdiction over the constitutional validity of a
state statute. Miller, 172 S.W.3d at 843.
Hence, if th ~ issue of preemption created a
question co lcerning the statute's validity,
we would not have jurisdiction to address
the issue. Freemption, however, does not
concern the statute's validity. It merely
presents an issue of whether or not a statute must yi ~ld to the dictates of a federal
directive b;! virtue of the United States
Constitutior's supremacy clause. Because,
in reviewing e. preemption challenge, we
do not determine whether or not a state
statute is ulconstitutional, we have jurisdiction to n;view Bruce's claim. This position is consistent with numerous appellate
court decisions that have decided preemption cases. :lee e.g., Jensen v. Mo. Dep't of
Health & ~'en:'or Servs., 186 S.W.3d 857
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(Mo.App.2006); City of Belton v. Smoky
Hill Ry. & Historical So<v. Inc., 170
S.W.3d 429 (Mo.App.2005).
[3][4] Medicaid is a cooperative federal-state program designed to assist the states in providing
health care to people *401 who cannot afford it.
McNeil-Terry v. Roling, 142 S.W.3d 828, 833
(Mo.App.2004). If a state opts to participate in the
program, it must comply with all federal statutory
and regulatory requirements. !d. Because Medicaid
is a cooperative program, it is not susceptible to express or implied field preemption. It is susceptible
only to conflict preemption. Jensen. 186 S.W.3d at
860-6l.
Missouri has opted to participate in the Medicaid
program. Gee v. Department of Social Services,
Family Support Division, 189 S.W.3d 621, 623
(Mo.App.2006). In Section 473.398 and 473.399,
RSMo 2000, the General Assembly authorized Missouri's Medicaid authorities to obtain reimbursement from a recipient's estate after the recipient's
death or from the estate of the recipient's spouse
after the spouse's death. Section 473.399.2 says:
For the purposes of this section, the providing
of assistance shall create an obligation which
may be recovered by filing a claim in the probate
division of the circuit court against the decedent
estate of the spouse of the deceased recipient
upon such spouse's death as provided by the probate code of Missouri, chapters 472, 473, 474 and
475, RSMo. The amount of the state debt shall be
the full amount of assistance without interest
provided to the recipient during the marriage of
such recipient and spouse; provided that the liability of the obligor estate shall not exceed the
value of the combined resources of the recipient
and the spouse of the recipient on the date of
death of the recipient.
Orville Bruce's estate asserts that Section 473.399,
which clearly authorizes spousal recovery, conflicts
with 42 U.S.c. Section 1396p, which clearly prohibits it in this case.

[5] When interpreting a statute, the judiciary'S
primary task is to a5certain legislative intent. The
preferred means for doing this is to accord the statute's language its plain and ordinary meaning. Cline
v. Teasdale, 142 S.W3d 215,222 (Mo.App.2004).
Section 1396p(b) say,:
Adjustment or recovery of medical assistance
correctly paid under a State plan
(1) No adjustme.'lt or recovery of any medical
assistance correct/y paid on behalf of an individual under the S'.:ate plan may be made, except
that the State shall seek adjustment or recovery of
any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of
an individual under the State plan

A. In the case of an individual described in
subsection (a)(lI(B) of this section, the State
shall seek adjus':ment or recovery from the individual's estate or upon sale of the property
subject to a lien imposed on account of medical
assistance paid en behalf of the individual.
B. In the caSt of an individual who was 55
years of age or older when the individual received such medical assistance, the State shall
seek adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate, but o1ly for medical assistance consisting of-(i) nnrsing facility services, home
and communi!) -based services, and related
hospital and prtscription drug services, or (ii)
at the option of the State, any items or services
under the State plan.
C. (i) In the case of an individual who has received (or is enritled to receive) benefits under
a long-term care imurance policy in connection
with which assets or resources are disregarded
in the manner described in clause (ii), except as
provided in such clause, the State shall seek adjustment*402 or recovery from the individual's
estate on account of medical assistance paid on
behalf of the inclividual for nursi ¥f2facility and
other long-term care services[.] t
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FN2. We added the emphasis.
In Section l396p(b), the United States Congress
plainly restricts recovery of Medicaid benefits from
a recipient's estate to three specific situations, and
none authorizes a state to seek recovery from the
recipient's spouse. Because Congress has mentioned these three situations expressly, we infer that
it intended to exclude recovery in other situations.
Groh v. Ballard, 965 S.W.2d 872. 874
(Mo.App.1998). See also In re the Estate of Budney, 197 Wis.2d 948, 541 N.W.2d 245. 246
(App.1995) ("[Section 1396p(b) ] does not counter
the initial blanket prohibition by specifically authorizing a State to recover medical assistance benefits paid on behalf of a recipient from a surviving
spouse's estate[.]"); Hines v. Department of Public
Aid, 221 Ill.2d 222, 302 Ill.Dec. 711, 850 N.E.2d
148, 153 (2006) ("No provision [in Section
1396p(b) ] is made for collection from the estate of
the recipient's spouse.").
Although Section 13 96p(b) authorizes recovery
only from the recipient's estate, it allows states to
define "estate" in such a way that will permit recovery from traditionally non-probate property.
Concerning this issue, Section 1396p(b)(4) says:
F or purposes of this subsection, the term
"estate," with respect to a deceased individualA. shall include all real and personal property
and other assets included within the individual's
estate, as defined for purposes of State probate
law; and
B. may include, at the option of the State (and
shall include, in the case of an individual to
whom paragraph (l)(C)(i) applies), any other real
and personal property and other assets in which
the individual had any legal title or interest at the
time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir,
or assign of the deceased individual through joint
tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life
estate, living trust, or other arrangement.

Applying the plain aJ~d ordinary meaning of Section
1396p(b)(4)A's lang~.age, we conclude that an estate, for the purpose of Medicaid recovery, lliust include all of what l\1issouri's probate law would
define as a recipient's estate. We understand "shall"
as a mandate. SS},,( Health Care St. Louis v.
Schneider, 229 S.W 3d 279, 281 (Mo.App.2007).
Section 1369p(b)(4)E\, on the other hand, by using
"may," grants Missouri permission to include any
of the recipient's other property and assets that
would traditionally 1'111 outside the recipient's probate estate. Estate of Parker, 25 S.W.3d 611, 616
(Mo.App.2000) ( " '.:M]ay' in a statute implies alternate possibilities and that the conferee of the
power has discreti<m in the exercise of the
power.").
Section 1396p(b)(4)B empowers Missouri to defme
"estate" broadly and thereby to pursue property that
a recipient owned jointly with another individual
when the recipient (jed but that would not be included in the decedent's estate. If a surviving
spouse's estate inch:des property that was owned
jointly with a deceased Medicaid recipient, Section
1396p(b) permits a f:tate to trace this property back
to the recipient and to recover it as a reimbursement. In the Estate nfShuh, 248 S.W.3d 82, 85-86
(Mo.App.2008): Hilles, 302 Ill.Dec. 711, 850
N.E.2d at 154; Esta'e of DeMartino v. Division of
Medical Assistance and Health SenJices, 373
N.J. Super. 210, 861 A.2d 138, 145 (2004); *403
State Department of Human Resources Welfare Division v. Estate of Ullmer, 120 Nev. 108, 87 P.3d
1045, 1050 (2004); :ANEL C. FRANK, Note, How
Far is Too Far? Trrcing Assets in Medicaid State
Recovery, 79 N.D.L.REV. 111, 130-31 (2003).
Hence, although Section 1396p(b) does not permit
recovery from a spl)Use's estate, Missouri's Medicaid program could :;till recover from the estate of a
recipient's spouse if Missouri's probate law defined
a Medicaid estate to include property not susceptible to probate, inCluding property owned by tenants by the entirety.
For the purposes of probate, the General Assembly
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has defined "estate" as "the real and personal property of the decedent or ward, as from time to time
changed in form by sale, reinvestment or otherwise,
and augmented by any accretions and additions
thereto and substitutions therefor, and diminished
by any decreases and distributions therefrom[.]"
Section 472.01 O( 11), RSMo 2000. Although this
definition is vague, case law has held consistently
that probate law does not govern the passing of
property owned by tenants by the entirety. See
Rinehart v. Anderson, 985 S. W.2d 363, 367
(Mo.App.1998) (property passes immediately to
surviving spouse and is not subject to probate); In
re Estate of Hughes, 735 S.W.2d 787, 791
(Mo.App.1987).
[6](7] Probate's non-application to tenancy by the
entirety results from its being a form of ownership
that is created by marriage in which each spouse
owns the entire property, rather than a share or divisible part. Rinehart, 985 S. W.2d at 367. It is
based on a legal fiction that the husband and wife
own the property jointly as a single person. In re
Estate of Hughes, 735 S.W.2d at 791. Together,
each has an undivided interest,Id. When one of the
spouses dies, the surviving spouse becomes the
property's sole owner by virtue of being owner of
100 percent of the property. Id. Hence, property
owned by Minnie and Orville Bruce as tenants by
the entirety was not part of Minnie Bruce's probate
estate and did not fit within the definition of
"estate" enunciated in Section 472.010(11). Rinehart, 985 S.W.2d at 367; In the Matter of Estate of
Hughes, 735 S.W.2d at 791. The State, therefore,
could not use Section 1396p(b)(4)A to seek recovery from Bruce's estate.
Nor could the State recover from Orville Bruce's
estate because the General Assembly has not taken
the step required by Section 1396p(b)(4)B to adopt
a definition of estate for the purpose of Medicaid
recovery to include such property. For example, the
New Jersey legislature, unlike Missouri, has adopted a definition of estate that includes:

included in the recipient's estate as defined in
N.J.S. 3B:l-1, as well as any other real and personal property and oilier assets in which the recipient had any legal title or interest at the time
of death, to the extent of that interest, including
assets conveyed to a survivor, heir or assign of
the recipient thro::>gh joint tenancy, tenancy in
common, survivorship, life estate, living trust or
other arrangement.
N.J.Rev.Stat. Section 30:4D-7.2a(3) (l995).FN3
Until the General A,sembly takes *404 this step,
Missouri's Medicaid Jrogram will not be able to recover property possessed by a successor by virtue
of being owned as a tenant by the entirety.
FN3. Other examples of states that have
taken this course are Iowa and Nevada.
The Iowa legislature has defined a Medicaid estate to include "any real property,
personal prcperty, or other asset in which
the recipiem, spouse, or child had any legal
title or inte'~est at the time of the recipient's, spouse's, or child's death, to the extent of SUCl interests, including but not
limited to ir.terests in jointly held property,
retained lil e estates, and interests in
trusts." 10", a Code Ann. Section 249 A.5
(2)(c) (2003). Similarly, Nevada has
defined a l<'edicaid estate as "all real and
personal pre perty and other assets Lt1.c1uded
in the esta,e of a deceased recipient of
Medicaid and any other real and personal
property and Ocher assets in or to which he
had an interest or legal title immediately
before or at the time of his death, to the extent of that in~erest or title. The term includes, witl:.out limitation, assets conveyed
to a survivor, heir or assign of the deceased
recipient through or as the result of any
joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, annuity, declaration 01' homestead or other arrangement." Nev.Rev.Stat. Section ·-122.054
(2003).

[A]l! real and personal property and other assets
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The State argues that Section 461.300, RSMo 2000,
expands the definition of estate to include property
held as tenants by the entirety. Section 461.300.1
says:

Each recipient of a recoverable transfer of a decedent's property shall be liable to account for a
pro rata share of the value of all such property received, to the extent necessary to discharge the
statutory allowances to the decedent's surviving
spouse and dependent children, and claims remaining unpaid after application of the decedent's
estate[.]
Section 461.300 authorizes the court to expand the
decedent's estate when the estate is insufficient to
pay its creditors. Even assuming that the State is a
creditor that could make a claim under Section
461.300, the State's contention fails because the
house that Minnie Bruce and her husband owned as
tenants by the entirety was not a recoverable transfer under the statute. Section 461.300.10(4) defines
a recoverable transfer:
[A] nonprobate transfer of a decedent's property under sections 461.003 to 461.081 and any
other transfer of a decedent's property other than
from the administration of the decedent's probate
estate that was subject to satisfaction of the decedent's debts immediately prior to the decedent's
death, but only to the extent of the decedent's
contribution to the value of such property.
To meet this definition, Bruce's house would either
have to be a "nonprobate transfer of decedent's
property" or "property ... that was subject to satisfaction of the decedent's debts immediately prior to
the decedent's death." Property held by tenants by
the entirety does not fit within either of these categories.
Section 461.005(7), RSMo 2000, defines a nonprobate transfer as "a transfer of property taking effect upon the death of the owner, pursuant to a beneficiary designation," and it does not include
"survivorship rights in property held as joint tenants or tenants by the entirety[.]" And property held

by tenants by the entire-:y is not subject to satisfaction of the decedent's debts. In Missouri, creditors
are not able to levy on this property to satisfy the
debts or claims of one spouse. Farmers Exchange
Bank v. },,{etro C01tracting Services, Inc., 107
S.W.3d 381, 395 (M).App,2003).
Hence, Orville Brucr's house was not a recoverable
transfer under Secticn 461.300. Even assuming that
the General Assembly intended for Section 461.300
to expand the definilion of the estate for Medicaid
recovery purposes, :1 did not expand it to cover
property held by tem,nts by the entirety.
Equally flawed is the dissent's suggestion that the
General Assembly resed Section 473.399.2 to expand the definition of a Medicaid estate. As we
noted above, Section 473.399.2 says:
For the purpose'; of this section, the providing
of assistance shall create an obligation which
may be recovered by *405 filing a claim in the
probate division of the circuit court against the
decedent estate of the spouse of the deceased recipient upon such spouse's death as provided by
the probate code cf Missouri, chapters 472, 473,
474 and 475, RSMo. The amount of the state debt
shall be the full arnOlmt of assistance without interest provided to the recipient during the marriage of such recipient and spouse; provided that
the liability of the obligor estate shall not exceed
the value of the combined resources of the recipient and the spouse of the recipient on the date of
..
FN4
death 0if the reclpl mt.
FN4. We added the emphasis.
If, as has been suggested, the General Assembly intended for this statute to expand the definition of an
individual MedicaiG recipient's estate to include
non-probate property, it could not have chosen a
more oblique and crabbed manner for doing so. Indeed, many of the stctes whose courts have declared that the law pennits spousal recovery did so
only because those states' legislatures had adopted
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definitions that closely track the language of Section 1396p(b)(4)B. See In re Estate of Laughead,
696 N.'vV.2d 312, 315 (Iowa 2005); Estate of Def:'f1stino, 861 A.2d at 143; Ullmer, 87 P.3d at 1050.

FN5. Iowa's expansive definition of Medicaid estate appears supra, at 403. New Jersey's and Nevada's expansive defmitions of
Medicaid estate appear supra, at Note 3.
Weare dubious that Missouri would have elected to
shroud its expansion of the definition of a Medicaid
estate in discussions of the limits on the value of
the property to be recouped. Such a prospect is
highly unlikely. Indeed, the Supreme Court has instructed that the primary rule of statutory construction is to glean legislative intent by understanding
the statute according to its objective. Nixon v.
QuikTrip Corporation, 133 S.W.3d 33, 37 (Mo.
bane 2004). The objective that the General Assembly articulated in Section 473.399 was to authorize spousal recovery and to set a limit on how
much could be recouped from the obligor's estate.
Nothing in the statute's language indicates that its
objective was to expand the definition of a Medicaid estate. Even had the General Assembly decided to take an oblique and crabbed route to redefining a Medicaid estate, surely it would have declared that the liability of the obligor's estate extended only to the spouses' combined resources instead
of saying that the "liability of the obligor estate
shall not exceed the value of the combined resources of the recipient and the spouse." FN6 The
General Assembly' use of this phrase establishes
that the Section 473.399's second sentence was the
monetary limit for spousal recovery.
FN6. We added the emphasis.
Although the General Assembly enacted Section
473.399.2 for the obvious purpose of facilitating
spousal recovery, it did so in 1990. LAWS OF
MISSOURI 1990. At that time, however, federal
law did not give the states the option of defining estate to include non-probate property. Federal au-

thorization for reCOUi;>ment of non-probate propertyprovided a state redefined a Medicaid estate to allow it-did not come '111tiI three years after the General Assembly ena:ted Section 473399.2. See
FRANK, 79 N.D L.REV. at 118 (Congress
amended SECTION 1396p during 1993 to include
the definition of estlte currently found in Section
1396p(b)(4)).
That Section 473.399.2 predated federal authorization is quite telling in eliminating the possibility
that the General Assembly intended for the statute
to expand the defmifon of a Medicaid estate. Obviously, *406 the Geileral Assembly did not enact
Section 473.399.2 lecause it foresaw Congress's
enactment of Section 1394p(b)(4). The timing of
Section 473.399's emctment belies a notion that its
purpose was to expald the definition of a Medicaid
estate.
The State avers nurrercus public policy reasons as
to why we should interpret Section 1396p(b) as
providing for spousrl recovery. While these public
policy reasons may be valid, we are constrained by
the language of Section 1396p(b). It simply does
not permit spousa recovery under Missouri's
present statutes. Mi isouri has not opted, as other
states have, to take advantage of the authority afforded by Section 1396p(b)(4)B to define a Medicaid estate in such a manner as to capture traditionally non-probate as;;ets. If the General Assembly
wanted to empower Missouri's Medicaid program
to recover non-prob lte assets, all it need do is redefine "estate" for rurposes of Medicaid recovery,
but it has not done so.
For these reasons, vie reverse the judgment of the
circuit court. We renard the case to it so it can vacate its jUdgment for the State and enter judgment
for Orville Bruce's e ,tate.
JAMES M. SMART. JR, Judge, concurs.
JOSEPH M. ELLIS, hdge, dissents in a separate
opinion.
JOSEPH M. ELLIS, Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority that
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federal law allows a state to recover Medicaid assistance from the recipient's spouse's estate if the
state opts to expand its definition of "estate" to include property that the Medicaid recipient owned
jointly with his or her spouse at the time of the recipient's death. However, I differ with the majority's conclusion that Missouri has not adopted such
an expanded definition, finding rather that the legislature did so when it enacted the public assistance
FNI
recovery statutes, §§ 473.398 and 473.399.
FN 1. Unless otherwise noted, all statutory
references are to RSMo 2000.
Sections 473.398 and 473.399 are amendments to,
and parts of, the Probate Code, specifically Chapter
473 dealing with administration of decedents' estates. While Chapter 472 contains the general provisions of the Probate Code, and § 472.010
provides the general definition of "estate" for probate purposes, §§ 473.398 and 473.399 are more
specific statutes dealing with the same issue.
Statutes addressing the same subject matter are considered in pari materia, and must be construed together. KC Motorcycle Escorts, L.L.c. v. Easley, 53
S.W.3d 184. 187 (Mo.App. W.D.2001). "When one
statute deals with a subject in general terms and another statute deals with the same subject in a more
specific way, the two statutes should be harmonized
if possible. If the statutes cannot be reconciled, the
more specific prevails over the more general." Id.
(internal citations omitted).
Sections 473.398 and 473.399 amended the Probate
Code to permit recovery of public assistance. They
set forth the procedure for doing so and the extent
to which recovery may be had. In doing so, they expanded the concept and definition of "estate" for
purposes of Medicaid assistance recovery. This
conclusion is confirmed by an examination of state
and federal statutes and applicable case law.
A review of the Medicaid Act and its history is essential to an understanding of both the federal and
Missouri statutory schemes. Congress created the

Medicaid program when it amended the Social Security Act in 1965, tt what is now codified as *407
42 U.S.C. § 1396, et. seq. In re Estate of Shuh, 248
S.W.3d 82, 83-84 Ci"'lo.App. E.D.2008). States are
given the option of participating in the Medicaid
program. !d. If they ehoose to do so, they must adopt a state plan, including provisions for eligibility
and assistance, that ,~omp1ies with all federal statutory and regulatory requirements. Id. If a state participates, it reimburses health care providers for the
cost of care provided to Medicaid recipients, and
the federal government then reimburses the state for
a portion of the expenditures. West Virginia v.
United States HHS, 132 F.Supp.2d 437, 440
(D.W.Va.200l).
Congress became concerned as early as 1980 that
wealthy elderly Anericans were "gaming" the
Medicaid program bJ divesting themselves of their
assets before enterin:~ a nursing home and then applying for Medicaid benefits. Thus, "[t]he first major restriction in th,~ Medicaid program came in
1980 with the Boren-Long Amendment, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396p(c)(2)(J988). " Ira Stewart Wiesner, OBRA
'93 and ii-fedicaid: A .•set Tramfers, Trust Availability, and Estate Recmery Statutory Analysis in Context, 19 Nova L.Rev 679,682 n. 10 (Winter 1995).
Continued concern a',od loopholes in Medicaid eligibility led to frequent amendments between 1980
and the adoption of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 i"OBRA '93"). !d. OBRA '93
contained the estate recovery provisions that are
generally still applicabie today and are at issue in
this appeal.
"Prior to 1993, stat!s were permitted, but not required, to establish estate recovery programs." West
Virginia, 132 F.Supp.2d at 440. OBRA '93 made it
mandatory that state, "recoup benefits from the estates of certain decnased Medicaid recipients as a
condition of receivirg Medicaid Funds." !d. But, as
noted by the cour in the West Virginia case,
"OBRA '93 does not force estate recovery upon any
citizen of a state. Persons subject to estate recovery
elect to receive Me :licaid benefits and the regula-
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tions demand that such recipients receive notice of
the estate recovery requirement when choosing to
accept or reject Medicaid long-term care benefits,"
Id. at 441.
Although Congress expressed frequent concern
about loopholes in the Medicaid laws in the decade
or more leading up to its adoption of OBRA '93, it
was similarly concerned about protecting the elderly from hardships. A person seeking to qualify for
Medicaid as medically needy must have low income and low assets, and, therefore, the person's resources, to the extent they exceed the statutory and
regulatory limit, must be spent down before qualifying. Shuh, 248 S.W.3d at 84-85. Congress recognized the potential hardship that "spend down" requirements could have on the spouses of medical
assistance recipients. Id.
To ameliorate that hardship to spouses of Medicaid recipients, Congress enacted the Medicare
Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 ("MCCA")
which includes provisions to financially protect
the spouse who was not receiving medical assistance. These provisions, commonly called the
spousal impoverishment provisions, allow the
spouse to retain a certain level of resources and
income and protect those assets from use as payment for medical care.

Id.
Congress's concern over spousal hardship was also
apparent in OBRA '93. 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(a)(1)(B)
authorizes imposition of a lien on a Medicaid recipient's real property, but 42 U.S.c. § J396p(a)(2) expressly provides that "[n]o lien may be imposed under paragraph (l )(B) on such individual's home if(A) the spouse of such individual... is lawfully
residing in *408 such home." The provisions of the
federal law applicable to this appeal similarly reflect a desire not to impoverish a Medicaid recipient's spouse during their lifetime. In 42 U.S.C. §
13 96p(b), authorizing a recovery of benefits under
the state plan, subsection (b )(2) expressly limits recoveries, stating that "[a]ny adjustment or recovery

under paragraph (1) may be made only after the
death of the individual's surviving spouse.... "
(Emphasis added).
The spousal impoverishment provisions relating to
eligibility for Medicaid benefits, and the estate recovery provisions of the Medicaid law authorizing
such recoveries onl;, after the recipient's spouse's
death, are an expre1;sion of two salutary congressional goals.
First, expanding estate recovery furthers the
broad purpose of providing for the medical care
of the needy; the g~eater amount recovered by the
state allows the state to have more funds to
provide future s,;:rvices. Second, the MCCA
[Coverage Act of 1988] serves as part of the
overall effort to not impoverish a Medicaid recipient's spouse duri:lg the spouse's lifetime. According to the United States Supreme Court and
the Congressional Record, the goal of the MCCA
was to protect the community spouse from
poverty, while pntecting the Medicaid system
from being abused by financially secure couples.

Shuh, 248 S.W.3dlt 86 (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
All the while, however, Congress was expanding
the Medicaid progrun, often without appropriate
funding levels, which led to skyrocketing costs for
the states. "The states, particularly after the passage
of the MCCA, experie:J.ced rapid, and [from their
perspectives] uncontroEable escalation oftheir state
Medicaid expenditures!' Wiesner, supra, at 693.
"In Florida, for exanpie, the annual Medicaid expenditures for nursbg homes increased onr $100
million for a $1 hilEon budget for fiscal year
1992-1993." Id. at 6B n. 14 (citing Burton D. Dunlop et al., Fla. Int l Univ., The Context of Long
Term Care in Floric'a: Interrelationships of Medically Needy, Assets Recovery and Long Term Care
Insurance Policy Initiatives 1 (1992».
As a result, Goverr.ors and state legislatures concerned with balancing state budgets were creatively
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trying to reduce costs and secure recovery for payments made. "Prior to 1993, states were permitted,
but not required, to establish estate recovery programs." West Vir:..~inia, 132 F.Supp.2d at 440. Thus,
the states, as is often the case in "cooperative federalism" programs, served as incubators of new ideas
in cost management and recovery.
For example, as early as the late 1970s, New York
adopted provisions granting eligibility to a Medicaid applicant even though he or she had a spouse
with sufficient income and assets to provide medical assistance. See In re Estate of Imburgia. 127
Misc.2d
756,
487
N.Y.S.2d
263,
265
(N.Y.Surr.Ct.l984) (ajj'd by 130 A.D.2d 658, 515
N.Y.S.2d 590 (N.Y.App.Div.1987), disapproved on
other grounds by In re Estate of Craig, 82 N.Y.2d
388, 604 N.Y.S.2d 908, 624 N.E.2d 1003, 1006
(N. Y.1993». The statute was interpreted to create
an implied contract allowing for recovery from the
spouse or the spouse's estate. !d.
California, on the other hand, adopted a statute prior to 1987 that permitted the state to " 'claim
against the estate of the decedent, or against any
recipient of the property of that decedent by distribution or survival an amount equal to the
[Medi-Cal] payments received.' " Citizens Action
League v. Kizer, 887 F.2d 1003, 1005 (9th
Cir.1989) (quoting Cal. Welf & Inst.Code §
14009.5 (West Supp.1989)) (emphasis *409 and
brackets in original). Thus, the statute expanded the
definition of "estate" to include property owned in
joint tenancy with a former benefits recipient.
At least as early as 1990, Minnesota had a statute
allowing for recovery from a surviving spouse's estate to the extent of "the value of the assets of the
estate that were marital property or jointly owned
property at any time during the marriage."
lv/inn. Stat. § 256B.15. This is the same statute, but
for minor changes not here relevant, that was examined in lobe. Gullberg, and Barg. all discussed
infra.
And, of course, Missouri, also in 1990, adopted §§

473.398 and 473.39S', which will be discussed in
more detail infra, g':nerally allowing for recovery
from a surviving spouse's estate to the extent of
"the value of the combined resources of the recipient and the spouse d ti1e recipient on the date of
death of the recipien:" § 473.399.2.
Not surprisingly, tr,,~re were legal challenges to
some of these statutes, but they met with mixed results. In Imburgia, th('; state paid the cost of nursing
home assistance for Mrs. Imburgia prior to her
death in 1981 then 50ught to recover those costs
from the estate of ~h. Imburgia after his death in
1983.487 N.Y.S.2d [,t 264 (adopting facts from prior decision at In re Estate of Imburgia, 122 Misc.2d
1033,
472
XY.S.2d
305,
305-06
(N.Y.Surr.Ct.l984)). The estate claimed that, to the
extent New York statutes permitted such recovery,
they conflicted witl:. L"-le pre-1993 version of 42
U.S.C. § 1396 p(b)(l), which provided that "[n]o
adjustment or recov~ry of any medical assistance
correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the
State plan may be made." !d. The court analyzed
federal statutes and regulations relating to the
concept of "deeming ," where a portion of a spouse's
income is "deemed" available to the benefit recipient, and those relatir.g to recoupment of medical assistance. Id. at 264- 55. Based on this analysis, the
court held that "to lhe extent that New York statutes permit recovery against the estate of [a surviving spouse], such statutes are not in conflict with
Federal law or regulations and do not therefore violate the supremac:r clause of the United States
Constitution." Id. at 265.
The California stature was also challenged in Kizer,
a 2-1 decision with one judge dissenting. In that
case, survivors of Medicaid recipients who held assets in joint tenanc:r with the recipient during the
recipient's lifetime claimed that the California provIslon was incorsis:ent with 42 U.S.C. §
1396p(b)(1)(B) (19112). 887 F.2d at 1005-06. The
majority noted that:he federal statute limited states
to recouping benefi:s from the recipient's "estate,"
and that Congress had not defined "estate" in the

v
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statute. !d. at 1006. Therefore, the majority looked
to the common law definition of the term, holding
that "[b]ecause 'estate' under common law does not
include property formerly held in joint tenancy, '"
we conclude that the California statute is impermissibly broad and is inconsistent with federal
Medicaid law." Id. at 1007-08. The dissent, on the
other hand, argued that adoption of the common
law definition "makes recovery depend on a technical distinction that has nothing necessarily to do
with the purposes of the Medicaid program or of
the exception permitting recovery of benefits furnished .... " Id at 1008.
Thus, when Missouri adopted §§ 473.398 and
473.399 in 1990, the state of the law was far from
clear as to whether a state could expand its definition of "estate" to include "combined resources of
the recipient and the spouse ... on the date of death
of the recipient," § 473.399.2, and could permit recovery from a surviving spouse's estate. Accordingly, any suggestion that § 473.399 could not have
been *410 intended to expand the definition of
"estate" because it predated 42 U.S.c. §
1396p(b)(4)(B) (1993) is clearly without merit.
Rather, it is absolutely crystal clear that the intent
of the Missouri legislature was to push the envelope, to expand the definition of estate, and to allow
recovery from a surviving spouse's estate.
The Missouri law was not challenged prior to the
adoption of OBRA '93, so it is unknown whether it
would have passed muster based on the prior version of 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b). But when COI!gress
FNT d
. ...
illlilatives
an
filila11y respon de d to testate
h
specifically allowed states to expand their definition of "estate" with the passage of OBRA '93, Missouri was already on board with the expanded
concept of "estate" encompassed in § 473.399. See
Demille v. Belshe. 1994 WL 519457, 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13917,42-43 (N.D.Ca1.l994) (holding
that Kizer's striking down of California's expansive
definition of estate was superseded by the adoption
of an expansive definition of "estate" in OBRA '93,
stating that "[n]ow, the state is permitted to recoup

its expenses from pr:perty (such as joint tenancies)
not included within ;he common law definition of
'estate.' ").
FN2. In addition to the numerous state law
initiatives, at both the January 1992 meeting of the Stat,;: Medicaid Directors' Association ("S1>rlDA") and the July 1992 conference of tbe National Governors' Association ("NGA"), Medicaid reform was a
featured and hot topic, where "[r]estriction
of eligibility, through the attractive vehicle
of loophole closing, and budget replenishment through stronger estate recovery authority wen! the most sought results."
Wiesner, sUj:ra, at 691-94.
This brings us to the relevant provisions of federal
and Missouri statutory law that are applicable to the
case sub judice. The pertinent federal law is set out
in 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b):
(b) Adjustment or recovery of medical assistance
correctly paid unde:r a State plan.
(1) No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual
under the State plan may be made, except that the
State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any
medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an
individual under the State plan in the case of the
following individuals:

***
(B) In the case of an individual who was 55
years of age or older when the individual received such medical assistance, the State shall
seek adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate ....

***
(2) Any adjustmelt or recovery under paragraph
(1) may be mademly after the death of the individual's surviving spouse, if any ....
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***
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term
"estate", with respect to a deceased individual(A) shall include all real and personal property
and other assets included within the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; and
(B) may include, at the option of the State '"
any other real and personal property and other
assets in which the individual had any legal
title or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets
conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the
deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.
*411 Missouri's estate recovery statute, § 473.399,
provides, in relevant part, as follows:
1. As used in this section, the following terms
mean:

***
(2) "Obligor estate", the estate against which an
obligation under this section arises;

(3) "Recipient", a person to whom or on whose
behalf assistance is provided;

***
2. For the purposes of this section, the providing
of assistance shall create an obligation which
may be recovered by filing a claim in the probate
division of the circuit court against the decedent
estate of the spouse of the deceased recipient
upon such spouse's death as provided by the probate code of Missouri, chapters 472, 473, 474 and
475, RSMo. The amount of the state debt shall be
the full amount of assistance without interest
provided to the recipient during the marriage of
such recipient and spouse; provided that the liah-

ility of the obligfN estate shall not exceed the
value of the comb.ined resources of the recipient
and the spouse 0/ the recipient on the elate of
death of the recipient.
(Emphasis added.)
As noted supra, based on the history of the Medicaid program and the states' efforts to control costs,
it is certain that the purpose of the Missouri legislature in adopting il 473.399 was to expand the
definition of "estate'" and provide for recovery from
the estate of a benefi: recipient's spouse. Whether it
was effective in dobg so prior to 1993 is unclear,
but the conclusion is inescapable that it did so after
adoption of OBRA '93. While evident on its own,
this conclusion is als,) supported by significant case
law.
We start with the :t,:orth Dakota Supreme Court's
decision in the case of In re Estate of Thompson,
586 N.W.2d 847 (t;.D.1998). In that case, Nathaniel Thompson received Medicaid benefits prior to
his death on December 20, 1992. Id. at 848. His
wife, Victoria Thomoson, never received any medical assistance benefits. Id. She died on September
15, 1995, leaving assets subject to administration.
Id. An estate was opened and a personal representative appointed. Id. The North Dakota Department
of Human Services filed a claim against Mrs.
Thompson's estate f)r recovery of the medical assistance benefits prcvided to her husband. !d. The
trial court entered summary judgment in favor of
the Department allo'ving the claim, and the personal representative aprealed. Id.
On appeal, the cout did not examine its general
definition of "estate" but only looked at the following language in its e itate recovery statute, N.D. C. C.
§ 50-24.1-07:
1. On the death of any recipient of medical assistance who was fifty-five years of age or older
when the recipien' re::eived the assistance, and on
the death of the spouse of such a deceased recipient, the total amcum of medical assistance paid
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on behalf of the recipient following the recipient's fifty-fifth birthday must be allowed as a preferred claim against the decedent's estate ....
2. No claim must be paid during the lifetime of
the decedent's surviving spouse, if any ....

ld at 849 (emphasis omitted). The court held that
the "broad definition of the recipient's estate in 42
U.S.C. § 1396p(b)( 4) must be considered," id at
850, stating:
That expansive definition is broad enough to encompass the department's claim against the estate
of a deceased *412 spouse of a deceased recipient
of medical assistance benefits for the amount of
medical assistance paid out, to the extent the recipient at the time of death had any title or interest in assets which were conveyed to his or her
spouse 'through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.' "

against Mrs. Jobe's e~ta~,e for the amount of medical
assistance benefits provided to Mr. Jobe before his
death.ld The trial court allowed the claim, and the
estate appealed. !d.
The estate asserted on appeal that the statute authorizing recovery of medical assistance was invalid because it conflicted with federal law. [d The
statute in question pmvides:
Subd. lao Estates subject to claims. If a person
receives any medical assistance hereunder, on the
person's death * * I< or on the death of the survivor of a married couple, either or both of whom received medical assistance, the total amount paid
for medical assistance rendered for the person
and spouse shall be filed as a claim against the
estate of the perso!l or the estate of the surviving
spouse in the court having jurisdiction to probate
the estate.

***
ld In so holding, the court also stated:
Because the expansive federal defmition of
'estate' in 42 U.s.c. § 1396p(b)(4) extends only
to assets in which the medical assistance benefits
recipient 'had any legal title or interest in at the
time of death,' it is a matter of little moment
whether the department seeks to recover the benefits paid by filing a claim in the estate of the
recipient after the death of the recipient's surviving spouse or by filing a claim in the surviving spouse's estate.
ld at 851 n. 3 (emphasis added).

A Minnesota court reached a similar result in In re
Estate of lobe, 590 N.W.2d 162 (Minn.App.1999).
In that case, Amos and Alice Jobe, husband and
wife, owned 120 acres that they acquired in 1974.
Id at 164. Mr. Jobe entered a nursing home in 1993
and received Medicaid benefits from that time until
his death in 1995. ld Mrs. Jobe, who never received medical assistance, died in 1996 and was the
sole owner of the 120 acres at that time. Id The
County Department of Social Services filed a claim

Subd. 2. Limitati JUS on claims. * * * A claim
against the estate of a surviving spouse who did
not receive medicLl assistance, for medical assistance rendered for the predeceased spouse, is limited to the value ,)f the assets of the estate that
were marital property or jointly owned property
at any time during the marriage.
ld. at 164 (emphasis added); Minn.Stat. § 256B.15.
The Minnesota cowt regan its analysis by stating
that there was a:hree-part test in determining
whether a federal statute preempts a state statute,
that being: "(1) conpliance with the federal and
state provisions is physically impossible; (2) preemption is express and unequivocal in language of
the federal statute; me:. (3) congressional preemptive intent is implici1 in the overall scheme of federal and state regulat;on." Jobe, 590 N.W.2d at 165.
The court found thLt the second and third parts of
this test did not apIly to the facts at hand and that
the only basis for p,:eemption was whether compliance with the feder21 and state provisions was phys-
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ically impossible. Id.
The court then reviewed the federal statute, 42
U.S.C. § 1396p(b). It noted that the federal statute
gives states the option to define an individual's estate as including *413 "assets in which a decedent
held 'any legal title or interest at the time of death,'
including 'assets conveyed ... through joint tenancy
... or other arrangement.' " Id. at 165. The court rejected the estate's contention that the Minnesota
statute went beyond the authority granted by the
federal statute by permitting recovery from the estate of a surviving spouse. Id. It stated that
"[a]cceptance of the estate's position and its narrow
interpretation of section 1396p would render portions of the federal statute meaningless, particularly
the phrase 'conveyed to a survivor ... through joint
tenancy.' " Id. at 166. The court also rejected the
assertion that allowing claims against surviving
spouse's estates conflicts with the asset allocation
and spend down provisions of state and federal law.
[d. In doing so, the court stated:
The rules regarding eligibility for medical assistance do not necessarily override rules for recovery of benefits paid. Rather, because both federal
and state law allow recovery only after the death
of an individual's surviving spouse, dual interests
are served. One policy prevents the impoverishment of the surviving spouse during his or her
lifetime. Once that spouse dies and the need for
protection from impoverishment ceases, allowing
a state to recover medical assistance benefits previously paid furthers the broader purpose of funding future services to the medically needy. These
policies are both served by allowing the state to
recover medical assistance benefits paid to or on
behalf of a predeceased spouse from a surviving
spouse's estate, to the extent the assets contained
in that estate were jointly owned by the couple
during their marriage.

Id. (internal citations and parentheticals omitted).
The Minnesota court's holding is clear and concise:

Because federal law now allows states to opt for
a definition of es1ate that may include "assets
conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of ;;he deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancyin-common, survivorship, life estate, living trust,
or other arrangement," the state statute that al-

lows medical assi;;tance benefit reimbursement
from the estate ,t)f a surviving spouse from
"assets of the estt;~te that were marital property
or jointly-owned property at any time during the
marriage" is entir.rdy consistent with federal law
and not preempted. We therefore affirm the district court's allow:mce of this claim against the
estate.
[d. at 166-67 (internd citation omitted).

It is important to recognize that the Minnesota statute under review ir lobe, like Missouri's statute,
predated the passage of OBRA '93. It remained essentially unchanged from the time it was adopted
until lobe was decided (and thereafter). Accordingly, lobe, like Demille, supra, also stands for the
proposition that it matters not whether the statute
was efficacious prier to 1993 because even it was
not, it became effective upon passage of OBRA '93.

The Minnesota Cou.1: of Appeals addressed this issue again, albeit in a different factual situation, in
In re Estate oj Gullberg, 652 N.W.2d 709
(Minn.App.2002). In Gullberg, the recipient spouse
had conveyed the 'lomestead, which was marital
property held in j.JinI tenancy, to the surviving
spouse before appl:/ing for and receiving medical
assistance benefits. Id. at 713. The court reaffirmed
its holding in Job,'~, declaring that "the county's
claim against the e~;tate is clearly allowed by Minnesota's estate reccvery statute," but asserted that
"the issue is whether allowance of the claim in its
entirety complies with federal law." Id. The court
stated *414 that to the extent that Minnesota law
"allows recovery 'to the value of the assets of the
estate that were mlrital property or jointly owned
property at any tirr.e during the marriage,' we conclude that it goes b,~yond what is allowed by federal
law, which allows recovery only 'to the extent of'
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the individual's legal interest at the time of death."
Id at 714. Thus, the court found a partial preemption, holding only, as had lobe. that Minnesota law
"allows claims against a surviving spouse's estate
only to the extent of the value of the recipient's interest in marital or jointly owned property at the
time of the recipient's death." Jd. The court concluded its analysis by stating:
Thus, allowing a claim like this serves to fulfill
the purposes of the Medicaid Act by protecting
the surviving spouse's right to enjoy and use assets during his or her lifetime, while enabling the
county to recoup a portion of its expenditures and
to prevent "capable individuals from using Medicaid as artificially inexpensive long-term care insurance."
!d. (quoting Jon M. Zieger, The State Giveth and
the State Taketh Away: In Pursuit of a Practical
Approach to A1edicaid Estate RecovelY, 5 Elder L.J.

359,374-76 (Fall 1997)).
The Minnesota Court of Appeals' most recent pronouncement on the subject came in the recent case
of In re Estate of Barg, 722 N.W.2d 492
(Minn.App.2006). The issue in Barg was the proper
calculation, pursuant to Gullberg, of the value of a
Medicaid recipient's interest in transferred jointtenancy property that was part of the surviving
spouse's estate. Id. at 494. Nonetheless, the court
again reaffirmed the holding in lobe, stating:
Minnesota's estate-recovery statute provides that
the state may assert a claim against the estate of a
surviving spouse to recoup medical-assistance
benefits provided to the predeceased spouse. The
Minnesota statute thus reflects the legislature's
exercise of the option to expand the definition of
estate to allow claims against the surviving
spouse's estate.

lei. at 495 (emphasis added).
Several other courts have reached similar results.
See In re Estate ofLaughead, 696 N.W.2d 312,317

(Iowa 2005) (holding that the probate definition of
"estate" and the gen::ral probate laws do not apply
because the estate nco very statute "is a specific
law that addresses tl:e particular matter at issue");
Estate of DeMartino v. Div. of Medical Assistance
& Health Servs., 373 N.J.Super. 210, 861 A.2d 138,
145 (NJ.Super.Ct.2004) (holding that the estate recovery statutes define the term "estate" consistent
with federal law anc the assets of decedent's testamentary trust, which was merely a vehicle for transfer of the decedent's assets to his heirs, are part of
decedent's "estate" for purposes of estate recovery
act); State of Nevad, Deptt of Human Resources v.
Ullmer, 120 Nev. 108, 87 P.3d 1045, 1050
(Nev.2004) (Nevaca estate recovery "statutes
broaden the definiticn of 'estate' to include 'assets
conveyed to a survivor, heir or assign of the deceased [Medicaid] r ~cipient through joint tenancy,
tenancy in common, slli-vivorship, life estate, living
trust or other arrangement.' " (quoting NRS 422.054
(2001) (amended 2003))).
I

Cases ruling to the, on:rary are limited. In Hines v.
Dep't of Public Aie', 221 m.2d 222, 302 Ill.Dec.
711, 850 N.E.2d 14:5 (111.2006), Beverly and Julius
Tutinas were husband and wife and owned their
home and an automc,bile in joint title. Id. at ISO. Julius entered a nursir.g home and received Medicaid
benefits prior to his death. Id. Beverly died several
years later still owring, as the survivor, the home
and automobile. Jd. An estate was opened and *415
the Department of'ublic Aid filed a claim to recover the benefits paid on behalf of Julius. Id. The
trial court allowed the claim, and the estate appealed. Id. The Corn of Appeals reversed and the
case was transferred. Id. at 150-51. The Illinois Supreme Court, while noting that many states would
allow such a recove::y, held that the Illinois General
Assembly had "exFessly limited the more expansive definition of estate to the only situation where
the Medicaid Act requires it to be used, namely,
where the deceased recipient 'has received (or
[was] entitled to receive) benefits under a long-term
care insurance poLey.' " Id at 154 (quoting 305
ILCS Ann. 5/5-13, Historical & Statutory Notes, at
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189 (Smith-Hurd 2001)). Thus, Hines was decided
on the basis of a state statute that expressly pre-

Thompson, 586 N.W 2d at 850. I am likewise unpersuaded by the decision.

cluded recovery.
The only other case to which we have been referred, or have found through our own research, is
In re Estate of Budney, 197 Wis.2d 948, 541
N.W.2d 245 (Wis.App.1995).FN3 In that case, Paul
and Grace Budney were husband and wife. Id. at
246. Grace entered a nursing home and received
Medicaid benefits prior to her death. Id. Paul subsequently died, and the Department of Health & Social Services filed a claim in his estate to recover
medical assistance benefits paid on behalf of Grace.
Id. The estate ohjected, and the trial court entered
judgment in favor of the estate. Id. The court, in
one short paragraph with virtually no analysis, and
without any mention whatsoever of the federal
law's expansive definition of "estate," concluded
that 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l) does not permit recovery from the estate of a surviving spouse. Id.
FN3. The Budney court cites Estate of
Craig. 82 N.Y.2d 388, 604 N.Y.S.2d 908,
624 N.E.2d 1003 (N.Y.1993), as being in
accord. This is incorrect because Craig
was applying prior law. The New York
court expressly stated that "[t]he Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 ... has
no relevance to the resolution of this case;
it applies only to Medicaid recipients who
die after October 1, 1993. Thus, by its own
terms, the amendments '" do not aid the
appellant's case for nunc pro tunc recovery
on the 1983 payments on behalf of Mr.
Craig." Jd. at 1006 (internal citations omitted).
Budney has only been followed in one case, Bienemann v. State, 577 N.W.2d 387 (Wis.App.199N4
and otherwise has rarely even been mentioned. F
The North Dakota Supreme Court in Thompson discussed the holding in Budney. but it stated that "the
Budney court did not address the effect of the broad
definition of 'estate' in 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4),
and we are not persuaded by the decision."

FN4. The d;:cision in Budney, among numerous others, was noted in In re Estate of
Smith, 2006 WL 3114250, 2006 Tenn.App.
Lexis 715 (Tefu'1.Ct.App. Nov. 1,2006), in
referring to Gases addressing issues similar
to that in Smith. The Tennessee court
found it uru::ecessary to decide whether the
state could recover through the estate of a
surviving s)ouse, concluding rather that
the state cculd not recover "because the
benefit recirient, Mrs. Smith, had no estate
as that tern is defined under 42 U.S.C. §
1396 p(b)(4)." Id. at *4, 2006 Tenn.App.
Lexis 715 al *13.
Returning now to the instant appeal, Missouri's estate recovery statute, § 473.399.2, provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
The amount of the state debt shall be the full
amount of assistance without interest provided to
the recipient during ;:he marriage of such recipient and spouse; p;>ovided that the liability of the

obligor estate sh(!ll not exceed the valut! of the
combined resources of the recipient and the
spouse of the reclpient*416 on the date afdeath
of the recipient.
(Emphasis added.) 'I'his language is very similar to
the Minnesota statute, which limited recovery from
the spouse's estate to "the value of the assets of the
estate that were marital property or jointly owned
property at any time during the marriage." Jobe,
590 N.W.2d atl64. Although the statute in
Thompson did not include this limiting language,
the North Dakota Supreme Court still found that it
fell within the e'l.pansive federal definition of
"estate" in 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4) of "assets in
which the medical assistance benefits recipient 'had
any legal title or imerest in at the time of death.' "
586 N.W.2d at 851 n. 3.
As noted above, the Bruce's residence was titled as
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a tenancy by the entirety. Under Missouri law,
"[ a]n estate by the entireties is created by a conveyance to the husband and wife by a deed in the
usual form. It is one estate vested in two individuals who are by a fiction of law treated as one
person, each being vested with entire estate.
Neither can dispose of it or any part of it without
the concurrence of the other, and in case of the
death of either the other retains the estate. It differs from a joint tenancy where the survivor succeeds to the whole estate by right of the survivorship; in an estate by entireties the whole estate
continues in the survivor. The estate remains the
same as it was in the first place, except that
there is only one tenant of the whole estate
whereas before the death there were two."
In re Estate of Honse, 694 S.W.2d 505, 508
(Mo.App. S.D.1985) (quoting Greene v. Spitzer,
343 Mo. 751, 123 S.W.2d 57, 60 (Mo.1938))
(emphasis supplied by Honse court). Thus, although
the estate passes in its entirety to the surviving
spouse upon the death of one spouse, the predeceased spouse clearly has a "legal title or interest"
in the property at the time of death. The Missouri
statute does not define "combined resources."
"When a term is not defined, the legislature is not
held to a technical meaning, but rather reference is
made to the dictionary to find the meaning that the
legislature intended." Fisher v. Waste lli!anagement
of Missouri, 58 S.W.3d 523,526 (Mo. banc 2001).
"Combine" is defined as "to come or bring into union; to unite or join," and "combined" is defined as
"united closely." Webster's New Twentieth Century
Dictionary 360 (2d ed.1979). The word "resource"
is defined among other ways as "wealth; assets;
available money or property." Id. at 1542. Accordingly, "combined resources," by definition, means
joint wealth or assets. Nothing could be more unqualifiedly "combined resources" than a tenancy by
the entirety, where one estate is vested in two individuals.

to permit estate reco'/erj of medical benefits as allowed by 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4).
1 am mindful that the Ea.stern District of this Court,
like the majority here, recently concluded that
"Missouri's statutory definition of 'estate' does not
allow for spousal re:overy." Shuh, 248 S.W.3d at
89. Curiously, the Shuh court found Thompson and
Jobe "persuasive," 221d relied on them in holding
that "Congress intended the term 'estate' can have a
broad meaning under the Medicaid Act allowing for
spousal recovery," but it did not apply their reasoning in analyzing Mis ,ouri's statutory scheme. Id. at
88. In any event, since Shuh reached essentially the
same result as the mFJority here, I must respectfully
differ with it as well.
*417 For all the fon:going reasons, I would affirm
the judgment of the learned trial judge below and
allow the State of Missouri's claim against Respondent Randy R. Bruce, Personal Representative,
in the amount of $8C ,OC3 .00 and assign the claim to
Class 7.
Mo.App. W.D.,2008.
In re Estate of Bruce
260 S.W.3d 398
END OF

DOCUME~T

Thus, it is my view that the legislature expanded
the definition of "estate" sufficiently in § 473.399

© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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MAR 16 2011
fN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FO{JRTH JUDfCLi\L DIST~~is~HER D. RICH,

1

S NlCOL TYLER

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlINTY OF

1-

3
4

5

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF:

6
7

GEORGE D. PERRY,

8

Deceased.

Case No. CV -IE-2 )OQ-052 t 4

MErv!ORANDUlYf DECISION
AND ORDER

9

10

Currently before the Court is an appeal from the March 10, 2005, order of the Honorable

11

12

Christopher M. Bieter, dismissing the State's Medicaid reimbursement claim in probate

13

proceedings. For the reasons stated below, the opinion of the magistrate will be affirmed.

14

15

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

16

George D. Perry ("George") died February 25, 2009.
17

His late wife, Martha J. Perry

(" Martha" or "recipient"), was the owner, as her sole and separat!~ property, of certain real

18

property in Ada County prior to her marriage to George. On November 18, 2002, well into the

19
20

couple's marriage, Martha executed a quitclaim deed on the real property, with the grantor

21

named as '" Martha Jean Boy Ie" (her prior name) and the grantee :;s "Martha Jcan Perry &

22

George Donald Perry" Several years later, with Martha's health declining. George and Martha

23

III needed assistance

in paying for Manha's medical care. To qualify for government assistance

24

with medical costs, the couple and Martha. individually. could not exceed certain maximum asset
2S

I

I criteria.

26

On or about July 31. 2006, George made the transfer now in dispute, assigning

I
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II
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II

Martha's remaining interest in the real property to himself alone, by signing a quitclaim deed on
1

behalf of Martha pursuant to a power of attorney

2

0

3

A few months later, on or about September 15. 2006, George and Martha applied to the

4

Department of Health and Welfare for medical assistance to help pay 'or Martha's medical careo

5

Since October 1, 2006, Martha has been a recipient of medical payments

6

0

The Department

provided payments for Martha's medical care through the Medicaid program in the sum of at

7

least $108,364.230
8

Although it was Martha's health which was in decline, George predeceased Marthao
After George passed away, the Appellant, Human Services Division of the State Attorney General.
(the State) sought funds from his estate, specifically from the sale of the property, as reimbursement
for taxpayer funds previously expended on his wife's behalf. The masistrate denied this request,
holding that because Martha had conveyed her interests in the property dujng her lifetime, she had
no interest in the property from which the State could seek reimburserrent The Attorney General
subsequently filed this appeaL Martha, the recipient, died while this app·;al was pendingo

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A

vVhether the magistrate erred in detennining that the gene~al power of attorney held
by George Perry gave him authority to make a gift to him~elf 0 f Martha Perry's real
property.

R

Whether the magistrate erred in its application and interpretation of [daho Code § 56218, in refusing to allow the State's claim against the estae of George Perry

C

Whether the magistrate erred in its application and interrretarion of 42 USC
§ 1396p as preempting application of Idabo Code § 56-2[80

Do

Vlhether [he magistrate erred in failing to apply [he Idaho Supreme Court holding
in Idaho Depamnent of HealTh aJ7..d Welfare v. Jackman, 132 rdaho 213,970 Pold
6 (1998) to the facts of this case.
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1

E.

\Vhether the State is entitled to attomey fees on appeal.

2

STANDARD OF REVIEW

3

"Vhen a district judge considers an appeal from a magistrate judg<:" the district judge is acting
5

as an appellate court, not as a tTial court. State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 826 P.2d 1306, 1308

6

(1992); rRCP 83(u)(J). Accordingly, the standards of review are the same as those applied by the

7

Idaho Supreme Court or Court of Appeals in a regular appeal: the district court upholds (he lower

8

court's factual findings if based on substantial and competent, though conflicting, evidence; and
9

affinns conclusions of law which demonstrate proper application of kgaI principles to the facts
10
11

found. Hentges v. Hentges, 115 Idaho 192,194,765 P.2d 1094 (Ct. Apu. 1988).

Interpretation of

12

an instrument, such as the power of attorney. is a question of law. Cl'avez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho

13

212,192 P.3d 1036 (2008)

14

Where issues on appeal involve questions of law, a reviewing court exercises free review.

15

Clements Farms, Inc. v. Ben Fish & Son, 120 Idaho 185,814 P.2d 917 (1991). An issue involving

16

statutory construction and interpretation is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo. State

17

Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Housel, 140 Idaho 96,100, 102,90 P.3d 321,325,317 (S. Ct. 2004).
18
19

ANALYSIS

20
21
22
23

24

I.

Power of Attorney and Transfer of Property
The parties agree that the transfer of Martha's interest in the property

performed by Martha, but by George acting pursuant

to

to

George was not

a power of attorney from Martha. The

State argues that the magistrate erred in its determination that George had the authority and valid

25

power of attomey to transfer Martha's Interest in the property to himself. The State argues that
26
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George could only make a valid transfer wah an e:..-press power of attJmey, \vhich specifically
1

2

I granted

him the authority to make gifts of Martha's property on her behalf

It argues that the

3

magistrate failed to make any requisite factual inquiry regarding \vhether t-..1artha consented to the

4

transfer by interspousal agency or any other form of consent.

5
6
7

Although not addressed in detail in rhe magistrate's written opinion, at the hearing this issue
was addressed and decided by tbe magistrate.

The magistrate made a factual and legal

detemlination regarding the extent of the authority granted to George, 111d found that although the

8

gifting Janguage in paragraph H was not rhe "clearest kind of authority." "[i]t certainly can be read
9

that way"; and considering "all of the language in that power of attorney", "the document was
10
11

12
13

14

15
16

entitled to give George Perry as broad of authority as possible, .. incllldjng the right to deal with
interest in real property."
Idaho Code § 32-912 prohibits either spouse, individually, fron~ conveying the community
estate, unless by use of an "express power of attorney."
As cited by the parties, the opening statement of the power of atwrney, which declares in all
capital letters that "powers granted by this document are broad and sweeping."

A subsequent

17

section states:
18

19
20

21
22

24

2S
26

(H) Estate, trust, and other beneficiary transactions. To accept, receipt for,
exercise, release, reject, renounce, assign, disclaim, demand, sue for, claim
and recover any legacy, bequest, devise, gift or other prClperty interest or
payment due or payable to or for the principal; assert any interest in and
exercise any power over any trust, estate or property subject to fiduciary
control; establish a revocable trust solely for the beneti: of the principal
that terminates at the death of the principal and is then di:;tributable to the
legal representative of the estate of the principal; and, inseneraL exercise
all powers with respect to estates and trusts which the principal could
exercise jf present and under no disability; provided, however, that the
Aaent
mav, not make or change a will and mav-' not revoke or amend a trust
:;:,
revocable or amendable by the principal or require the trustee of any trust

for the benefit of the principal to pay income or princpal to the Agent
unless specific authority to that end is given. (emphasis added)

1

2

The Court agrees with the State that the language relied upon by tl-:e persona! representative

3
1!1

Paragraph H is attenuated, and appears to refer to the agent's ability to act with regards to

4

additional property that the principal may obtain. However, Paragraph A of the power of attorney
s

allowed George to convey Martha's interests in real property as he deemed proper. The power of
6

attorney was executed in 2005 prior to the enactment of the current Unif)ml Power of Attorney Act,

7

8

Idaho Code § 5-12-10 1 el seq, in 2008. The present act requires express authority to ma1(e gifts, but

9

it is not applicable here. No authority has been cited requiring such language prior to the adoption

10

of the act. Based on the record before it, this Court affirms the interpreta lion by the magistrate.

11

II.

Statutory Interpretation and Preemption

12

This appeal also involves a question of statutory interpretation. /\ statute must be construed
13

as a whole, taking the literal words of the statute, which words must be given their plain, usual, and
14

ordinary meaning. Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 50 P.3c 488 (2002); State v. Hart,

15

135 Idaho 827, 25 P.3d 850 (200I). If a statute is not ambiguous, the COllrt does not construe it, but

16

simply applies the ordinary meaning. Hansen v. State Farm ivIut. Auto. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 663, 735

17

P.2d 974 (1987). Unless the result is palpably absurd, or legislative intent is clearly to the contrary,
19

a court must assume that the legislature means what is clearly stated in the statute. /v/iller v. State,

20

110 Idaho 298,715 P.2d 968 (1986); Garza v. State, 139 Idaho 533,82 P.3d 445 (2003).

21

Both parties agree that the Medicaid program is a jointly funded and "cooperative end,=avor
22
I In
<.5

which the Federal Government provides financial assistance

(0

partici:1ating States to aId them in

i

furnishing health care to needy persons." Harris v. A'fcRae, 448 U.s. 2<77,308,100 S.Ct. 2671,65

24

LEd.2d 784 (J980). Thus, participating states enact legislation and rules, incorporate them into

25

!

2;;

I
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state medical assistance plans, and submit those plans to the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human
1

:2
3

Services ("HHS") for approval. 42 U.S.e. § 1396a(a)-(b) (2000 & Sup{::. III 2003).

At issue in this case are those provisions dealing with the ability of the State to recover costs

4

of medical care from the estate of the recipient and the reclpient's spome. The State argues that the

5

state and federal provisions allow it to recover costs from the estae of the recipient and the

6

recipient's spouse if those assets were once part of the recipient's estat; and were transferred from

7

the recipient to the recipient's spouse. In other words, the State argues that I.e. § 56-218( I) allows

8

recovery from the estate of a recipient's spouse, including any "asses" within the definition of
9

"estate" under 42 U.S.c. 1396p(b)(4). The definition of "assets" inchdes property transferred to
10
11

one's spouse prior to death under 42 V.S.c. 1396p(h)(l).

12

The personal representative argues that the magistrate's position is correct The magistrate

13

held that the State's ability to recover costs is limited to those "assets" which were transferred to the

14

recipient's spouse at the time of death by operation of law, Because the recipient transferred her

15

property prior to her death, and because that transfer was not of the sarne nature considered in the

16

statutes allowing state cost recovery, the magistrate disallowed the State'; claim.
17

A.

Interpretation, Construction, and Application of 42 U.,s,c, §1396p(b)(4)

18

Title 42 of the United States Code, Section 1396p is entitled "Liens, adjustments and
19
20

recovelles, and transfers of assets." Subsection (b) addresses "[ a ]djustnent or recovery of medical
assistance cOlTectly paid under a State plan" and requires "the State shall seek adjustment or
42 USC §

22

recovery from the [receiving] individual's estate" under certain circumstances.

23

1396p(b)( I )(A),(C)(I). Subsequent sections further define what is meant by an individual'S "estate,"

24

and define which forms of property are subject either to mandatory or discretionary recovery by a
state. Those provisions state:
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II
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", wirh respect to a
deceased individual--

1

2

CA) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included
within the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law;
and

3
4

(B) may include, at the option of the State (and shall include, in the case of
an individual to whom paragraph (l)(C)(i) applies), any other real and
personal property and other assets in which the individual had any legal
title or interest at the time of death (to the extent ()f such interest),
including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the
deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy m common,
survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.

5
6
7

8
9

The State disputes the magistrate and personal representative'snterpretation, which places

10

emphasis on the phrases limiting the property and assets ofthe recipient )fbenetits held "at the time

11

of death." The magistrate found that this definition of "estate" did not permit a state agency to look
12

back and recover property interests that the recipient divested prior tc death. This Court agrees.
13

The language and definition of "estate" is broad, and includes all interests, including any which may
14

have automatically transferred upon the death of the recipient. However, it goes without saying that

15
16

where a recipient has long ago been divested of any particular interest, it would not fall within that

17

individual's estate.

18

divested weJl before death, something which the drafters were clearly able to articuiate in those

19

Moreover, nothing in this provision seeks to preserve interests that were

provisions dealing with Medicaid eligibility requirements.

20

Indeed, when addressing the eligibility requirements for assistan<::e, under § 1396p(c)( )(A),
21

the drafters made those who transfer property "for less than fair market value" ineligible for
22

assistance. The State argues that it would be absurd to prohibit the reclpient and/or recipient'S
23

spouse from disposing of assets below market value in eligibility deteiminations, while allowing

24

assets to be transferred at no cost post-eligibility for purposes of avoiding reimbursement or

25
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Ii

II
recovery payments in probate, However, § J396p(c)( l)(A) deals specifically with eligibility, not
1

recovery, Had the drafters sought to include this same provision in the ;,rea of probate and recovery
J

matters, they easily could have made stich distinction. The Court note:;, however, that even in the

4

context of eligibility, "[aJn individual shall not be ineligible for medica assistance ... to the extent

5

that (A) the assets transferred were a home and title to the home was transferred

6

such individua![.]"

42 USC. 1396p(c)(2),

to

(i) the spouse of

Thus, even in the st:icter setting of eligibility

7

determinations, the dratters recognized and pemlitted the transfer of a recipient's interest in the
8

home to that recipient's spouse. In addition, the drafters were clearly able to articulate specific
9

instances and circumstances where look-back dates should be used to counteract suspect transfers of
10
11

12

property.

Finally, for reasons which will become apparent later, the Cocrt notes that provision (B)
allows the state latitude in applying this expanded definition of "estate," except "in the case of an

14

individual to whom paragraph (l)(C)(i) applies[.)" Paragraph (J)(C)(i) addresses "[aJdjustment or

15

recovery of medical assistance", mandating state recovery of medical assistance where benefits were

16

paid to any individual of 55 years of age or older when the medical assistance was received.

17

However, that clause and related provisions limit recovery to certain f':Jrms of medical assistance,
18

including long-tenn care services and nursing facility services. !d. In (lis scenario, which appears
19

20

to be the circumstance in this case, the state is required to include this ex Janded version of "assets."

Interpretation, Construction, and Application of 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(h)

21

B.

22

The State also disputes the magistrate's interpretation of the definitions under § 1J96p(h),

23
24

particularly as applied to § 1396p(b)(4). That provision states:
(h) Definitions[:J fn this section, the following definitions shall apply:

25

26
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(1) The tenn "assets", with respect to an individual, includes all income
and resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse, including
any income or resources which the individual or such irdividual's spouse

1

2

is entitled to but does not receive because of action--

3

(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse,
4

The State argues that "assets" includes the property which originally belonged to the
5

recipient, but of which she was divested due to the action of her spouse, even it he was acting as her
6
7

agent at the time, The Court has several problems with this interpretation.

8

First of all, "assets" as described in this definition include "income or resources." The Court

9

notes that real property, while it might be described as an "asset" or "resource," is much more

10

clearly described as "real property." The drafters of this section were :ikely aware of this, as they

11

had previously used the phrase "real property" in multiple sections, inchlding § 1396p(b )(4)(A),(B),

12

above.
13

More Importantly, the definition of "resources" as listed in 13(;'6p(h)(5), "has the meaning
14

given such term in section 1382b[.]" Thus, the definition of "resources," specifically excludes "the
15

16

home (including the land that appertains thereto)." 42 U.S,c. 1382bia)(l ), Accordingly, where

17

"resources" as contained in this section (1396p(h) specifically excludes the home, the Court finds It

18

necessarily excludes it from the definition of "assets" as well.

19

definition of "assets" applied to § 1396p(b)(4)(A),(B), the Court filds it fails to expand that

20

TIm;, even with this expanded

recovery provision to include real property owned by a recipient prior to death.

21

C.

Interpretation, Construction, and Application of I.e.

q 56-218.

22

Idaho Code § 56-21S( 1) is entitled "Recovery of certain medical 3.ssistance" and states:
23

24

Except where exempted or waived in accordance WIth federal law medical
assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an in jividual who was
fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the individlal received such

26
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assistance may be recovered from the individual's estate, ar;d the estate of
the spouse, if any, for such aid paid to either or both:

1

2

3

The State argues this language clearly includes the option of rec(very from "the estate of the
spouse" and does not limit the "estate of the spouse" to property in which the recipient had an

4

interest at the time of death. The Court recognizes and agrees thar this departure from the language
5

of the federal provisions indicates a more aggressive policy adopted by this state to recover costs
6
7

from the estate of the recipient's spouse.

8

As far as I.e. § 56-218 is concerned, the Court agrees with the State that this section clearly

9

indicates an intent to recover medical costs from the estate of the spou"e of a recipient. However,

10

several concerns remain regarding whether this provision, standing ale :1e, allows the state to look

11

back to any period beyond those transfers effectuated at death.

12

First of all, the subsequent provisions of §56-218 further define and limit what is meant by
13

"estate." Subsection (4)(a)-(b) ofLe. § 56-218, states "the ternl "estate" shall include:"
14

(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within the
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law; and

15
16

(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which the
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death, to the extent
of such interest, including such assets conveyed to a suprivor, heir, or
assign of the deceased individual through joint tenmcy, tenancy m
common, survivorship, life estate, living trust or other arrangement.

17

18
19
20

Jd. This language should look familiar, because it is, almost without exception, the same language

21

used in the federal code, 42 U.S.e. § 1396p(b)(4)(A), (B). The person<i representative argues that

22

because

23

accordingly. As discussed above, this language taken in the context

24

2S

I.e.

§56-218(4)(a)-(b) mirrors the language of the federal statue, it should be interpreted
0

f the federal statute clearly

limits the recovery-eligible estate of the recipient's spouse to property transferred at or around the

Itime of death.

Thus, the "assistance (which] may be recovered from the

26
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to

estate of the spouse"

appears to be limited accordingly. However, when taken in the context of the Idaho Code section,
1

and the broader language targeting recovery costs from the estate of the recipient's spouse, the
:2

abdity to recover from a spouse appears to be expanded.

In

I.e.

§ 56-218(1), it refers to the

4

recipient as the "individual," and the spouse as the "spouse." The lan~uage of § 56-218(4)(a),(b)

5

refers only to the "individual's estate" or the estate of the recipient.

6

It contains no reference or

limitation on the estate of the spouse.

7

I

8

I recipient's spouse is further supported and explained by the internal rules and

9

I

The State's interpretation of these provisions, and the intent to reach the assets of a Medicaid

10

IDepartment.

11

II provisions for recovery of medical assistance," among other things.

12

Iin relevant part:

regulations of the

IDAPA 16.03.09.900 is entitled Liens and Estate Recovery, and "sets forth the
IDAPA 16.03.09.905.01, states

A claim against the estate of a spouse of a participant is limited to the
value of the assets of the estate that had been, at any time atter October 1,
1993, community property, or the deceased participant's share of the
separate property, and jointly owned property.

13

14

15
16

ld. The plain language of this section does not restrict the language oL.e § 56-218, which allows

17

the Department broad authority to seek recovery against the "estate elf Ihe spouse."

18

218(1). A subsequent provision, IDAPA 16.03,09.905,05 states:

19

I.e.

§ 56-

A marriage settlement agreement or other such agreemen' which separates
assets for a married couple does not eliminate the debt against the estate of
the deceased participant or the spouse. Transfers under a marriage
settlement agreement or other such agreement may belOided if not for

20
21

adequate consideration.
22
23

Id.
Taking into account the broad language of

24

:;"

I.e.

§ 56-218, i 1 addition to the specitlc

provisions in the Idaho Administrative Rules (which have the same ()rce and effect of iaN per
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Mallonee v. State, 139 Idaho 615, 619, 84 P.3d 551, 555 (2004», it is clear that Idaho law p1ennits
1

recovery from the estate of the recipient spouse, limited only by the broad interpretation of "estate"
2

of I.C § 56-218(4)(a)-(b) and time and community property restraints ~)f lD.A.PA 16.0309.905.01

3
4

Thus, the clear and plain language of Ida..ho law (without considering the federal provisions and

5

effect they have) \vould allow the State to recover from the estate of the spouse, so long as the

6

property sought was community property held by the participant after October 1, 1993, which was

7

the case here.
8

E.

Preemption Doctrine

9

This Court has found that the plain meaning of the rda.~o and federal Medicaid provisions
10

differ, in that the Idaho provisions clearly and unambiguously broadeI~. the ability of the State to

11

recover from separate assets of the recipient's spouse beyond those asset, in which the recipient had

12

an interest at the time of death. This juxtaposition requires a discussion regarding the validity of the

13

14

15
16

I

Idaho regulations in light of the doctrine of preemption.
The basis for the doctrine of preemption is found in Article VJ,

2 of the United States

Constitution, which states that the laws of the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the Land;

17

. . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the t=ontrary notw·ithstanding."
18

Consequently, the United States Supreme Court has established that a ~tate law that conflicts with
19
20

federal law is "without effect." Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.5. 504, 516, 112 S.O. 2608,

21

2617, t20 L.Ed.2d 407, 422-23 (1992); M'Culloch v. Marylalld. 17 U.S.( 4 \Vheat) 316,427, 4 LEd.

22

579,606 (1819); Lewis v. Stale, Dept. oj Transp, , 143 Idaho 418, 146 P,3d 684 (Ct. App. 2006).

2.3

24

Congressional purpose

IS "

'the ultimate touchstone' " of the preemption inquiry. Mali.Jne v.

White AIotor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504, 98 S.Ct. 1185, 55 LEd.2d 443 (1973) (quoting Retail Clerks

2S

Inc'/ Ass 'n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn. 375 U.S. 96,103,84 S.O. 2U, 11 L.Ed.2d 179 (1963)).
26
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1/

This Court's primary focus in the analysis must be to ascertain the intent of Congress. See Cal. Fed.
1

2
3

Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra. 479 U.S. 272, 280-81, 107 s,Ct. 683, 93 LEd.2d 613 (1987), The

United States Supreme Court has explained that H[c]onsideration of issues arising under the

4

Supremacy Clause 'start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are]

5

not to be superseded by Federal Act unless that [is) the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'"

6

Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516, 112 S,Ct

2608, 120 LEd,2d 407

7

(1992) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 61 S.Ct. 1146,91 LEd. 1447
8

(1947»).

Thus. preemption is generally disfavored. Cipollone, 505 C.S, at 516, 518, 112 S.Ct.

9

10

2608).

Federal law may preempt state law in two ways, either expres;;!y or impliedly. Boundary

11
12

Backpackers v. Boundary County, 128 Idaho 371, 375, 913 P.2d 1141, 1145 (1996).

13

preemption occurs where Congress exhibits intent to occupy a given field of law. Lel.... is v. State,

14

Dept. of Transp., supra. w'here such intent is shown, then any state law encroaching into that field

15

16

is preempted. Id.

Express

fn this instance congress clearly did not intend t) occupy the entire field of

Medicaid law. Rather, the intent appears to be to the contrary. as the laws in this area are full of

17

provisions which encourage the States to enact legislation and rules, and incorporate them into their
18

overall medical assistance plans. See inter alia 42 U.S,c. § 1396a(a)-(b). Nevertheless, many of
19
20
21

the sections contained in the federal code require that the states must "c(JmJly with the provisions of
the federal code, particularly with respect to liens and other recovery for a~sistance paid. 42 U.S,c.
§ 1396p; 42 USc. § 13963(a)(18).
Thus, where congress has not expressed [he intent to occupy a given field of law, st2.te law

24

may still run afoul of the preemption doctrine to the extent the state la\,( conflicts with federal law,

, II Lewis

F.

Siole, Dept. of Trallsp., supra. This is called "connict preemption" and requires that state
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law is preempted to the extent it cont1icts with the federal law. Jd. Hm." ever, conflict preemption is
1

only found where compliance with both state and federal laws is impossible (Fla. Lime Avocado

2

Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 US. 132, 142-143, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 10 L.Ed.2:d 248 (1963)), or when the

3

state law is "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the fur pt:.rposes and objectives of
Congress," Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,67,61 S.Ct. 399,85 L.Ed. 58l (1941).

5

6

In Stafford v. Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare, 145 Idaho 530, 534, 181 P.3d 456, 460 (S.

7

Ct. 2008), the court conducted a review of the Idaho rules regarding Med.icaid, in particular the rules

8

involved with Medicaid qualification. While that court noted the need for the State to promulgate
9

rules, it also foood that "both the federal government and state govemnent expect federal law to
10

predominate" in that regard. Id. at 460, 534.
12

In the case of In re Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52, 64 (Mim1. 2008), the court specitically

13

dealt with a conflict involving the federal statutes at issue in this cast, As that court noted, the

14

federal statute regarding recovery contains specific language limiting the field of available recovery.

15

fd. Title 42 of the United States Code, Section 1396p is entitled "Liens,ldjustments and recoveries,

16

and transfers of assets." Subsection (b) addresses "[a]djustment or recovery of medical assistance

17

correctly paid under a State plan."

Parenthesis (1) begins the subsection with the broad rule

18

prohibiting recovery in general, and then requiring the State seek recove y in certain circumstances.
19

Tl1at provision states:

20

No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on
behalf of an individual under the State plan may be made, except that the
State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical as~;istance correctly
paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case of the
following indiViduals:

21
22

24

42 U.S,c. 1396p(b)(I).

Thus, the federal government has outlined a general rule prohibiting

5

I recovery.
26

As such, Congress has indicated its object and desire to pn:vent recovery in all but a

I
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II

limited number of circumstances. It follows then, that if these circunsLmces are expanded by a
1

2
3

particular state law, the state law becomes an obstacle to the accompJi~hment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress to limit recovery, and is thereby preempted.

4

Subsection (B) explains the required recovery exception againEt the estate of the recipient

s

individual who was 55 years of age or older when assistance was received, but further limits

6

recovery to care costs at nursing facilities, horne and community. For :onvenience, that provision

7

states:
B
9

10
11

12
13
14

15

16

In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when the
individual received such medical assistance, the State shall seek
adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate, but only for medical
assistance consisting of-(i) nursing facility services, home and community-based servlces, and
related hospital and prescription drug services, or
(ii) at the option of the State, any items or services uncer the State plan
(but not including medical assistance for medicare co:;t-sharing or for
benefits described in section I 396a(a)(10)(E) of this title)
42 U.S.c. 1396p(b)(1 )(B)(i-ii). This provision limits recovery by age, by type of service, or by
types of allowed services any particular state might choose to include, Neither party has argued

17

regarding the ability to recover for services in this case. Thus, the issues in this case bring us back,
IB

full circle, to the interpretation and effect of 42 U.S.c. 1396p(b)(4), 42 V.S.c. 1396p(h)(J), and
19
20

1. C. § 56-218( 1), regarding whether recovery may be had against the ass::ts of the recipient's spouse
in which the spouse did not have any interest prior to the time

22
23
24

0

f death. As discussed in detai I

above, the federal provisions limit such recovery to assets of the spouse in which the recipient had
an interest at death.
Because the federal provisions seek, overall, to limit re::overy except in cel1ain

5

circumstances, because exceptions to a general statement of policy are to be construed narro'vvly, and
26

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 15

because the state provisions expand this recovery policy, the Court filds the State provisions are
1

2

preempted. Comm'r v. Clark, 489 US. 726, 739,109 S.C!, 1455, 103 LEd.2d 753 (1989).
Effect of Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman

3

D.

'*

Up to this point in the process of interpreting and applying the Jfovisions above, the Court

5

has relied upon relatively little case lav,,·.

6

statutory construction as required by Idaho law. The Court first considered the plain language

By so doing, the Court has followed the rules of

7

contained in the provisions, which it found unambiguous.

Consequ::ntly, legislative intent and

8

case law are not necessary to further interpret the language.

George W. Watkins Family v.

9

10

Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 797 P.2d 1385 (1990); Friends of Farm to Market v. Valley

11

County, 137 Idaho 192, 197,46 P.Jd 9, 14 (S. Ct. 2002) (citing Lawless v. Davis,_98 Idaho 175,560

12

P.2d 497 (1977) ("Where the language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the

13

legislative body must be given effect, and there is no occasion ft)f a court to construe the

14

15

language.")).
The State, however, argues throughout its briefing that ldaho has clear precedent

16

interpreting these provisions differently. In the case of Idaho Departrrzent of Health and Welfare
17

v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6 (1998), the recipient's

spouse received nearly all

18
19

community property of the recipient pursuant to a marriage settlement agreement. After both the

20

recipient and the spouse had died, the Department sought recovery ITem the estate of the spouse.

21

Id. at 214, 7. The language of I C. § 56-218 as it existed at that time allowed recovery from the

22

spousal estate only where rhe estate of the recipient contained absolute' y nothing. Thus, although
[here was clear legislative intent that the State should be able to seek recovery from [he spousal

24

estate, this expressed intent of the legislature would virtually never o:cur. where the imprecise,
25

26

express language of the statute led to an absurd result. Id. at 215, 8
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II
The Idaho Supreme Court found that a more reasonable interp'etation, which woule! be in
1
2
3

line with the legislature's intent. would be to allow recovery against lhe spousal estate where the
estate of the recipient was insufficient. ]d. However, in the very next section, the court found
federal law preempted the Department's authority given by 1. C. § S6-218 to recover from the

5
6

7

spouse's separate estate.

Id. at 216. 9. The court's analysis in t:mt case involved state and

federal provisions which have since been replaced and/or amended.

'I'Itt Ie or no

glll'd ance

This Court finds it offers

. . .Issues .111 thIS
. cas~.
to th e re 1evant and determmatlve

8

The State's reliance on Jackman is based largely on the original opinion in that case,
9

10
11

12

13
14

which has since been substituted. The State urges this Court to consider this opinion, arguing that
it clearly shows the court's intent to give "assets" a broad interpretation, and that the decision

I would

have been different if the court had been able to apply the stautes in their current form.

The Court does not agree. The full reasons for issuing a substitute Minion are not ascertainable
by simple comparison of a substitute opinion. Given Internal Rule

0

f the Idaho Supreme Court

15

15(f)'s prohibition against citation of unpublished opinions, the Cour: will not speculate about a
16

withdrawn opinion to determine how the clear and unambiguous language of the statutes in
17
18
19

20
21

22

23

question should be interpreted, or to determine the applicability of the preemption doctrine.

Ill.

Attorney's Fees

Pursuant to LA.R. 35(b)(5) and

I.e. § 12-117, each party has resi~rved the right to attorney's

fees on appeal. fdaho Code § 12-117(1) requires this Court to award re;.sonable attorney's fees and
expenses to the prevailing party "if it finds that the nonprevailing part} acted without a reasonable

II basis in fact or law,"

Where questions of law are raised, attorney's fee:; should be awarded only if

24

the nonprevaJling party advocates a plainly fallacious, and, therefore, net fairly debatable, position.
25

26

Lowerv v. Board of COlin tv Com'rs for Ada Co lin t}', 115 Idaho 64, 764 P.2d 431 (S. CL 198.3). A
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II
state agency acted yvithout reasonable basis where it has no authority to take a particular action.
1

Reardon v. Magic Valley Sand and Gravel. Inc., 140 Idaho 115, 90 PJ d 340 (S. CL 2004). In this

2

I.e.?

3

case the State acted in accordance with the authority granted it by

4

agency regulations. Although this Court found that provision to be pr :!empted, the magistrate did

5

I not

6

56-218 and corresponding

make such a clear finding. Given this, and the fact that this is a m ltter of first impression, the

State acted based on reasonable argument and authority.

7

8

CONCLUSION
9

Based on the reasoning above, the decision of the magistrate is p.FFIRMED.
10

IT IS SO ORDERED.

11

Dated this

12

Iv ~

day of March, 2011.

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
~2

23

II

!

24

25
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IN TIlE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DTSTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHlNGTON

IN TIIE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF

)
)

Case No. CV-2009-1926

)

VIVIAN WIGGINS and

)
)

E1vIERSON D. WIGGINS,

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON APPEAL

)
)

Deceased.

)

------------------------)
This matter carne on for hearing on February 8, 2011, on appeal from the trial court's
Memorandum Decision Denying Petitioner's Claim Against the Estate. Appellant was
represented by Corey Cartwright, Deputy Attorney General, I-Iuman Services Division and the
Respondent, who is the personal representative for the Estate of Vivian Wiggins and Emerson D.
Wiggins, was represented by Brad MasingiU. Respondent filed a Notic~: of Augmentation andior
Supplementation of his Brief on March 21, 2011, which included the recent appellate decisjon i.n
the Ada County case of George D. Perry, CV-IE-2009-5214. The Cour: having heard and
considered the arguments of counsel as well as the briefing fHed, now issues this Memorandum
Decision on Appeal.
1. FACTS
Vivian Wiggins was bor
Wiggins was bor

and died on January 30, 2009. Emerson
and died on February 9, 2009. Vivian and Emerson were

1
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married and continued to be married at the time they applied for Medicaid benefits and up until
the time of Vivian's death.

In June 2002, Vivian was admitted to a nursing home. Emerson

and Vivian applied for medical assistance on November 18,2002 to help pay for Vivian's
medical care and again on August 27,2003. Vivian became eligible for Medicaid on September

l.,

2003~

and between that time and Vivian's death, the Department of Health and Welfare

(Department) paid for Vivian's medical care through Medicaid, in the snm of at least
$272,134.68. The Department received a voluntary payment in April 2008, in the amount of
$7,460.23, resulting in the Department's claim amount of $264,876.45.
A joint probate estate for Vivian and Emerson (the Estate) was cpened on May 21,2009,

and the inventory which was filed shows assets of $78,659.44. On November 23,2009, the
Department filed a claim against the Estate for medical assistance paid on behalf of Vivian in the

amount of $264,674.45. The Estate's personal representativefiJed a Nctiee ofDisallcwanee of
Claim on November 30, 2009. The trial court heard the Department's I=etition for aUowan.ce ofa
claim against the Estate on February 3,2010. The parties stipulated in open court that the
Department treated Vivian as if she had entered into a Marriage Settlerr ent Agreement (MSA) in
2002 or 2003. but that a copy ofthe MSA cannot be found. The admittl~d purpose of the MSA
was to transfer any assets in which Vivian had an interest to Emerson, ~s his sole and separate

property, so that she would be considered eligible to receive Medicaid henefits. The trial court
found that the assets in the Estate were Emerson's separate property baDed upon the MSA which
had transmuted the community property to separate property, and there was no legal obligation
owed by Emerson' 5 Estate to repay the Department for his wife's care ll'om his separate
property. The trial court disallowed the Department's claim in its MelT.orandum Decision filed
on March 30, 2010. The Department appealed that decision to this COlilt.

2
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II. ISSUES ON APPEAL:
Wh.ile the Department lists a number of issues in its opening brief, the basic assertion is
that the Magistrate Judge erred in detennining that a valid MSA existed and that the MSA
transm.uted Vivian and Emerson's community property to the separate property of Emerson l1'om
which the Department could not recover. The Department also argues tilat in making that
determination, the trial court improperly interpreted and applied Idaho Code Section 56-218 and
42 U.s.C. 1396p. Both parties assert they are entitled to attorney fees

0:3.

appeal.

ITI. LAW AND ANALYSIS
The Department has appealed the trial court's decision to deny the Department's Petition
for Allowance of Claim seeking recovery from the Estate of money spent on Vivian's healthcare.
The Department argues that it is entitled to recover this money under I.e. §56-218 from assets
which were the separate property of Emerson at the time of Vivian's de;lth. The Department also
contends that Vivian's estate includes the property she transferred to Enerson through the MSA
and is an asset which is subject to a claim for Medicaid reimbursement:Jnder both federal and
state law. Finally, the Department asserts that it did not stipulate to all)f the facts the magistrate
judge relied on in his decision.
Respondent argues that under both state and federal law, the cla 1m filed by the
Department only applied to property in which Vivian had an interest as ofthe date of her death
and does not apply against Emerson's separate property which he acquired when the MSA
transmuted the community property to separate property_

3
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A.

Standard of review
When a district judge considers an appeal from a magistrate judge as an appellate

proceeding, rather than exercising the option of granting a trial de novo, the district judge is
acting as an appellate eourt, not as a trial court. State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 596 (1992).
A court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantlal and
competent, thou.gh conflicting, evidence. T.R.C.P. 52(a). The trial court is the arbiter of
conflicting evidence; its determination of the weight, credibility, inferef':::e, and implications
thereofwill not be supplanted by this Court's impressions or conclusions: from the written record

Johannsen v. Utterbeck. 146 Idaho 423, 431-432, 196 P.3d 341,349·350 (2008).
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which dis Court exercises free

review. State v. Hart. 135 Idaho 827, 829, 25 P.3d 850, 852 (2001). Il1t1:rpretation of a statute
begins with an eXanJ.ination of the statute's literal words. State v. Bumight, 132 Idaho

654~

659,

978 P .2d 214, 219 (1999). Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, courts

give effect to the statute a.,c; 'Nritten~ without engaglng 1n statutory constrlctlon. STale v. Rhode,
133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685,688 (1999). Only where the language is ambiguous will this
Court look to ru1es of construction for guidance and consider the reason lblencss of proposed
interpretations. Idaho Conservation League. Inc. v. Idaho State Dep't l! r Agric., 143 Idaho 366,
368, 146 P.3d 632, 634 (2006). Moreover, unless a contrary purpose is clearly indicated,
ordinary words will be given their ordinary meaning when construing a statute. Bunt v. Ci(vof

Garden City, 118 Idaho 427, 430, 797 P.2d 135, 138 (1990). In construing a statute, this Court
will not deal in any subtle refinements of the legislation, but will ascertain and give effect to the
purpose and intent of the legislature, based on the whole act and every word tberein, lending

4
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substance and meaning to the provisions. Curlee v. Kootenai County Fite & Rescue. 148 Ide.ho

391,398, 224 P.3d 458, 465 (2008).
B.

Stipulation of facts
At the hearing before the trial court, both the Department and the Estate, through their

respective attorneys, stipulated to the fact that the Department treated Vbian and Emerson as if
an MSA had been entered into between them prior to Vivian's receipt ofM,!dicaid asslstance.
They further stipulated that the MSA was entered into for the purpose of transmuting Vivian's
interest in the community property to Emerson's separate property so sh~ could meet the
eligibility requirements to receive Medicaid l , Both agreed that the orig.bal MSA eould not be
located. On appeal the Department is challenging the existence of the lV'SA and its effect in
tiansmuting property, even though it failed to raise the issue with the trial court and appears,
from the record, to have S-bTIeed to these facts. Based upon the parties' :ltipulation, the Court will
not address this issue further.

c.

Id9ho Code Section 56-218(1)
The Department argues that I.e. §56-218(1) allows recovery fron the estate of the

recipient of Medicaid and also from the estate of the rccipient~s spouse. Respondent argues that
the claim filed by the Department only applied to property in which Vhian. had an interest as of
the date of her death and does not apply against Emerson's separate property.
Idaho Code Section 56-218 is entitled "Recovery of certain medical assistance~' and
provides in part:

(1) Except where exempted or waived in accordance with federal
law medical assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an
individual who was fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the
I It appears the intent was to enable Vivian to become eligible for Medicaid assistanc ~ while at the same time
leaving Emerson, who did not need nursing home care. with enou~h money on which to live while Vivian was in the
nursing home.

5
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individual received such assistance may be recovered from the
individual's estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any, for such aid
paid to either or both ....
The Department tlrgue!i tha.t this section gives broad authority for the Depa.'1ment to seek
recovery from the spouse of a Medicaid recipient for any monies owed. Admittedly this part of
the statute appears to allow sueh recovery, but there are additional provi3ions which narrow this
authority.
Idaho Code §56-218(4) states as follows:
For purposes ofthls section, the tenn "estate" shall include:
(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within
the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probatei:;w;
and
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which
the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death, ':0
the extent of such interest,. including such assets conveyed to a
survivor. heir. or assign of the deceased individual through joint
tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust
or other arrangement.

The Department agrees that "individual" as used in this statute refers to the recipient, Le. Vivian.
Thus, the question becomes, once the MSA was executed, was there any property in which
Vivian had "any legal title or interest at the time of death?" It appears from a plain reading of
this section that the recipient'S estate includes not only property in which the recipient had a
legal interest but also property which passed by operation of law to sorr:.cone else at the time of
the recipient's death. Neither of those circumstances would include prcpcrty which the recipient
had sold, given away or transferred prior to death.

Part of the difficulty is that the Department's interpretation of what should be included in
the recipient's estate ignores Idaho community property law and does not address the impact of
having separate property in the recipient's spouse's estate.

Indeed~

in its bde,f, the Department

asserts that I.e. §56-218(l) "effectively alters marital property law in Idaho when it comes to the
6
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property of Medicaid recipients and their spouses." There is no indicati In in this statute that the
Idaho legislature intended such a sweeping change by simply authorizing the State to assert a

claim against a recipient's spouse's estate.
Idaho Code defines separate property in Section 32-903 as:

All property of either thc husband or the wife owned by him or her
before marriage, and that acquired aftetvlard by either by gift,
bequest, devise or descent, or that which either he or she shall
acquire with the proceeds of his or her separate property, by way
of moneys or other property, shall remain his or her sole and
separate property.
A debt incurred by the Medicaid recipient is a community debt and clea.r1y the recipjent's interest

in separate property or in the recipient's share of community property would be liable. Idaho
Code §32-911 states: "The separate property ofthe wife [husband] is O,)t liable for the debts of
her husband [his wjfe], but is liable for her own debts contracted before or after marriage."
Typically, under Idaho community property law, the spouse's separate :property is not liable for
debts incurred by the other spouse. I.e. § 32-912, entitled "Control of community property"
provides:

Either the husband or the wife shall have the rig11t to manage and control
the community property, and either may bind the community property by
contract., except that neither the husband nor wife may sell, conveyor
encumber the community real estate unless the other joins in ex!~cuting the
sale agreement, deed or other instrument of conveyance by which the real
estate is sold, conveyed or encumbered. and any community ohDgation
incurred by either the husband or the wife without the consenl in writing
ofthe other shall not obligate the separate property o/the spouse who did
not so consent: provided, however, that the husband or wjfe may by
express power of attorney give to the other the complete power to sell.
conveyor encumber community property, either real or personal All
deeds, conveyances, bills of sale, or evidences of debt heretofore made in
conformity herewith are hereby validated. (emphasis added)

7
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There is nothing in the record to 1ndicate that Emerson signed in writing agreeing to bind his
separate property for the debts of Vivian. While that may very well have: bleen part of the
Medicaid application process, it is not in the record. Thus. while I.e. §56-218 gives the
Department the legal authority to seek reimbursement from both spouses, it doesn't answer the
question of which assets in the estate are liable for the Medicaid debt.
At the hearing in this matter, the Department admitted that it car.~10t pursue property that
has always been the separate property of the recipient's spouse (even tht)ugh this contradicts the·
Department's argument that I.e. 56-218 broadly allows recovery against both spouses' estates).
The Department contends it can collect from separate property that was:mce community
property if it was community property after October 1, 1993, and itjustHles this position by
citing to a Department rule that provides as fonows:

IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20 (deleted in 2010)
20. Limitations on Estate Claims. Limits on the Department's ch:im.
against the assets of a deceased participant or spouse are subject to
Sections 56-218 and 56-21SA, Idaho Code. A claim against the
estate of a spouse of a participant is limited to the value of the
assets of the estate that had been, at any time after October 1, 1993,
community property. or the deceased participant's share of the
separate property, andjointly owned property. Recovery will not
be made until the deceased participant no longer is survived by a
spouse, a child who is under age twenty-one (21). or a blind or
d.isabled child. as defined in 42 U.s.C. 1382c as amended and,
when applicable, as provided in Subsection 900.09 ofthls rule. ::~o
recovery will be made if the participant received medical
assistance as the result of a crime comm.itted against the
participant. (3-30-07)
IDAPA 16.03.09.900.24 (deleted in 2010)
24. Marriage Settlement Agreement or Other Such Agreement. .A
marriage settlement agreement or other such agreement which
separates assets for a married couple does not eliminate the deb'
against the estate of the deceased participant or the spouse.
Transfers under a marriage settlement agreement or other such
agreement may be voided if not for adequate consideration. (3-:: 007)

8
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Both of the IDA..P A rules that the Department relies on were deleted in ::010. At oral argument
the Department was unable to jnstify the reasoning or lOglc to support i1 s position that some

separate property of the recipient's spouse is liable to the State while ofler separate property is
not (apart from the Rule mentioned above).
Thus, while I.C. §56-21S gives the Department the authority to !;eek recovery from the
estate of a Medicaid recipient's spouse, it does not answer the question )fwhether it controls
over Idaho's community property law and allows recovery from separate property which would
otherwise not be liable for community debts incurred by the recipient. ,Absent some clear
authority, this Court does not read this statute to do so.
D.

Meaning of "estate"

The Department argues that not only can it collect from separate property in Emerson's
estate,l but it can also collect from property which once belonged to Vivian. It makes this
argument based on the definition of "estate" contained in federal and stlte laws. The Department
argues that 1. C. §56-21 g authorizes recovery in this case because the strtute does not say that
recovery is limited to assets of the community. Respondent argues that the federal statute only
provides recovery for property in Vivian's estate; property in which Vi'ria.'1 had an interest at the
time of her death; and community property.
The Idaho Supreme Court has reviewed the federal Medicaid pDgram and its relationship
with the state. "While it is often thought of as pr.oviding medical care )nly for the indigent, it
also provides coverage for the aged whose income a.l1d resources are in:rufficient to meet the
costs of necessary medical services including nursing horne care." StaffOrd v. Idaho Dept. of

Health & Welfare. 145 Idaho 530, 534, 181 PJd 456,460 (2008). The States operate Medicaid
by their own design but these programs roust be consistent with federal standards and
regulations. Jd. Both the federal goverrunent and the state government expect federal law to
9
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predominate in determining qualifications for receipt of Medicaid assistmce. Jd.

Fjnal1y~

Court went on to comment that: "Over the years, as the Medicaid prognrrn evolved from strictly
an indigent assistance program to one that provided assistance to elderly persons who struggle to
meet the cost of medical and nursing homc care, steps were taken to keep those recipients from
having to divest themselves of their home and other basic resources.~' ld,
The definitions of "estate'~ under state law and federal law are si:-nilar. The state
definition which is found at I.e. §56-218(4) was previously quoted above. The federal law
governing Medicaid defines "estate" in Title 42 U.S.CA. § 1396p as follows:
(b) Adjustment or recovery of medical assistance correctly paid tInder a State plan
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate~', with respe(!t to a deceased
individuaJ-(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets i:Jcluded within the
individual's estate, as defi.ned for purposes of State probate law; and
(B) may include, at the option of the State (and shall inc1ude~ in the case of an individual
to whom paragraph (l)(C)(i) applies), any other real and personal property and other
assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the
extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of
the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life
estate, living trust, or other arrangement.
Thus fedcral1aw includes all assets in the recipient's estate which would be allowed under state
probate law, and also allows the state to broaden "estate'~ for purposes cfrecovering medical
assistance to include other property in which the recipient had an intere:;t at the time of death, as
Idaho has. Fcderal1aw does not discuss the impact of state community property laws and,
presumably, that must be up to the state.
The Department admitted that the state and federal definitions of "estate" apply only to
the "individual's" estate (Le. recipient, not spouse of recipient). The Department also agrees that
Vivian had no legal interest in any property at the time of her death; however, it argues that the

10
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federal definhion of ""assets" found in 42 USC 1396p(h)(1) must be incorporated. The federal
law governing Medicaid defines "assets" in Title 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396p a.!i follows:

(h) Definitions
Ln this section, the following definitions shall apply:
(1) The term "'assets", with respect to an individual, includes all
income and resources of the individual and of the individual's

spouse, including any ineome or resources which the individual or
such individual's sIXluse is entitled to but does not receive becau~e
ofaction-(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse,
(B) by a person, including a court or administrative body. with
legal authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or
such individual's spouse, or
(C) by any person, including any court or administrative body,
acting at the direction or upon the request of the individual or SUGh
individual's spouse.
That provision, which is difficult to understand at best, broadens what s;:lould be included in the

recipient's estate and appears to include resources which the recipient would have had in his or
her estate but for the actions of the recipient ()r the recipienfs spouse. '\?bile this would appear
to include property transmuted by virtue of an MSA as the Department nrgu.es, there is nothing in
the statute that makes this happen automatically. Tn other words, simply because the definition
of "assets" could include that property doesn't m.ean that such transactions are set aside without
further action. There should be some action takcn to recover those resouces into the recipient's
estate, such as setting aside the MSA, which will be discussed later in tliis Decision.

E.

Effect of Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Jackman
In its brief, the Department argues that the issue presented by th:s appeal has already been

decided by the Idaho Supreme Court in Idaho Dept. Of Health and We~ure v. Jackman, 132
Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6 (1998). That case does have facts similar to those in this case but it

in effect in 1993. In .lackman, a marriage settlement
addressed the version ofLe. 956-218
,
agreement was signed, which transmuted most of the wifers community property into the
11
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separate property of the husband. After the wife died, her estate was probated and the money left
in her estate was paid to the State as partial reimbursement for the

Medjl~aid

paid on behalf of the

wiJe. After the husband died, the State sought to obtain additional mon'ies owed for the wife~5
care from the husband's estate. The Court held that the federal statute r:!garding recovery of
Medicaid assistance as it existed in 1991. did not permit the Department to recover from the
husband's estate. This was so because the definition of "assets" from which recovery could be
made excluded "assets disposed of on or before [Aug. 10, 1993]." Because the MSA executed
by Jackman was signed prior to this date, any assets transferred by that document were excluded.
While the Supreme Court did talk about the effeet of the 1993 amendments in broadepJng the
definition of "assets," that was not necessary to the Court's decision based on its reasoning. The
Court was not presented directly "With the question of whether, under the law as it now exists,
federal law would trump state community property laws in making sepZlrate property liable for
debts that could otherwise not be rec()vered from separate property.
While it would seem that the Department has no recourse against assets transferred to the
recipient's spouse, there is an additional provision which allows it to set aside the MSA and
place the assets back in the recipient's estate. Thus, regardless of how the terms "estate" and
"assets" are interpreted, there is a process through which the Departrner.t can set aside the MSA
and can collect current or fonner community property from both spouse:s' estates as ifthe MSA
never existed.
F.

Application of I.e. §56-218 (2)

Idaho Code Section 56-218(2) states:
Transfers of real or persol1al property, 011 or after the look-back
dates defined in 42 U.S ,c. 1396p~ by recipients of such aid, or 6eir
spouses, without adequate consideration are voidable and may 1: e
set aside by an. action in the distri.ct court.
12
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This statute has also been incorporated into a Department rule:
IDAPA 16.03.09.900.24 (deleted in 2010)
24. Marriage Settlement Agreement or Other Such Agreement. P,
marriage settlement agreement or other such agreement which
separates assets for a married couple does not eliminate the debt
against the estate of the deceased participant or the spouse.
Transfers under a marriage settlement agreement or other such
agreement may be voided jf not for adequate consideration. (3-3007)
If the terms "estate" and "asset" are as broad as has been argued by the Department, those terms

would automatically include any property transferred by an MSA and there would be no need to
set aside such an agreement. Not every transfer ofpToperty by a Medicn.id recipient is improper
or without adequate consideration, nor should transferred property autor::latically be included in
the individual's estate and be liable for reimbursement of Medicaid benefits paid. Some action
should be required in order for those resources to be included and Le.

§56~218(2)

is the vehicle

for doing so.
The Department argues this provision is of no use to them in cases like the current one
because there is a three-year statute of limitations for setting aside the ?viSA and that ran in 2005,
well before Emerson died. This is a matter which could be addressed b~r the Idaho legislature in
order to give the Department more time within which to set aside the MSA. It is not a
justification for broadly interpreting the meaning of "estate" or amendir:g Idaho community
property law so the Department doesn't have to go through the process

~f setting

aside an MSA.

The Department further argues that it can't go back and void the MSA after the fact
because ti1at would render Vivian "ineligible" for benefits, meaning that she should never have
received benefits in the first place. That argument ignores the fact that LC. §56-218 (2)
specifically provides that any transfer of property without adequate consi.deration is "voidable"
not '''void''. A voidable contract is one in which the parties have the pO'Ncr to avoid the contract
13
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provisions, or they can ratify it and it will continue in effect. Robinson v State Farm Mut. Auto.

Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 1.73., J80,45 P.3d 829,836 (2002); Restatement (Sc·~ond) of Contracts, §7.
A void contract is one that is treated as if it never existed~ void ab initio The consequences of
voiding a voidabJe contract vary depending on the circumstances; thus, setting aside the MSA
would not necessarily retroactively affect benefits already paid to the recip:ent.
Moreover, 42 USC 1396p(c)(2)(B)(i), which governs asset transters for the purposes of
Medicaid reimbursement provides in part as i:allows:
(2) An individual shan not be ineligible for medlcal assistance b:r
reason of paragraph (1) to the extent that--

***

(B) the asset'l-·
(i) were transferred to the individual's spouse or to another for the
sole benefit of the individual's spouse,
This means a recipient is not ineligible for benefits by reason of having disposed of assets for

less than their fair market value to the extent that the assets were transfn:red to a spouse fOT the
spouse's benefit. That is exactly what l.e. §56-218 (2) is designed for -- it allows the State tJ set
aside transfers that lack consideration, and the transfer doesn't render the recipient ineligible for
benefits.

G.

Attorney fees
Both parties have asserted a right to attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code §12-117 which

provides as follows:
(l) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any
administrative proceedings or civil judicial proceeding
involving as adverse parties a state agency or political
subdivision and a person, the state agency or political
subdivision or the court, as the case may be, shall award the
prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fee~;
and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the
nonprevailing party acted 'without a reasonable basis in fact
or law.

14
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It is this Court's view that the questions presented by this appeal are difficult and complex,

involving interpretation of state and federal Medicaid benefits law. wllile this Court bas
concluded that the magistrate judge was correct in denying the Dcpartmt;nf s claim, the answer is
by no means simple or clear and both parties presented persuasive arglliL.ents regarding their

views of how the statutes and administrative rules should be interpreted. This is clearJy not a
situation where either party acted "without a reasonable basis in tact or law" and therefore, both
requests for attorneys fees on appeal are denied. The Respondent is entitled to its costs on
appeal.

IV. CONCLUSION
The burden is on the Department to assert a cognizable claim against Vivian and
Emerson's Estate and to support it by citation to some statute. The statl1tes must be clear that not
only can the Department collect from the recipient, Vivian, but ~hat ther:~'s a statutory basis for
claiming property of Emerson which would otherwise not be liable for 11ivian's debts under
Idaho's community property law. While Vivian's e5tate could have incuded property she
transmuted to Emerson utilizing I.e. §56-218 (2), that was not done in thls case. Broadening the
meaning of "estate" under Idaho law in order to reach Emerson's sepanlte property, or altering
accepted community property law, is not an alternative solution. to allo'\:{ recovery to the
Department. Based on the reasoning above~ the dedslon of the trial cour is AFFIRMED.

DATED this

d-day of July) 2011.
hd
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Deputy Attorney General
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Boise, ID 83720-0009
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Facsimile: (208) 334-6515
ISB No. 3361
cartvvriw@dhw.idaho.gov
ill THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIllRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, ill AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of the Estate Of:

)
)
)
)
)

Vivian Wiggins and Emerson D. Wiggins,
Deceased.

Case No. CV 2009-1926
NOTICE OF Al'PEAL

--------------------------))
State of Idaho, Department of Health and
Welfare,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
Lynn Wiggins, Personal Representative of
the Estate of Vivian Wiggins and Emerson
D. Wiggins,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

-------------------------)
TO: Lynn Wiggins, Personal Representative and his Attorney, R. Bra 1 Masingill, Esq., and to
the Clerk of the above Entitled Court:

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1

Y:\i\1RCaseslEstate\WCc\WCC Open Cases\Wigg' lSV\Supreme Court\i"<otice of Appeal.wpd

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare (hf~;~eihafter "the

Department"), appeals to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Decision on Appeal,
filed on the 20th day of July, 2011, Honorable Linda Copple Trout, Seni')r District Judge,
presiding.
2.

The Department has the right to appeal to the Supreme Court, and the judgment or

order described in paragraph 1 is appealable under and pursuant to Ru1es 11(a)(2) and 11(b),
Idaho Appellate Ru1es, and Idaho Code § 17-201(7).
3.

The issues on appeal include, but may not be limited to:

a.

Mether the Magistrate erred in its application and interpretation of Idaho Code

§ 56-218, in refusing to allow the Department's claim against assets whkh had been community
property, but had become the separate property of Emerson Wiggins.
b.

Mether the Magistrate erred in holding that Idaho Code § 56-218(1) - which

authorizes recovery from the estate of the spouse where the assets had been community property,
or had been the property of the Medicaid spouse - is preempted by fedemllaw.
4.

No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record.

5.

(a)

A reporter's transcript is requested.

(b)

The Department requests the preparation of the fonowing portions oftlJ.e

reporter's transcript: The standard transcript supplemented by:
1.

Oral argument presented to the district court at th,:;, hearing held February

8,2011 at 1:30 p.m.

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2

Y:\MRCases\Estate\WCC\WCC Open Cases\Wiggi 1SV\3upreme Court\Notice of AppeaLwpd

Oral argument presented to the magistrate divisioJ at the hearing held

ii.

February 3, 2010, at 11:00 a.m.

6.

The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's

record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.

o.

Claim Against Estate (11/23/2009)
Demand For Notice (11/23/2009)
Objection to Final Settlement (11/23/2009)
Notice of Disallowance of Claim (1113012009)
Inventory Schedules (11130/2009)
Petition for Allowance of Claim (12/0112009)
Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance (12/0112009)
Reply Brief (02/03/2010)
Response to March 15,2010 Memorandum (03/25/2010)
Memorandum Decision Denying Petitioner's Claim Against the Estate
(03/30/2010)
Notice of Appeal (04/0712010)
Appellant's Brief (09/17/2010)
Respondent's Brief (10/22/2010)
Appellant's Reply Brief (1111512010)
Memorandum Decision on Appeal (0712012011)

7.

Not applicable.

8.

I certify:

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
1.

J.
k.
L
m.
n.

(a)

That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the reporter.

(b)

That the clerk of the district court has been contacted and arrangements

have been made to have the court reporter bill this office for preparation of transcripts of the
hearings dated February 8, 2011 and February 3,2010.
(c)

That the appellant is exempt from paying the estirna:~ed fee for the

preparation of the record pursuant to Idaho Code § 31-3212.

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3

Y:\ivfRCaseslEstate\WCC\WCC Open Cases\Wiggi 1SV'Supreme Court\Notice of Ap,eaLwpd

(d)

That the appellant is exempt from paying the appc:l1a!e filing fee purSUB..lt

to Idaho Code § 67-2301.

(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant

to Rule 20.
DATED this 25th day of August, 2011.
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Vi.C9REYCART~GHT---------

Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing doct:ment was mailed,
postage pre-paid, to the following:
LYNN WIGGINS
C/O R BRAD MASINGILL
ATTORNEY AT LAW
PO BOX 467
WEISER ID 83672
CAROLE BULL
CANYON COUNTY COURTHOUSE
COURT REPORTER
1115 ALBANY ST
CALDWELL ID 83605
DATED this Q5Jay of August, 2011.

,n
)~~
~secre;Y
Contracts and Administratlve Law Division
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R. BRAD M.A..8INGILL
Attorney at Law
27 'V. Commercial Street
P.O. Box 467

Weiser, Idaho 83672
Telephone (208) 414-0665
Fax (208) 414-0490
email bmasin2ill(@.hotmail.com

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIDRD JUDICIAL OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATES OF:
VIVIAN M. WIGGINS and
El\'IERSON D. WIGGINS,
Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.:

CV-2r~09-1926

NOTICE OF CPOSS-APPEAL

----------------------------))
STATE OF IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND WELFARE,

)
)
)
Petitioner/Appellant,
)
)
vs
)
)
LYNN WIGGINS, PERSONAL
)
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF )
VIVIAN GGINS AND El\'IERSON D.
)
WIGGINS,
)
Respondent/Cross-Appellant)

TO: The State of Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, and its Attorneys, Lawrence G.
Wasden, S. Kay Christensen, W. Corey Cartwright, and the Clerk of the above Entitled Court.

Notice of cross-AP7.al - 1
1)0'0·
'1 '1
UV ;'~~£"X

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
L The above entitled estates, by and through their attorney of record, R. Brad Masingill,
of Weiser, Idaho, hereby cross-appeal the Department of Health and Welfare's
Appeal filed on August 25 th , 2011. This Cross-Appeal i:, only for the denial of
Attorney's Fees and Costs to pursuant to Idaho Code 12-121 [md Idaho Code 12-117.

2. The above entitled estates, by through their attorney of reGord, R. Brad Masingill
appeals to the Idaho Supreme court from the Memorandum Decision on Appeal, filed
on the 20 th day of July 2011, Honorable Linda Copple Trout, Senior District Judge
presiding.

3. The above estates have the right to appeal to the Supreme Court, and judgment or
order described in paragraph 1 is appealable under and pun,uant to Rules 11 (a) (2)
and 11 (b), Idaho Appellate Rules, and Idaho Code § 17-20 I}).

4. The title of the Court to which the cross-appeal is taken is th: Idaho Supreme Court.
5. The Estate cross-appeals regarding the decision denying an award of Attorneys Fees
by the Magistrate Court and the District Court. The two decisions of the Magistrate
Court and the one decision of the District Court are: (a) tha: Order on Attorney Fees
filed June 23, 2010 (and therein only that portion of the der::ision which failed to
award attorney's fees to the Estate) and (b) that Order Re: il.ttorney's,Fees and Costs
filed on April 30, 2010, and (c) the Memoralidum Decisior all Appeal filed on July
20,2011.
6. This cross appeal is taken upon matters of fact and law.

7. This matter was heard at District Court by oral argument on :february 8, 2011 at 1:30

p.m.
8. The issues on cross-appeal are:
a. Did the District Court err in failing to grant the Esta,;;s their attorney's fees
pursuant to Idaho Code 12-121?
b. Did the District Court err in failing to grant the Estates their attorney's fees
pursuant to Idaho Code 12-117?
9. The basis for the right to cross-appeal derives from the appeal taken by the Appellant
and from the one order of the District Court denying attorney's fees to the Estates.
10. Cross-Appellant will pay the costs of the transcript when made available and will pay
the estimated costs thereof when an estimate is made availal:1e. The Cross-Appellant
requests the entire transcript of the proceedings to the extent they are not already
included in the Appellant's request. It is unnecessary to duplicate the transcript,
however, the Cross-Appellant wants the transcript of the hearing on April 21, 2010 to
be included as well as all briefing done on both sides throughout the entire case, not
just the briefing relative to the attorney's fees issues as presented at the April 21,
2010 hearing, but to include the subsequent briefing on the issue of the applicability

of Idaho Code 12-117, which was referenced in the June 23. 2010 Order on Attorney
Fees and in the Order Re: Attorney's Fees and Costs filed April 30, 2010.
11. Additional Transcript: The Cross-Appellant further requests :hat the stipulation put on
the record on February 26, 2010 and the entire transcript of :hat hearing be made part
of the record.

12. Designation of documents to be included in clerk's recc,d: In addition to ul0se

documents automatically included in the record pursuant to I\R 28, and in addition to
those designated by the Appellant in the original Notice of A)peal shall be as follows:
The Cross-Appellant requests that all filings in the Magistrate case be included in the
record, including all motions, all memorandums, all briefs., all affidavits, including
~

but not limited to the following:
a~j

Notice of Disallowance of Claim dated November 24,201')9; and

b.~Memorandum in Support of Denial of Lien Against Emerson D. Wiggins'

Property dated January 29,2010; and
c. :iResponsive Memorandum in Support of Denial of Lim Against Emerson D.
Wiggins' Property dated February 2,2010; and
d. ~Supplementary Post-Hearing Memorandum Re: Legisative History of Idaho
Code 56-218 dated February 8, 2010; and
~e.

Affidavit of Peter Sisson filed May 05,2010; and

f.~ Affidavit of Counsel In Support of Motion for Attcrney's Fees and Costs,

(

Including the Factors in IRCP 54 dated Apri16, 2010; anli
("

g. Plaintiffs First Supplemental Memorandum in Support (fthe Estate's Motion for
Attorney's Fees and Costs dated May 5, 2010; and

Memorandum in Opposition to Department's Motion fo' Stay re Attorney's Fees
dated April 20, 2010; and

i. il:. Memorandum in Opposition to the Department's Motion to Stay dated April 9,
2010; and
j. ",)Memorandum in Support of the Estate's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs
.
dated April 6, 2010; and

Reply to Department's March 18 Memorandum dated MITch 31, 2010; and

)

l. .JFirst Supplemental Post-Hearing Memorandum Re: Esta.te of George D. Perry,
Ada County Case No. CVIE0905214 dated March 15, 20i 0; and
m::>Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs dated April 6, 201 C,

13. Cross-Appellant further requests that the transcript of the apfeal hearing from District
Court of February 8, 2011 be part of the record.
14'?Respondent's Brief to the District Court dated October 22nd, 2010.
15~Cross-Appellant

further requests the Notice of Augmentatior. and or Supplementation

of Respondent's Brief Pursuant to IAR 34(f)(1) dated the 21"1 day of March, 2011.

16:::Cross-Appellant further requests that the Memorandum Dedsion on Appeal by the
Honorable Linda Copple Trout on July 20th , 2011 to be part )fthe record.
17. Appellant further agrees to pay any cost of preparation of the clerk's record or the
transcript as required by law when such is submitted.
18. Cross-Appellant requests attorney fees and costs on appeal, .n addition to those at the
lower levels.

DATED this

I 3fJ, day of September, 2011.

A_~_"'--------",--(
M~gill

;1

Aijf..ad

Attorney for the Respondent!
Cross-Appella 1t

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

f~

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT on the /3 Hay of September, 2011, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Notice of Cross-Appeal was sent via facsimib and mailed by regular
United States mail, postage prepaid thereon to the following:

Lynn Wiggins
1520 W. 2nd Street
Weiser, ID 83672

Idaho Department of Health and Welfare
c/o Corey Cartwright
State of Idaho
Office of Attorney General

Human Services Division
3276 Elder, Ste B
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036

&~,~
Attorney f{lr the Respondentl
Cross-App ~lhmt

LA \VRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORl'ffiY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO
S. KAY CHRISTENSEN, ISB No. 3101
CHIEF, CONTRACTS Al'ID
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DIVISION
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT
Deputy Attorney General
3276 Elder, Ste. B
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0009
Telephone: (208) 332-7961
Facsimile: (208) 334-6515
ISB No. 3361
cartwriw@dhw.idaho.gov
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAl DISTRlCT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY or "VASHINGTON

In the Matter ofthe Estate Of:

)
)

Vivian Wiggins and Emerson D. Wiggins,
Deceased.

)
)
)

-------------------------))
State of Idaho, Department of Health and
Welfare,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
Lynn Wiggins, Personal Representative of
the Estate of Vivian Wiggins and Emerson
D. Wiggins,
Respondent.

Supreme Court Docket No. 39129-2011
Washington COt nt; Docket No.
2009-1926

REQUEST Fn~ ADDITIONAL
RECORD

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)

----------------------------)
TO: THE ABOVE NANffiD CROSS-APPELLANTS AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY,
AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT:
REQUEST FOR
i\DDITIONAL RECORD - 1

Y;IJvlRCases\Estate\WCC\WCC Open Cases\WigginsVlSuprerr j COur!\Request for Additional Recordwpd

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that the Cross-Respondent in the above !:ntitled proceeding
hereby requests pursuant to Rule 19, LA.R., the inclusion of the following material in the clerk's
record in addition to that required to be included by the LA.R. and the notice of appeaL
Additional clerk's record requested:
1.
4/20/2010
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dis:lllow Attorney Fees and
Costs
2.
4/30/2010
Order RE: Attorney Fees and Costs
5/19/2010
Post Hearing Memorandum RE: Idaho Code § 12-117
4.
Second Affidavit of W. Corey Cartwright
511912010
5.
Order on Attorney Fees
6123/2010
I certify that this request for additional record has been served upon the clerk of the
district court and upon the following parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20.

Lynn Wiggins,
CIO R. Brad Masingill, Attorney at Law, P.O. Box 467, '7Ieiser, ID 83672

DATED this 28th day of September, 2011.

jt/~;~~W. C~TWRIGflT
Deputy Attorney General

REQUEST FOR
ADDITIONAL RECORD - 2

Y:\MRCases\Estate\WCC\WCC Open Cases\Wigginsv\Supremt COllrt\Request for Additional Record.wpd

Clerk Dis!;!\:: Court

~;~ fuw o.pul"J
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIDRD JUDICl,(L DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF vVASIDNGTON

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF:
VIVIAN WIGGINS and
EMERSON D. WIGGINS,
Deceased.

)

Case No. ·=V-2009-1926

)
)

ORDER

)
)
)

)

------------------------~--)
This court having filed its Memorandum Decision on Appeal on July 20,2011;
NOW THEREFORE, for the reasons set for in the Memorandum Decision on Appeal, the
Memorandum Decision Denying Petitioner's Claim Against the Estate is l:ereby AFFIRMED.
ENTERED this

ORDER -1

b
L\~~(
day of ~~ ~hQ .V

2011,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing docr.lment was mailed,
postage pre-paid, to the following:
BRAD NIASINGILL
ATTORNEY AT LAW
PO BOX 467
ViEISER ID 83672
W COREY CARTWRIGHT
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
PO BOX 83720
BOISE ID 83720-0009
WASHINGTON COUNTY
APPEALS CLERK.

WASHINGTON COUNTY COURTHO{ rSE
256 EAST COURT
WEISER ID 83672-0670

HONORABLE GREGORY FRATES
NIAGISTRATE JUDGE
WASHINGTON COUNTY COURTHOI.TSE
256 EAST COURT
"VEISER ID 83672-0670
DATED this

~~day of~~~~r, 201l.
~ ~ ~ J. ~W""",--eJ_
~ty Cl~rk of the Distril:t Court

ORDER-2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I do hereby certifY that a certified copy of the Order in C33e No. CV 2009-01926,
Supreme Court Docket No. 39129-2011, was mailed delivered this 31 st day of October 2011, to the
following persons:

Idaho Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0101
Attorney General
State ofIdaho
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720

BETTY J. THOMAE
Clerk of the District Court
-r

By~I~J
Dept ty Clerk

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

1

LA"VRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO

S. KAY CHRISTENSEN, ISB No. 3101
CHIEF, CONTRACTS AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DIVISION
W.COREYCART~GHT

Deputy Attorney General
3276 Elder, Ste. B
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0009
Telephone: (208) 332-7961
Facsimile: (208) 334-6515
ISB No. 3361
camvriw@dhw.idaho.gov
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Estate Of:
Vivian Wiggins and Emerson D. Wiggins,
Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2009-1926
Al\1ENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

------------------------~))
State ofIdaho, Department of Health and
Welfare,
Petitioner-Appellant,

)
)
)
)

vs.

)
)

Lynn Wiggins, Personal Representative of
the Estate of Vivian Wiggins and Emerson
D. Wiggins,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)

------------------------)
TO: Lynn Wiggins, Personal Representative and his Attorney, R. Brai Masingill, Esq., and to
the Clerk of the above Entitled Court:

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPKL\L - 1
Y:\.lvlRCases\Estate\WCC\WCC Open Cases\WigginsVlSupreme Court\Ac\:ffit;'I?ED Notice of Appeabvpd

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare (h:reinafter "the

Department"), appeals to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Order on appeal, filed on the 25th
day of October, 2011, Honorable Linda Copple Trout, Senior District Judge, presiding.
2.

The Department has the right to appeal to the Supreme Court, and the judgment or

order described in paragraph 1 is appealable under and pursuant to Rules 11 (a)(2) and 11 (b),
Idaho Appellate Rules, and Idaho Code § 17-201(7).
3.

The issues on appeal include, but may not be limited to:

a.

Whether the Magistrate erred in its application and interp ~etation ofIdaho Code

§ 56-218, in refusing to allow the Department's claim against assets whi ~h had been commurdty

property, but had become the separate property of Emerson Wiggins.
b.

Whether the Magistrate erred in holding that Idaho Code § 56-218(1) - which

authorizes recovery from the estate of the spouse where the assets had h!eI1. community property,
or had been the property of the Medicaid spouse - is preempted by federal law.
4.

No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record.

5.

(a)

A reporter's transcript is requested.

(b)

The Department requests the preparation of the f( Howing portions of the

reporter's transcript: The standard transcript supplemented by:
1.

Oral argument presented to the district court at th~ hearing held February

8,2011 at 1:30 p.m.
11.

Oral argument presented to the magistrate divisio n at the hearing held

February 3, 2010, at 11:00 a.m.
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2
Y:\,\1RCasesIEstateIWCO,WCC Open Cases\WigginsV\Supreme Court\AMENDED Notice of AppeaJ.wpd

6.

The appellant requests the following documents to be inc luted in the clerk's

record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, LA.R.

m.
n.
o.

Claim Against Estate (11123/2009)
Demand For Notice (11123/2009)
Objection to Final Settlement (1112312009)
Notice of Disallowance of Claim (11130/2009)
Inventory Schedules (1113012009)
Petition for Allowance of Claim (12101/2009)
Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance (12/0112009)
Reply Brief (02/03/2010)
Response to March 15,2010 Memorandum (03/25/2010)
Memorandum Decision Denying Petitioner's Claim Against the Estate
(03/3012010)
Notice of Appeal (04/07/2010)
Appellant's Brief (09/17/20 10)
Respondent's Brief (10122/2010)
Appellant's Reply Brief (11115/20 10)
Memorandum Decision on Appeal (07120/2011)

7.

Not applicable.

8.

I certify:

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
1.

J.
k.

1.

(a)

That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the reporter.

(b)

That the clerk of the district court has been contacted and arrangements

have been made to have the court reporter bill this office for preparation of transcripts of the
hearings dated February 8, 2011 and February 3,2010.
(c)

That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the

preparation of the record pursuant to Idaho Code § 31-3212.
(d)

That the appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee pursuant

to Idaho Code § 67-2301.

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3
Y:\MRCasesIEstateIWCClWCC Open CaseslWigginsVlSupreme Court\AMENDED Notice of AppeaLwpd

(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pUrSUllijt

to Rule 20.
DATED this 27th day of October, 2011.
.

,

~

,:----A--

/"

~J

---

~C~W1UG~r---------Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed,
postage pre-paid, to the following:
LYNN WIGGINS
C/O R BRAD MASINGILL
ATTORNEY AT LAW
PO BOX 467
WEISER ID 83672
CAROLE BULL
CANYON COUNTY COURTHOUSE
COURT REPORTER
1115 ALBANY ST
CALDWELL ID 83605
DATED thlsd:1 day of October, 2011.

~I

~.~
<

Dawn Phipps, Legal Secretary
Contracts and Administrati ve Law Division

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4
y:\t\1RCasesIEstate\WCc\WCC Open Cases\WigginsV\Supreme Court\At\1ENDED Notice of AppeaLwpd

R. BRAD lVIASINGILL
Attorney at Law
27 "V. Commercial Street
P.O. Box 467
Weiser, Idaho 83672
Telephone (208) 414-0665
Fax (208) 414-0490
email bmasingill(a)hotmaiI.com
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATES OF:

)

Case No.: CV-2009-1926

)

VIVIAN M. WIGGINS and

)
) AMENDED NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL
)

EMERSON D. 'WIGGINS,

)

Deceased.

)

-----------------------------))
STATE OF IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND WELFARE,

)
)
)

Petitioner/Appellant,

)
)

vs.

)
)

LYNN WIGGINS, PERSONAL
)
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF )
VIVIAN WIGGINS AND EMERSON D.
)
WIGGINS,
)
Respondent/Cross-Appellant)

TO: The State of Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, and its Attorneys, Lawrence G.
Wasden., S. Kav
. Christensen, W. Corey Cartwright, and the Clerk ofthi: above Entitled Court.
'

Amended Notice ofCross-Appea! - 1

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1. The above entitled estates, by and through their attorney of record, R. Brad Masingill,
of Weiser, Idaho, hereby cross-appeal the Department

l)f

Health and Welfare's

Amended Appeal filed on 27th day of October, 2011. This Amended Cross-Appeal is
only for the denial of Attorney's Fees and Costs to pursucnt to Idaho Code 12-121
and Idaho Code 12-117.

2. The above entitled estates, by through their attorney of r ::cord, R. Brad Masingill
appeals to the Idaho Supreme court from the Memorandum Decision on Appeal, filed
on the 20th day of July 2011, Honorable Linda Copple Trout, Senior District Judge
presiding.

3. The above estates have the right to appeal to the Supreme Court, and judgment or
order described in paragraph 1 is appealable under and pursuant to Rules 11 (a) (2)
and 11 (b), Idaho Appellate Rules, and Idaho Code § 17-201 (7).

4. The title of the Court to which the cross-appeal is taken is the Idaho Supreme Court.

5. The Estate cross-appeals regarding the decision denying an award of Attorneys Fees
by the Magistrate Court and the District Court. The two d'~cisions of the Magistrate
Court and the one decision of the District Court are: (a) thLt Order on Attorney Fees
filed June 23, 2010 (and therein only that portion of the decision which failed to
award attorney's fees to the Estate) and (b) that Order Re: Attorney's Fees and Costs

-2

filed on April 30, 2010, and (c) the Memora11dum Decisio:l on Appeal filed on July
20,2011.

6. This amended cross-appeal is taken upon matters of fact ane law.

7. This matter was heard at District Court by oral argument or. February 8, 2011 at 1:30
p.m.

8. The issues on the amended cross-appeal are:
a. Did the District Court err in failing to grant the Estates their attorney's fees

pursuant to Idaho Code 12-121?

b. Did the District Court err in failing to grant the Estates their attorney's fees
pursuant to Idaho Code 12-117?

9. The basis for the right to cross-appeal derives from the appeal taken by the Appellant
and from the one order of the District Court denying attorney's fees to the Estates.

10. Cross-Appellant will pay the costs of the transcript when made available and will pay

the estimated costs thereof when an estimate is made available. The Cross-Appellant
requests the entire transcript of the proceedings to the extent they are not already
included in the Appellant's request.

It is unnecessary to duplicate the transcript,

however, the Cross-Appellant wants the transcript of the hearing on April 21, 2010 to
be included as well as all briefing done on both sides throughout the entire case, not

2011-11-10 00:47

208 414 0490 »

R. Brad Masingil,PA

414 3925 P 2/2

just the bdefmg relative to the attorney's fees issues as presented at the April 21,
2010 hearing, but to inelude the subsequent briefing on the issue of the applicability
of Idaho Code 12·117, which was referenced in the June 23, 2;) 10 Order on Attorney
Fees and in the Order Re: Attorney's Fees and Costs filed April 30,2010.

11. Additional Transcript: The Cross-Appellant further requests that the stipulation put on
the record on February 3, 2010 and the entire transcript of that hearing be made part

of the record.

12. Designation of documents to be included in clerk's record: In addition to those

documents automatically included in the record pursuant to IAR 28, and in addition to
those designated by the Appellant in the original Notice of App,~al shall be as follows:
The Cross-Appellant rcques+t.S that all filings in the MagistraTe case be included in the
record, including all

motions~

all memorandums, all briefs, a] affidavits, including

but not limited to the following:
9.

Notice of Disallowance of Claim dated November 24,20)9; and

b. Memorandum in Support of Denial of Lien Against Emerson D. Wiggins'
Property dated January 29,2010; and

c. Responsive Memorandum in Support of Denial of Lien Against Emerson D.
Wiggins' Property dated February 2,2010; and
d. Supplementary Post-Hearing Memorandum Re: Legis[atlve History of Idaho

Code 56·218 dated February 8, 2010; and
c. Affidavit of Peter Sisson filed May 05, 2010; and

Amended Notice of Cross-Appeal· 4

f.

Affidavit of Counsel In Support of Motion for Att)mey's Fees and Costs,
Including the Factors in IRCP 54 dated April 6, 2010; ard

g. Plaintiffs First Supplemental Memorandum in Support )fthe Estate's Motion for
Attorney's Fees and Costs dated May 5, 2010; and
h. Memorandum in Opposition to Department's Motion fer Stay re Attorney's Fees
dated April 20, 2010; and
i.

Memorandum in Opposition to the Department's Moti)n to Stay dated April 9,
2010; and

j. Memorandum in Support of the Estate's Motion for p,ttorney's Fees and Costs
dated April 6, 2010; and
k. Reply to Department's March 18 Memorandum dated March 31,2010; and
l.

First Supplemental Post-Hearing Memorandum Re: E3tate of George D. Perry,
Ada County Case No. CVIE0905214 dated March 15,2010; and

m. Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs dated April 6, 2010.

13. Cross-Appellant further requests that the transcript of the appeal hearing from District
Court of February 8, 2011 be part of the record.

14. Respondent's Brief to the District Court dated October 22nd, 2010.

15. Cross-Appellant further requests the Notice of Augmentatie,n and or Supplementation
of Respondent's Brief Pursuant to IAR 34(f)(1) dated the 21 st day of March, 2011.

16. Cross-Appellant further requests that the Memorandum Decision on Appeal by the
Honorable Linda Copple Trout on July 20th , 2011 to be part of the record.

"<~,, .. rlUllIC'"

-
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17. Appelllli'1t further agrees to pay any cost of preparation

the clerk's record or the

transcript as required by law when such is submitted.

18. Cross-Appellant requests attorney fees and costs on appeaL in addition to those at the
lower levels.

nf(\

DATED this _'""_I day of November, 2011.

R. Brad Ma ItgiIL----Attorney for the Respondent/
Cross-Appellant

Amended Notice of Cross-Appeal- 6

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT on the gtnday of November, 2011, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Notice of Cross-Appeal was sent via facsimie and mailed by regular
United States mail, postage prepaid thereon to the following:

Lynn Wiggins
1520 W. 2nd Street
Weiser, ID 83672

Idaho Department of Health and Welfare
c/o Corey Cartwright
State of Idaho
Office of Attorney General
Human Services Division
3276 Elder, Ste B
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036

!Y~llJ:..J;J
R. Brad M~singm
Attorney f,i)r the Respondent/
Cross-Appellant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of the Estate of:

Vivian Wiggins and Emerson D. Wiggins,
Deceased.
State of Idaho, Department of Health and
Welfare,
Petitioner-Appellant,

vs.
Lynn Wiggins, Personal Representative of
The Estate of Vivian Wiggins and Emerson
D. Wiggins,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)

Supreme Court Case No. 39129

)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE TO
THE RECORD AND EXHIBITS

------------------------------)
I, Betty Thomas, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for Washington County, do hereby certify that the foregoing
Clerk's Record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction
and contains true and correct copies of all pleadings, documents and papers designated
to be included under Rule 28, I.A.R. of the Idaho Appellate Rules, the Notice of Appeal,
the Notice of Cross-Appeal, the Amended Notice of Appeal, and the Amended Notice of
Cross-Appeal.
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE TO
THE RECORD AND EXHIBITS

I certify that there were no exhibits which were marked for identification and
admitted into evidence during the course of this action.
I further certify that the additional document being a copy of the Affidavit of Peter
Sisson, filed 05/05/2010, is included in this Record on Appeal.
I submit the transcript of the February 3, 2010, hearing as requested in the
Amended Notice of Appeal and the transcript of the April 21, 2010, hearing as
requested in the Amended Notice of Cross-Appeal.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed by official
seal this :J.)",j day of

/l/?ue rnher

, 2011.

, Clerk of th€~ District Court

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE TO
THE RECORD AND EXHIBITS

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Estate of:

)
)

Vivian Wiggins and Emerson D. Wiggins,

)

Deceased.

)
)
)

State of Idaho, Department of Health and
Welfare,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
Lynn Wiggins, Personal Representative of
The Estate of Vivian Wiggins and Emerson
D. Wiggins,
Respondent.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court Case No. 39129

)
)
)
)

---------------------------)
I, BETTY J. THOMAS, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Washington, do hereby
certify that I have personally served or mailed, by United State8 Mail, one copy of
the CLERK'S RECORD and one copy of the REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT(S) to
each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:

R. Brad Masingill
Attorney at Law
P. O. Box 467
Weiser, Idaho 83672
Attorney for Respondent

Lawrence Wasden
IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
Attorney for Petitioner-Appellant

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed
the seal of said Court this

3 / ~+

day of

Ie}

11(( C{

""1

' 2011.

BETTY J. THOMAS
Clerk of the District Court

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

